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letter from 
the editor
This is an exciting time for China scholars 
as the country continues to undergo major 
transformations in its domestic and interna-
tional spheres. Within the last year, China 
has founded a major international financial 
institution even as its economic growth rate 
has fallen to just above 6 percent. At the 
same time, we have witnessed an escala-
tion in hostilities in the South China Sea 
between China and its neighbors as well as 
increased tensions between China and the 
United States over cybersecurity. While no 
one journal can hope to capture all of these 
fascinating developments, we are pleased 
to present the second edition of the China 
Studies Review as a showcase of student 
scholarship at the Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies and hope 
it will further the understanding of China’s 
opportunities and challenges.
In our first section, we introduce three 
short pieces that examine important 
issues in U.S.-China investment relations, 
public opinion in China and Japan, and 
the Hong Kong pro-democracy move-
ment. Benjamin Pollock examines the 
progression of negotiations between the 
United States and China in adopting a 
high-quality bilateral investment treaty. 
Cheng Zhang uses data from Genron to 
understand the reasons behind mutual dis-
trust between China and Japan. Adrienne 
Dalton looks at the role of Hong Kong triads 
in the suppression of the 2014 Hong Kong 
pro-democracy demonstrations.
Our second section features six research 
articles covering a wide range of topics. 
Jakob Bund explores U.S.-China relations 
in cyberspace and provides an alternative 
framework by which the two countries can 
cooperate in the absence of trust. Patrick 
Lozada discusses China’s “creative indus-
tries”, and the shortcomings of China’s 
creative special economic zones in foster-
ing an innovation economy. David Rubin 
builds upon Bruce Gilley’s spectrum of 
democratic and authoritarian environ-
mentalism and finds that in the context 
of environmental policymaking, China is 
transitioning towards more inclusivity and 
grassroots engagement. Peter Kim also 
examines China’s environmental policy and 
uses dust and sandstorms, also known as 
“yellow dust”, to examine the challenges 
and opportunities for environmental coop-
eration in Northeast Asia. Shuxian Luo 
conducts a comparative analysis of China 
and India’s naval modernization efforts, 
noting that while China’s rapid economic 
development has spurred its naval modern-
ization at a more rapid pace, there are other 
important elements such as differing threat 
perceptions and alliance options that help 
to explain India’s relative lag in naval mod-
ernization. Finally, Winston Kung presents 
a Taiwan Straits crisis scenario analysis that 
examines the legal, diplomatic, strategic, 
and domestic opinion factors that would 
likely affect a U.S. response, concluding 
that U.S. diplomatic and military leverage 
would eventually lead China and Taiwan to 
de-escalate tensions in the region.
We in the China Studies program are excited 
to have this opportunity to showcase student 
work on China’s domestic developments and 
evolving foreign policy. I would like to take 
this opportunity to thank our staff editors 
and writers for their enthusiasm and hard 
work in making this publication a reality and 
to our faculty advisor, Carla Freeman, for 
her ongoing support of the Review. 
Natalie Lynch 
Washington, D.C.
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Potential Gains 
from a U.S.-
China Bilateral 
Investment Treaty
Benjamin Pollok
Since 2013, negotiations between the 
United States and China on a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) have made incre-
mental progress. A high quality BIT, based 
principally on the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, 
could be mutually beneficial and would 
represent a substantial step in China’s 
liberalization of market access for foreign 
investors. If negotiations are successful, the 
BIT will broaden two-way streams of invest-
ment and equip U.S. investors with greater 
legal protections and transparency. 
Of the two countries, the U.S. has the most 
to gain from a binding, high quality invest-
ment treaty. Countries with their own BITs 
with China have greater opportunities for 
investment, including greater access to 
the manufacturing, service and financial 
sectors. In 2015, the U.S. held a meager 
1.2 percent of total foreign investments in 
China. 1 A high quality BIT would address 
many of the key concerns that prevent U.S. 
investors from entering the Chinese market. 
Namely, the BIT would open previously 
inaccessible industries for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in China and potentially 
ease China’s controversial law requiring 
U.S. firms to partner with domestic firms 
in “joint ventures”.
While the proposed U.S.-China BIT is a 
major departure from China’s existing 
bilateral and regional BITs, it marks the 
next logical step in China’s broader trade 
liberalization process. China’s 107 existing 
BITs all operate on a “positive list”, which 
delineates the specific industries in which 
foreign firms can invest. This is the first Chi-
nese BIT that will function on the basis of a 
“negative list”, meaning that U.S. firms will 
be able to invest directly in all industries 
except those explicitly listed as exempt 
from international investment.
Though some critics have questioned Chi-
na’s ability to agree and adhere to a high 
quality BIT, over the past few years there 
have been positive indications of China’s 
willingness to create more robust invest-
ment agreements. Preceding their trilateral 
Free Trade Agreement, in 2012 China, 
Japan and Korea signed an investment 
treaty. This agreement was China’s most 
ambitious investment treaty yet. The U.S.-
China BIT would go further in expanding 
market access, meaning that U.S. investors 
would enjoy the broadest array of invest-
ment opportunities of any foreign investors 
in China.
Further economic integration may also 
strengthen U.S.-China diplomatic relations, 
and greater clarity in investment regula-
tions and dispute settlements may reduce 
the political friction that has resulted from 
a mutual lack of transparency. The BIT 
could even provide a launching point for 
an eventual bilateral trade agreement, or 
China’s integration into the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).
China’s slowing economic performance 
may provide an opportunity for expe-
dited negotiations over the coming year. 
In light of China’s increasingly ambitious 
BITs in recent years and its desire for a 
U.S.-China BIT as an economic stimulus, an 
opportunity for a high quality U.S.-China BIT 
has never been greater. With the Obama 
administration’s designation of the U.S.-
China relationship as “a top priority”,  2 
the U.S. should take advantage of China’s 
stagnation as an opportunity to expedite 
BIT negotiations.
About the Author
Benjamin Pollok is a second year SAIS stu-
dent concentrating in China Studies. After 
graduating from Colgate University in 2011, 
Ben worked for several years in interna-
tional education, first for Peking University 
and then for CET Academic Programs. In 
the summer of 2016, Ben interned at the 
Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy 
in Beijing.
1  Toward a US-China Investment Treaty,  
Peterson Institute for International Economics,  
PIEE Briefing 151, February 2015, 3.
2  The White House Office of the Press Secretary. 
“Fact Sheet: U.S.- China Economic Relations.” 
September 15, 2015.
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Shifting Public 
Attitudes in 
Japan and China 
in the Twenty-
First Century
Cheng Zhang 
Since the normalization of relations in the 
1970’s, the relationship between Japan 
and China has experienced periods of 
close cooperation and high tension. Joint 
public opinion polls conducted by the 
Japanese Public Opinion Research Insti-
tute Corporation (Genron NPO) and the 
Chinese newspaper China Daily found 
that public attitudes in both countries have 
been predominantly negative during the 
twenty-first century. 1 This piece examines 
public opinion data from Genron NPO and 
China Daily and areas for increased mutual 
understanding between the two countries. 
In China, public opinion polls conducted 
from 2000 to 2014 demonstrated predom-
inantly negative attitudes towards Japan. 
Public opinion data from Genron NPO and 
China Daily showed that although public 
opinion on both sides was more favorable 
from 2006 to 2008, negative impressions 
spiked in 2009 and again in 2013 and 2014. 
Japanese attitudes towards China were 
noticeably influenced by anti-Japanese 
demonstrations in China in the early 2000s, 
with negative impressions growing steadily 
after 2006. 2 Unfavorable attitudes in Japan 
spiked again in 2013 and 2014, which cor-
responded with a wave of anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China. 
Reasons for negative impressions are sim-
ilar in the two countries. First, both the 
Japanese and the Chinese respondents 
agree that one another’s actions over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are unacceptable. 
Almost 48.4 percent of Japanese Genron 
respondents stated that they expected the 
two countries to approach the issues by 
negotiating rather than through military 
means (2014; 2013, 49.1 percent). 3 Crit-
icism from Chinese respondents mainly 
focused on the unilateral actions of the 
Japanese government in claiming admin-
istrative control over the disputed islands.
Disagreement on how history should be 
treated is another major reason behind 
the negative public attitudes in Japan 
and China. Around 56 percent of Jap-
anese respondents believed that both 
China’s criticism of Japan’s past acts and 
China’s curriculum were too subjective 
and nationalistic. 4 In 2013 this figure rose 
to 58.6 percent of respondents. 5 Corre-
spondingly, in 2013 almost 61 percent of 
Chinese respondents declared that Japan 
must recognize and apologize for its past 
aggressions towards China. 6
Other reasons related to pressures associ-
ated with regional security concerns also 
contributed to the negative feelings in 
both countries. For the Japanese respon-
dents, the perception of China as a military 
threat to the region increased from 61.8 
percent in 2013 to 64.3 percent in 2014. 7 
For Chinese respondents, more than half 
believed that Japan’s military cooperation 
with the United States is an attempt to con-
tain China. 8
Despite the predominantly negative per-
ceptions in the early part of the twenty-first 
century, increased interaction between Jap-
anese and Chinese citizens has the potential 
to improve mutual perceptions. The recent 
increase in tourism in both directions, par-
ticularly Chinese tourists visiting Japan, has 
promoted understanding between Chinese 
and Japanese people, with Chinese tourists 
expressing positive impression of Japan after 
their travels. 9 Cultural exchanges on litera-
ture, movies and popular culture can also 
assist older and younger audiences to better 
understand Chinese and Japanese cultures.
About the Author
 Cheng Zhang is a second year Japan Stud-
ies concentrator at SAIS. Her academic 
interests include Japan-China relations 
and Northeast Asian regional collaboration, 
including diplomatic communication, his-
torical reconciliation and cultural exchange. 
She is currently working on a research 
paper regarding historical revisionism and 
reconciliation in Japan since the 1980s, as 
well as major historical contentions with 
East Asian countries.
1   “The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll,” 
2014, 3.
2  Su-Jeong Kang, “Anti Japanese Popular Nation-
alism and China’s Approach Towards Japan 
amid Sino-Japanese Political Tension, 2001-
2006,” Springer Science and Business Media: 
East Asia (May 2013), 167.
3  “The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll,” 
2014, 26.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.
6  Ibid.
7  “The 10th”, 32.
8  Ibid.
9  Adam Minter, “Why Chinese Tourists Love 
Japan,” The Japan Times, March 27, 2015.
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Knife Attacks on 
Pro-Democracy 
Protesters Remind 
Hong Kong 
of the Triad’s 
Political Past 
Adrienne Dalton 
Hong Kong’s organized crime groups, 
known as triads, have a colorful history of 
interaction and interdependency with the 
government of mainland China.  In 1819, 
the triads established their first Hong 
Kong headquarters, and by 1988 the Brit-
ish estimated that one in twenty Hong 
Kong Chinese was affiliated with a triad. 1 
The years following Hong Kong’s admin-
istrative changeover from Great Britain to 
China in 1997 saw a significant decrease 
in triad activity throughout the city, with 
many believing that the groups moved to 
mainland China in search of more lucrative 
business opportunities. However, recent 
political unrest in Hong Kong has revived 
discussion of the political influence of the 
triads in the territory. 2
In 2014, pro-democracy student protest-
ers were attacked by dozens of masked 
assailants armed with knives and other 
weapons. 3 The scale and coordinated 
nature of the attacks suggested that 
organized crime groups were behind the 
violence. Police units in Hong Kong were 
observed permitting the masked assailants 
to escape arrest, and allowing anti-democ-
racy mobs to harass and beat protesters as 
they attempted to flee to safety. 4 Follow-
ing the incident, student protesters called 
off plans to meet with Hong Kong officials 
under the suspicion that the Hong Kong 
government had been cooperating with 
Beijing in order to silence the pro-democ-
racy movement.  
If it is true that Hong Kong triads committed 
these attacks in cooperation with the Chi-
nese Communist Party, this would not be 
the first time that the triads have involved 
themselves in politics. The triads are 
opportunistic organizations whose primary 
objectives are economic gain and financial 
stability, but at times, political associations 
have proved to be lucrative investments. 
For example, in 1949, triads assisted 
Chiang Kai-shek in fighting against the 
People’s Liberation Army, and in 1989, the 
triads assisted in smuggling more than one 
hundred pro-democracy protesters out of 
Beijing during the Tiananmen crackdown. 5 
During the 1997 administrative changeover 
in Hong Kong, many people believed that 
Beijing directly recruited the triads to help 
maintain social order and to ensure that 
the transition would occur seamlessly. 
When Beijing announced its intentions to 
select the candidates for Hong Kong’s 2017 
executive elections, and pro-democracy 
protesters subsequently filled the streets, 
the charged atmosphere mirrored the 
scene that preceded the 1997 administra-
tive changeover.  If Beijing’s “united front” 
tactic with the triads worked to suppress 
pro-Western support in 1997, then it is not 
implausible that Beijing would once again 
call upon the triads to provide vigilante 
street patrols in order to ensure that the 
election goes according to the Communist 
Party’s plan. 6
 
About the Author
Adrienne Dalton is a is a graduate of Johns 
Hopkins SAIS, where she concentrated in 
Strategic Studies. Her research and pro-
fessional interests include Chinese civil 
society, Chinese social issues and the law 
of war. In addition to her studies, she taught 
English language literature at a public 
high school in China, and has traveled 
extensively throughout Asia. She holds a 
Bachelor of Accountancy and French lan-
guage from Wofford College.
1  Benjamin T. Liu, Hong Kong Triad Societies 
Before and After the 1997 Changeover (Hong 
Kong: Net e-Publishing, 2001), 30-35.
2  Dan Levin, “Triad Links to Attacks on Protesters 
Raise Some Old Questions,” The New York 
Times, October 4, 2014.
3  Tom Phillips, “Masked Men Attack Hong Kong 
Democracy Protesters,” The Telegraph, October 
13, 2014.
4  Ishaan Tharoor, “Watch: When a Triad Mob 
Attacked Hong Kong’s Protesters,” The Wash-
ington Post, October 4, 2014.
5  Liu, 40-43.
6  T. Wing Lo, “Beyond Social Capital: Triad Orga-
nized Crime in Hong Kong and China,” British 
Journal of Criminology 50, no. 5 (September 
2010), 858-860.
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Limited Agreement, 
Maximized 
Trust: Assessing 
the Prospect 
for Effective 
U.S.-China 
Cybersecurity 
Cooperation
Jakob Bund 
Relations between the United States and 
China in cyberspace are routinely depicted 
in antagonistic terms. Ongoing interna-
tional controversy over the laws and norms 
of permissible peacetime behavior appli-
cable in the cyber domain leave China and 
the United States with few tools to manage 
disputes. These conditions increase both 
the probability and consequences of esca-
lating tensions between China and the 
United States. Differing interests between 
both countries, however, do not preclude 
cooperation but require a rethinking of the 
approach to cooperation – independent 
of trust as an input. This paper explores 
alternative opportunities for issue-specific 
cooperation that can produce tangible 
results in the absence of trust, with the 
potential of generating trust as an output. 
Non-cooperation entails rising costs of its 
own. China’s parochial practice of cyber 
diplomacy, which is reflective of an authori-
tarian government that is concerned about 
regime stability, tarnishes its ambition to 
establish a new type of major country rela-
tions with the United States. For the United 
States, the continuous economic loss from 
cyber-enabled espionage has reached a 
scale that threatens to upend the interna-
tional balance of power. Given the costs the 
United States and China incur for non-co-
operation, mitigating their impact depends 
on direct engagement between the two 
countries, outside of the frameworks of 
each country’s coalitions of convenience.
This paper assesses the prospects and 
challenges of U.S.-China cooperation 
on global cybersecurity. Cyberspace, 
unlike any other sphere of interaction, is 
defined by its global reach and ability to 
reach across borders. In this transnational 
environment, no single country is able to 
determine the security architecture for the 
entire digital domain. Likewise, unanimous 
consensus on cybersecurity issues in the 
global community is an unlikely scenario, 
given the wide divergence of competing 
normative proposals to fill the current 
international regulatory vacuum. Instead, 
coalitions between countries will take the 
leading role to win enough support to 
shape cyberspace security arrangements. 
How smooth this process will be depends 
in large part on the positions the United 
States and China adopt, as representa-
tives of opposite sides of the normative 
spectrum regarding the issue and vis-à-vis 
each other. The underlying challenges of 
managing competing conceptions are not 
new to the United States. But the inherent 
interconnectedness of cyberspace presets 
a mode of engagement and precludes 
patterns of containment. During the Cold 
War, relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union were governed by 
a rudimentary form of trust, expressed in 
the logic of mutually assured destruction. 
Trust, if only in the credibility of the oppo-
nent’s threat posture, facilitated negative 
cooperation between the two adversaries 
that effectively proscribed specific behav-
ior by imposing a prohibitive cost. 1 The 
security threats China and the United States 
confront in the current strategic environ-
ment increasingly emanate from global 
governance challenges.
Organic coalitions may emerge to mobilize 
cooperative behavior for shared bene-
fits and do not necessarily need to be 
formalized in official alliances. Cooperation 
is more likely to occur around issue-spe-
cific agreements that can nonetheless 
produce powerful spillover effects as their 
procedural dynamics take on a life of their 
own and constrain the parties’ immediate 
control over their implementation. It is this 
prospect that should encourage the United 
States to pursue a cooperative approach 
with China, even if the initial benefit may 
seem small.
To corroborate this recommendation, 
this study contrasts two scenarios: (1) an 
unyielding hard-bargaining strategy that 
prompts China to form a counter-coali-
tion, and (2) an integrative approach that 
emphasizes mutual benefits. This anal-
ysis borrows from Bobo Lo’s concept of 
the axis of convenience to gain a better 
understanding of why actors change their 
coalitions in an attempt to regain freedom 
of maneuver. 2
Axes of Convenience and 
Axes of Confidence
In his 2008 book “Axis of Convenience: 
Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopol-
itics”, 3 Bobo Lo characterizes relations 
between China and Russia as operating 
along an “axis of convenience”, in which 
both nations unite behind a mutual distrust 
of U.S. foreign policy decisions. Lo’s analysis 
contends that although China and Russia 
appear to have strong relations and seek 
to counter U.S. influence, this axis of con-
venience is not a sustainable foreign policy 
vehicle. China’s priority rests with restoring 
its international position of influence and 
consolidating domestic political authority. 
While Russia follows objectives similar to 
China’s, it claims spheres of influence with 
greater assertiveness, willingly risking open 
conflict. Russia’s confrontational approach 
has the potential to cause serious harm to 
China’s agenda, precisely because of per-
ceived parallels between the two countries’ 
aspirations.  Overemphasizing the partner-
ship component of Russia’s relations with 
China comes at Russia’s and the United 
States’ own peril. With strategic vision, Lo 
argues, the United States can foster better 
relations with both countries by extending 
opportunities to China and Russia for more 
cooperative engagement. 
Lo’s analysis is critical in understanding the 
role of the United States in promoting coop-
eration on cybersecurity issues. First, the 
United States needs to seize the initiative 
and extend opportunities for engagement 
to China to unhinge the axis. Second, the 
United States has to be aware of potential 
alienating effects of its policy that could 
cause others to join China’s camp. While 
Lo’s research focuses on Russia and China, 
Iran and other members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) might 
choose to bandwagon with China for the 
same reasons that led to the partnership 
with Russia – providing leverage China may 
use in its negotiations about the orientation 
of a coalition with the United States.
Although a coalition-driven approach 
towards addressing cybersecurity issues 
would provide many benefits, the United 
States and China have fundamentally dif-
ferent understandings and experiences 
with such cooperative alliances. The next 
section seeks to address these differences 
and offers a brief recapitulation of the cir-
cumstances under which each country has 
entered into alliances in the past.
Anatomy of Alliances
U.S. foreign policy is alliance-based in its 
conception. U.S. coalitions, whether with 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Japan or South Korea, have grown out 
of war-time experiences and therefore 
have a prominent military component 
built into them. The salience of military 
affairs, however, has also been the source 
of repeated conflict within the coalitions, 
revolving around concerns about automatic 
military responses that grow out of treaty 
responsibilities. Germany, in particular, has 
taken a reserved stance on the issue. The 
political climate in Japan has only recently 
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS 11
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changed to facilitate support missions 
for allies. Additionally, while France has 
expanded its air campaign against ISIL 
targets in response to the terrorist attacks 
in Paris on November 13, 2015, the rallying 
around the fundamental values of “liberté, 
egalité, fraternité” 4 in the aftermath of the 
incident render it questionable whether a 
move towards militarization of the global 
common cyberspace would find popular 
backing. In this sense, the hard bargaining 
position the United States has adopted with 
regard to South China Sea has the potential 
to splinter a coalition of its traditional allies 
when carried over to cyberspace. Assur-
ances about the intention to protect the 
openness of cyberspace notwithstanding, 
militarization of the cyber domain would 
raise enormous domestic challenges for 
U.S. allies.
Yet, the current situation in the South 
China Sea offers a case in point for how 
permeable the different areas of con-
flict are and how fluent the passage is 
between the traditional domain of the sea 
and the unconventional environment of 
cyberspace. In July 2015, while holding a 
hearing at the request of the Philippines to 
assess the validity of the nine-dash line that 
encompasses China’s maritime claims in the 
South China Sea, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague became the target 
of a cyber attack. The court’s website was 
shut down. 5 Circumstantial evidence gath-
ered from the larger geopolitical situation 
suggests the attack originated from China. 6 
This incident speaks to the increasing risk 
that adversaries in the region resort to out-
of-area provocation or retaliation, using 
cyber means to exert influence in sover-
eignty disputes in the South and East China 
Sea. Benign network disruptions gener-
ally assumed to be below the escalation 
threshold could become a frequent tool. 
The lack of codified response mechanisms, 
however, adds to the uncertainty of how 
these events should be managed, poten-
tially giving rise to unintended escalation. 
China’s recent history of strategic part-
nerships, on the other hand, is shaped 
by tectonic shifts in the geopolitical land-
scape. Being a non-aligned latecomer to a 
“coalitionalized” international community 
explains China’s preference for opportunis-
tic behavior in forging an axis of temporary 
convenience. Following the collapse of 
the USSR, China seized the opportunity to 
settle its border disputes with the former 
Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia continues to form 
the center of gravity for China’s system of 
strategic partnerships. Together with these 
countries and Russia, China formed the 
Shanghai Five in 1996, an institutional 
framework for political, economic and 
military collaboration that grew into the 
SCO in 2001. China leveraged the institu-
tion in the past to push its cybersecurity 
agenda and Internet sovereignty as orga-
nizational principle. The July 2015 report 
“Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security” issued by the UN 
Group of Governmental Experts explicitly 
acknowledges the SCO’s proposal for an 
international code of conduct for informa-
tion security centered around the concept 
of Internet sovereignty. 7 
Present Chinese endeavors in the region 
focus on opportunities for mutual eco-
nomic gains that stand in contrast to the 
United States’ military orientation of foreign 
policy. China’s efforts to build closer eco-
nomic connections with Western Europe 
through Central Asia with its “One Belt, One 
Road” initiative and the development of the 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank demon-
strate an integrative approach that could 
help China in the medium-term to raise 
the political capital to forge coalitions on 
issues that diverge from the current route 
and extend into cyberspace.
CoalitiOFF: The Rise of 
Authoritarian Ideological 
Security Communities
Even with the backing of the SCO, China 
remains an international outlier when it 
comes to Internet governance. 8 The gov-
ernment-created information filter, dubbed 
the Great Firewall, severely limits open 
web access and reinforces China’s claim to 
Internet sovereignty by applying the prin-
ciples of territorial integrity to cyberspace. 
In this matter, hard bargaining on the part 
of the United States will accomplish little 
to change China’s position where internal 
stability is concerned. At the same time, 
if the United States seeks further integra-
tion through coalitions that exclude China, 
that is likely to only exacerbate concerns in 
China about the government’s ideological 
security and invigorate official support for 
the idea that cooperation with the United 
States on cybersecurity issues will open it to 
regime change, thereby prompting China 
to counter these coalitions with alliances of 
its own. In 2013 President Xi Jinping made 
comments in this vein:
Western anti-China forces continue to vainly 
attempt to use the Internet to “topple China.” 
Many years ago, there were Western govern-
ments that stated that “with the internet, there 
is a way to tackle China”, “Socialist countries 
are infused with Western ambitions, which 
starts from the Internet”. […] On this battle-
field of the Internet, whether we can stand up, 
and gain victory, directly relates to our coun-
try’s ideological security and regime security. 9
Leaked shortly after Xi’s speech, in April 
2013, the Communiqué on the Current 
State of the Ideological Sphere, issued 
by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) General Office, 
detailed the extent of China’s concern 
about foreign challenges to its ideological 
security. 10 Also known as Document 9, the 
General Office’s notice explicitly refers to 
efforts to “conscientiously strengthen man-
agement of the ideological battlefield”. 11 
The document identifies the Internet as the 
channel through which overseas media 
organizations penetrate China to dissemi-
nate “mistaken views and ideas.” The paper 
takes alleged links between civil society 
groups in China and “Western anti-China 
forces” as a clear indication “that the con-
test between infiltration and anti-infiltration 
efforts in the ideological sphere is as severe 
as ever, and so long as we persist in CCP 
leadership and socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, the position of Western anti-
China forces to pressure for urgent reform 
won’t change […].” 12
Ideological security opens an avenue for 
engagement with a number of actors. Iran 
features prominently in this list, given the 
shared concern about regime change 
and the common interest in surveillance 
of popular communication. Sino-Iranian 
cooperation has already moved beyond 
rhetorical alignment. 13 As Iran becomes a 
rehabilitated member of the international 
community, with sanctions related to its 
nuclear program gradually lifted, this part-
nership is expected to only deepen further.
On the technological front, China has long 
been assisting Iran in the build-up of its 
“halal” national network SHOMA. 14 The 
Chinese corporation ZTE, indirectly gov-
ernment-controlled through a 51 percent 
share held by a consortium of state-owned 
enterprises, has been discovered to have 
provided deep packet inspection technol-
ogy to the Telecommunication Company 
of Iran (TCI) that allows authorities to read 
online traffic. 15 The parties to the deal are 
revealing, considering that TCI controls 
almost all of Iran’s fixed line communica-
tions, telephone and Internet. 16 Moreover, 
ZTE-TCI documents have revealed that Iran 
had been able to circumvent U.S. sanctions 
and gain access to U.S. technology through 
a Chinese firm acting as an intermediary. 17
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies features as 
one possible issue in which the coopera-
tion on ideological security could play out. 
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Neither China nor Iran are signatories of the 
agreement. In December 2013, the agree-
ment was amended to prevent the export 
of cyber intrusion and surveillance software 
and technology to authoritarian regimes 
suspected of deploying these tools against 
their own populations. 18 The amendment 
has sparked controversy among technol-
ogy companies in the United States that 
cite the inherent dual-use nature of most 
software and technology products as a 
major obstacle to enforceability. 19 Even if 
implemented in its current form, the effi-
cacy of the amendment to deny access to 
communication monitoring tools to author-
itarian governments remains contested. 
As European and U.S. companies exit the 
market in countries of concern, China could 
become a major source of surveillance 
technology. These commercial relation-
ships could prove a point of departure for 
further cooperation between China and 
these countries on a normative level.
In the meantime, the Chinese ICT compa-
nies ZTE and Huawei have set up their North 
American headquarters in Richardson and 
Plano, Texas, taking the two-level game to 
foreign soil. Choosing Texas as the loca-
tion for their headquarters appears to be 
strategically motivated, with the purpose of 
enlisting local representatives and senators 
to lobby against the Obama administration 
in Washington, D.C. The fact that major Chi-
nese technology companies with strong 
ties to the government in Beijing vie for 
influence in U.S. domestic politics, however, 
also suggests that China has a fundamen-
tal interest in engagement with the United 
States and is willing to pursue other chan-
nels if the diplomatic track proves to be 
politically obstructed.
CoalitiON: The Spillover 
Potential of Engaging China
China’s economic trajectory provides 
further incentives to the United States to 
extend opportunities for cooperation to 
China. China cannot sustain an uncooper-
ative position indefinitely, given the rising 
cost of unresolved cybersecurity problems 
to its digitalizing economy. A 2014 study by 
McAffee and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies estimated the annual 
loss to the global economy from cyber-
crime to amount to $400 billion. 20 When 
measured in terms of GDP, the figures for 
the United States (0.64 percent) and China 
(0.63 percent) are remarkably close to each 
other. 21 National Security Agency Director 
Admiral Mike Rogers, in his remarks at the 
Halifax Security Forum in November 2015, 
put these findings into words: 
To my Chinese counterparts, I would remind 
them, increasingly you are as vulnerable as 
any other major industrialized nation state. 
The idea that you can somehow exist outside 
the broader global cyber challenges I don’t 
think is workable. 22 
To what extent this statement was intended 
as a veiled threat or merely a descriptive 
remark about China’s economic rise and 
increasing reliance on networked technol-
ogy is subject to individual interpretation. 
The following passage, taken from the 2015 
Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, 
however, places Rogers’ statement in an 
interesting context:
U.S. law does not allow retaliatory cyber 
attacks by private citizens and corporations, 
nor does it appear to allow counter-intru-
sions (or “hack backs”) for the purpose of 
recovering, erasing, or altering stolen data in 
offending computer networks. International 
law has not kept up with developments in 
cyber warfare, and no international consensus 
exists on how to attribute or appropriately 
respond to cyber attacks. However, a policy 
discussion on the issue of offensive and retal-
iatory cyber operations has begun. 23
Rogers’ remarks could also be construed as 
emphasis on the need to work together to 
address these common cyber challenges.
Since the announcement by President 
Obama and President Xi 24 in September 
2015 to resume bilateral cybersecurity talks 
under the new framework of the U.S.-China 
High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime 
and Related Issues, concerted efforts have 
been undertaken by both countries to 
establish a productive working relation-
ship. On December 1, 2015, U.S. Attorney 
General Loretta E. Lynch, Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh John-
son and Chinese State Councilor Guo 
Shengkun met for the first round of the 
U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on 
Cybercrime and Related Issues. 25 The 
meeting concluded with a set of mutu-
ally agreed guidelines for combating 
cybercrime and related issues, covering 
requests for investigative assistance and 
the responses to these requests. 
This initiative illustrates the prospect of 
issue-specific agreements, presumably 
contained in the functional area of cyber-
crime and related malicious cyber activities. 
As the outcomes of the first joint dialogue 
meeting suggest, the implications of these 
talks are unlikely to remain compartmen-
talized within the confines of assistance on 
cybercrime and have already expanded to 
table top exercises intended to improve 
the respective understanding of national 
authorities, processes and procedures for 
managing malicious cyber activity. 26 Prag-
matic, limited agreements have a higher 
chance of fulfilling their purpose because 
of their restricted scope and specific objec-
tives. The targeted approach China and 
the United States pursue in collaborating 
in their fight against cybercrime has the 
potential to develop a gravitational pull 
that spirals into increasingly comprehen-
sive agreements. Such a trajectory would 
confirm that the lack of agreement does 
not reflect a lack of interest but a lack of 
trust. Small agreements may remedy this 
deficiency one step at a time. Notably the 
announcement of the cybercrime guide-
lines made explicit mention of the intention 
to “establish common understanding and 
expectations regarding the information to 
be included in such requests and the time-
liness of responses.”
Adopting an approach of many limited 
agreements between the United States and 
China would almost inevitably create con-
cerns among traditional U.S. allies about a 
bilateral bias towards China in the design 
of U.S. foreign policy. Some countries might 
sense the need to position themselves to 
pre-empt the emergence of a G2 arrange-
ment between the United States and China 
that would significantly restrict their interna-
tional influence. The United States needs to 
be aware of and address these concerns as 
it progresses on this track. U.S. allies should 
draw assurance from the rationale President 
Obama offered in his remarks announcing 
the nuclear agreement with Iran: “you don’t 
make deals like this with your friends.” 27
Conclusion
The behavior the United States adopts vis-à-
vis China shapes the strategic options in the 
U.S.’ portfolio. The areas of limited cooper-
ation explored in this paper can produce 
tangible benefits for both parties. At the 
same time, non-cooperative behavior does 
not offer a neutral alternative but comes at 
costs of its own. If the United States contin-
ues to be confrontational, the opportunity 
for integrating China will wane. In the 
worst case scenario, China may engage in 
building coalitions with like-minded states 
in an act of counter-balancing. Such a con-
solidated block favoring Internet sovereignty 
and state-managed information flows will be 
considerably harder to break up later on than 
bringing China in as an individual actor now. 
An integration-oriented approach via func-
tional areas that gives the United States 
some mechanisms to point to Chinese 
non-compliance within a mutually agreed 
framework will make it difficult for China 
to continuously violate its commitments 
without incurring a tremendous cost to 
its reputation.
Non-cooperation has forced China to 
self-impose a tremendous diplomatic cost 
on its endeavor to strengthen its position of 
international influence. In response to the 
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U.S. indictment of five People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) officers on charges of cyber 
economic espionage in May 2014, the Chi-
nese leadership decided to suspend the 
U.S.-China working group on cybersecurity. 
The need to save face internationally forced 
China to pull out of a diplomatic initiative 
that had put it on par with the United States 
in addressing one the most pressing global 
security challenges. The reach of China’s 
soft power, in no small part, is defined as 
a function of its ability to provide an alter-
native while demonstrating a pragmatic 
approach to problem solving by keep-
ing its relationship with the United States 
free of major tensions. Realizing these 
constraints, China’s reaction pattern has 
changed significantly since its withdrawal 
from the working group mechanism led to 
the breakdown of official channels on the 
subject. Following the announcement that 
United States is mulling sanctions, China 
this time became active itself and arrested 
a number of hackers from a list the United 
States had shared in a deliberate attempt 
to test Chinese resolve. 28
The United States as an actor managing an 
intricate system of alliances needs to pay 
close attention to how its partners react to 
its China policy. A U.S.-Chinese rapproche-
ment on cybersecurity that is viewed by 
core U.S. allies as coming at their expense 
would offset any gains of a bilateral pact. 
If the United States succeeds in containing 
the potential for such negative externalities, 
the slow but steady trust dividends from 
limited agreements with China stand to 
equally benefit its allies.
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China’s Creative 
Stagnation: 
The Failure of 
Zone-Based 
Reform
Patrick Lozada
This paper examines how China’s approach 
to creative special economic zones for man-
ufacturing has affected their approach to 
develop “creative industries.” In their search 
to build an innovation economy, China 
has turned to the “creative class” vision 
of urban planners like Richard Florida. 
This vision, which links culture and space 
with economic production, fits in with the 
government’s concept of cultural power, 
the promise that such initiatives might 
help deliver value by moving Chinese 
companies high up the value chain and 
China’s previous experience with special 
economic zones. In the long run, these 
projects have failed to meet their intended 
goals. In “planning” for innovation, the Chi-
nese government has treated innovation 
like a manufactured and interchangeable 
commodity instead of as an independent 
ecosystem that needs space to thrive. This 
paper argues that creative enterprise is 
incompatible with the inflexible organiza-
tional scheme of state planning and control.
During the reform and opening period 
in the late 1970’s, China created “special 
economic zones” (SEZs) in which it con-
ducted small-scale policy experiments 
with economic liberalization. Today, as 
China seeks to escape the “middle income 
trap” by shifting production to higher val-
ue-added goods, it has sought to apply 
the same small-scale zoning approach to 
creative industries. While this approach has 
led to the creation of new creative clusters 
around the country, it has not produced the 
innovation that policymakers had hoped 
for. This paper argues that although the cre-
ative cluster approach has been successful 
in other countries as a means for fostering 
innovation and sustaining robust economic 
growth, it is unsuited to addressing China’s 
economic challenges. Although China’s 
cluster approach can lead to positive out-
comes, such as economies of scale in the 
manufacturing sector, a top-down, state-led 
approach is fundamentally incompatible 
with the creative mode of production. 
First, this paper will summarize the literature 
regarding creative clusters and develop-
ment zones. Second, it will explain why the 
idea of creative development zones has 
gained popularity in China. Third, it will 
describe how China has attempted to adapt 
the idea of creative clusters to fit into a Chi-
nese context and how the transformation of 
this Western concept ties into unique fea-
tures of China’s political economy. Lastly, it 
will speculate on how China might be able 
to create and sustain a creative economy 
in order to avoid the middle income trap, 
whereby gross domestic product (GDP) 
stagnates due to an over-reliance on low 
value-added forms of industrial production.
Literature Review
While creativity is a timeless feature of the 
human experience, the literature on “cre-
atives” as a distinct group of people who 
play a dominant role in driving the economy 
is much newer. The American economist 
and social scientist Richard Florida is often 
credited with pioneering the study of this 
group in his book, The Rise of the Creative 
Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, 
Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life. 
Florida argues that “Creativity— ‘the ability 
to create meaningful new forms,’ as Web-
ster’s dictionary puts it—has become the 
decisive source of competitive advantage” 
in the economy. 1 He argues that people 
engaged in creative enterprises are a class 
unto themselves and share similarities with 
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each other even though their work can 
be different:
I define the core of the Creative Class to 
include people in science and engineering, 
architecture and design, education, arts, 
music, and entertainment whose economic 
function is to create new ideas, new tech-
nology, and new creative content. Around 
this core, the Creative Class also includes a 
broader group of creative professionals in 
business and finance, law, health care, and 
related fields. 2
Florida argues that the nebulous force of 
creativity underlies this diverse group of 
professions and that the creative mode of 
production is inseparable from the lives of 
the people involved in it. Thus, the urban 
environment and the culture within it are 
key to promoting economic growth; “Place,” 
Florida argues, “has become the central 
organizing unit of our time.” 3 Florida has 
in mind places like “trendy” Manhattan with 
its fashion designers and stockbrokers and 
“quirky” Austin with its music and software 
development. The diverse and progres-
sive nature of these places is supposed 
to encourage would-be “disruptors” and 
innovators in all industries. For example, 
Florida famously uses a “gay index” to show 
that urban areas that have more gay people 
and gay-friendly culture have higher rates 
of growth and income. This is not because 
gay people are more productive, but rather 
because creative people are inherently 
attracted by and bring growth to cities that 
are progressive and accept people from 
diverse backgrounds. 4 
Other scholars, especially those in the fields 
of urban planning, economics, and sociol-
ogy, have built on and modified Florida’s 
framework of analysis. Ed Glaeser, an econ-
omist at Harvard University who studies 
cities, modified Florida’s theory by fitting 
it into his own model, which emphasizes 
urban labor pool impacts not tied to pro-
gressive culture. 5 Gregory Peck situates 
Florida’s argument within the Schumpeter/
Kondratiev models of economic growth that 
emphasize circular flows of innovation and 
critiques the implementation of Florida’s 
ideas in modern cities. 6 Critics of creative 
class theory such as Michele Hoyman, 
Chris Faricy and Mel Gray contend that 
Florida’s argument is guilty of conflating 
correlation with causation, and fails to 
incorporate stringent causality testing. 
These critics also argue that the statistical 
arguments for growth it presents are more 
adequately accounted for by Human Capi-
tal theory, which emphasizes education and 
job training. 7 
Of most direct relevance to the argument 
presented in this paper are those schol-
ars who examine how the creative cities 
model has been adapted to fit the Chi-
nese context. Justin O’Connor and Gu Xin 
of Queensland University approach the 
model from a cultural studies perspective, 
situating it within wider historical conflicts 
around modernity in China and arguing 
that Chinese notions of creativity differ 
from Florida’s characterization of creativ-
ity as disruptive. 8 Meanwhile, sociologists 
Ren Xuefeng and Sun Meng from Michigan 
State University attempt to identify creative 
spaces from the perspective of government 
control. Designating spaces as “creative” 
allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
to plan for and confine the impact of unsta-
ble creative forces while also allowing the 
government to profit from the subsequent 
development. 9 Michael Keane, a fellow at 
the ARC Center for Creative Innovation at 
Queensland University of Technology in 
Australia, takes a different approach, tracing 
the political economy of artistic develop-
ment and examining why officials chose to 
adopt the rhetoric of this fundamentally for-
eign urban planning approach. 10 Keane is 
the most prolific writer on the subject, and 
although he has a positive outlook on the 
prospects for creativity in China, he is less 
optimistic about the success of the cultural 
cluster concept. 
In examining the development of creative 
clusters, it is important to trace the dis-
course surrounding development zones. 
Wing Thy Woo’s characterization of the 
free market “C-School” and gradualist 
“E-School” effectively summarizes the dif-
ferent perspectives in the literature around 
development zones. “E-school” thinkers 
such as Barry Naughton or Peter Nolan are 
more likely to support the approach to extol 
the benefits of corralling free enterprise 
and industry into a confined space. This 
approach fits into their idea that China’s 
economic success has come from a unique 
model of controlled reform. By contrast, 
“C-school” thinkers such as Huang Yasheng 
or Wing Thy Woo himself see the inherent 
limits and forestalled economic progress 
of these productive forces. 11
The argument presented in this paper does 
not rely heavily on the urban planning and 
cultural studies criticism present by O’Con-
nor, Gu, Ren and Sun but rather seeks to 
combine Michael Keane’s dissection of the 
political economy of creative clusters and 
situate it within the more established litera-
ture around value chain and development 
zones. With regard to this literature, the 
early achievements of SEZs are acknowl-
edged and seen as valuable, but their 
long-term viability is questioned. Ultimately, 
creative enterprise in China cannot be cor-
ralled into zones and carefully controlled. In 
some ways, whether or not one agrees with 
Florida’s model of creativity is irrelevant. 
This analysis instead asks how and why this 
discourse, true or not, has been accepted 
and modified in China to fit into the govern-
ment’s broader development objectives. 
The Political Economy of Zone 
Development in China
Deng Xiaoping famously characterized 
China’s approach to “Reform and Open-
ing” as a process of “crossing the river by 
feeling the stones.” In other words, reform 
is a process of small steps that relies on 
lessons learned to chart the way forward. 
The four initial SEZs in Shantou, Shenzhen, 
Xiamen and Zhuhai are examples of the 
creation of geographically defined spaces 
focused on liberalization as a means to spur 
economic growth. By limiting new policies 
on foreign direct investment to a particular 
city or region, government officials were 
able to experiment with a new model in a 
controlled fashion. These zones, as Barry 
Naughton writes, “permitted incremental 
progress within a rigid system,” and the 
fundamental logic of zone-based reform 
has continued to appeal to policymakers 
to the extent that, “China has marked every 
major wave of liberalization with the estab-
lishment of a new batch of zones.” 12
SEZs are also compatible with the politi-
cal economy of China’s state apparatus. 
Because local officials are incentivized to 
promote GDP growth, successful reform 
in one province leads to the pressure 
to expand that growth in other areas. 
Susan Shirk calls this logic “playing to 
the provinces.” 13 Although she used this 
argument to describe the process of fiscal 
decentralization, the logic of it – provincial 
representatives to the Central Committee 
becoming invested in reform because of 
the direct benefits to local government 
budgets – also applies to development 
zones.  The place of SEZs in China’s politi-
cal logic has led to a veritable ‘zone fever’. 
According to the World Bank, there are 716 
SEZs in China as of 2014 with labels rang-
ing from “open coastal cities” and “financial 
reform pilot areas” to “national high-tech-
nology parks” and “national ecological 
civilization demonstration areas.” 14
Although SEZs have accompanied every 
wave of reform so far, the benefits of these 
zones are limited. As local officials around 
the country have used economic zones as a 
means to enhance their own prestige, they 
have over-saturated the economic envi-
ronment and wasted government funds 
on far-fetched projects. In the case of the 
Guangzhou Development District, sizable 
amounts of land and capital were commit-
ted to a project that struggled because of 
the sheer number of other zones that had 
preferential treatment toward industrial 
investors. 15 Additionally, China’s applica-
tion of the development zone model to 
sectors outside of manufacturing has had 
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It is then perhaps no surprise that China has 
taken Joseph Nye’s writings on soft power 
and incorporated it into their own concept 
of “Comprehensive National Power (zonghe 
guojia quanli)” that incorporates not only 
military and economic metrics, but also 
measures of cohesion such as a strong 
sense of culture. 18 As Hu Jintao said in 
his keynote speech made on behalf of the 
16th CCP Central Committee to the 17th 
National Congress of the CCP:
Culture has become a more and more import-
ant source of national cohesion and creativity 
and a factor of growing significance in the 
competition in overall national strength… [We 
must] enhance culture as part of the soft power 
of our country to better guarantee the people’s 
basic cultural rights and interests. 19
Michael Keane argues that the discourse 
around creativity and creative clusters 
incorporates both modern and tradition-
alist proponents of China’s growing cultural 
power. Discourses on cultural power rely 
especially on ideas such as “soft power,” 
which refers to a culture’s ability to influence 
the behavior of others without coercion. A 
common refrain in China was: “When will 
China have its Gangnam Style?” referring 
to a popular Korean pop song that had 
captured global attention in 2012. 20 Tra-
ditionalists are more inwardly focused and 
attempt to reinterpret ‘creative industries’ 
as ‘cultural industries’ promoting Chinese 
Confucian values. Thus, when Beijing was 
creating an office to promote creative 
cluster development, they attempted to 
mobilize factions, calling their initiative 
“Cultural and Creative Industries” and 
establishing an annual event called the 
International Cultural and Creative Indus-
tries Expo (ICCIE) in 2006. 21 The ICCIE was 
soon joined by the International Creative 
Industries Alliance (ICIA), the International 
Creative Industries Conference (ICIC), the 
International Cultural Creative Industries 
Conference (ICCIC) and several other sim-
ilarly named organizations. 
Creative Control
limited success due to the characteristics 
of these other sectors. For example, the 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone – at one point a 
strong central government priority under 
the personal direction of Chinese Premier 
Li Keqiang – has been called “disappoint-
ing” because of its failure to implement the 
kind of incentives that would attract valu-
able foreign business. 16 In a recent survey, 
three-quarters of American firms in Shang-
hai said that the zone did not offer them 
any benefits. 17
The Case for Creativity
Despite the decreasing returns on invest-
ment for development zones in China, the 
idea of “creative cities” has gained traction 
among Chinese policymakers in recent 
years. There are three main reasons why 
Chinese policymakers have adopted the 
creative cluster model in national planning:
Cultural Power
China has long had conflicting views on 
culture, sometimes promoting tradition and 
at other times advancing modernity. On the 
one hand, China’s five thousand years of 
history and its philosophers like Confucius 
and Laozi are regarded reverently and held 
up as superior. On the other, traditional 
CCP narratives portray a slowly modern-
izing China that is falling behind due to 
its culture, necessitating an increased 
acceptance of Western ideologies such 
as Marxism. For example, in the modern 
Chinese classic Diary of a Madman (kuang 
ren ri ji), Lu Xun carries on an extended 
metaphor that portrays Confucianism as a 
literally cannibalistic ideology that teaches 
Chinese people to eat each other. Indeed, 
traditional Chinese culture was a point of 
struggle during the Cultural Revolution as 
people were told to “smash the four olds.” 
Through China’s history, whether it is pro-
moting the simulacrum of Chinese history 
presented by traditionalists or embracing 
the unforgiving cultural critiques of the 
modernizers, culture has been closely 
linked to conceptions of power. 
Another factor that contributed to the pop-
ularity of creative clusters as a development 
tool was the ability to more effectively 
monitor and control artistic and innovative 
spaces through geographic limitation. For 
instance, the Beijing municipal government 
has extended its creative control over artist 
villages on the periphery through “dis-
trictification.” The new modes of control 
are achieved by the use of interlocking 
directorates, whereby the state appoints 
the same government officials across the 
executive boards of multiple key governing 
bodies in art districts. 22
The geographic limitation of creative 
clusters allows authorities to effectively 
contain disturbances and even shut down 
these zones if necessary. The 798 Art Dis-
trict in Beijing, as well as the Tianzifang 
and Moganshan Lu districts in Shanghai, 
are all physically contained within a gated 
space with entries and exits that can be shut 
down if need be. This adds to the inher-
ent peripheral nature of art districts, which 
generally form due to low rents and thus 
are not centrally located. When planned 
for actively, this isolation from the general 
public can be consciously fostered. There 
is precedent for this in the development 
of SEZs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
During this time, the Chinese government 
tried to locate development zones in rural 
areas in order to keep distance between its 
people and foreign investors. 23
Moving Up the Value Chain
China’s national policymakers are increas-
ingly aware of the importance of generating 
higher-value industries so as to avoid the 
“middle income trap” that results from the 
predominance of low value-added eco-
nomic activities such as manufacturing. 
Much of the economic growth that China 
has experienced so far has been the result 
of the modularization of global production, 
as developed economies have shifted 
to economic activities such as branding 
and research and development (R&D), 
developing economies have engaged in 
manufacturing. 24 This has been true even 
in the case of the production of “high-tech” 
goods, such as smart-phones and laptop 
computers. As Edward Steinfeld writes, “In 
the Chinese case, we have seen produc-
ers rush into newly opened industries but 
largely in the low-value end of the activity 
spectrum. What appears as upgrading from 
soft industries to high-tech ones, then, often 
involves very little upgrading at all.” 25 The 
challenge for the government thus is to 
focus on high-value production activities 
like marketing and product development 
that have historically been dominated by 
developed nations.  Michael Keane terms 
this shift being from a model of “Made in 
China” to “Created in China.” The key to 
unlocking this model and moving up to 
these high-value production activities was 
seen to be creativity, and the way to achieve 
this was through zone-based development. 
Implementation of the 
Creative Cluster Concept
As argued above, China’s desire to imple-
ment the creative clusters model is based 
on a desire to establish itself as a cultural 
power, exercise control over creative enter-
prise and avoid the middle-income trap by 
shifting production to higher value added 
goods. While the reasons why China is 
pursuing this model are interesting, the 
implementation of this concept sheds 
additional light on certain idiosyncrasies 
in China’s political economy. This section 
will first establish a baseline for comparing 
China’s pursuit of this model by describ-
ing how the creative cities framework is 
implemented and understood in the West 
and then will discuss how that framework 
changed when exported to China. 
As mentioned previously, Richard Florida’s 
ideas around the creative economy have 
gained significant traction in the West, 
particularly in the United States. Florida’s 
writings on the subject address certain 
peculiarities of the U.S. economy with its 
focus on inter-state competition through 
incentives, a wide range of voices and 
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organizations incorporated into planning 
decisions and its reliance on activities 
higher up on the value chain. This should 
not imply that the creative economy archi-
tecture is particular to the U.S. The creative 
cluster concept was transmitted to China 
through consultants from the United King-
dom, and creative economy discourse has 
become popular in Singapore, Hong Kong 
and other non-Western countries around 
the world. 26
How this model of urban development was 
processed as it made its way around the 
world from academia, to policy consultants 
and finally to Chinese government officials 
illuminates unique elements of political 
economy. Instead of incorporating Florida’s 
core beliefs in the three T’s of “technology, 
talent and tolerance,” the core message 
received seemed to be that increasing 
cultural products – envisioned by some 
provincial officials as interchangeable units 
– would attract economic growth through 
increased levels of creativity. This creation of 
cultural products as indistinguishable and 
interchangeable parts allowed the Chinese 
government to take the lessons it learned 
from creating cellphones and textiles and 
import them directly to “innovation.” Take 
for example of the early creative factory of 
Dafen outside of Shenzhen. The process of 
developing this area followed the classic 
development zone playbook. First, local 
bureaucrats identified the cultural/creative 
product – paintings and sculptures. Then, 
there was an obvious business model: 
set up a factory, call it a cluster and pro-
duce contracted products. Today in Dafen, 
this “artist village” employs around 8,000 
people working on replicating oil paintings 
for local and international customers. The 
artisans here have no art college training 
or painting experience. Production takes 
place under factory conditions, with labor-
ers working long hours replicating classic 
paintings to be hung in dentists’ offices 
and in the homes of the nouveau riche. 27 
This type of creative cluster is anything but 
creative. However, it elucidates Chinese 
notions of creativity as an undifferentiated 
product that informs official approaches to 
the development of creative clusters. 
This mentality is not only limited to the art 
industry. It is also evident in the techno-
logical industrial park model, especially 
prevalent in animation, digital content and 
software. A proliferation of these zones on 
the outskirts of major cities has been hap-
pening as the push for creative content has 
increased. For example, between 2005 and 
2009, China has set up seventeen accred-
ited animation bases. 28 Establishing an 
official zone is a concrete achievement an 
official can point to as he looks to move 
up the Communist Party system. A similar 
case can be made with regards to the cen-
tral government’s pressure on officials to 
increase the number of patents, irrespec-
tive of the quality or usefulness of these 
new “innovations.”
Since they are located far outside Central 
Business Districts in fringe industrial zones, 
these centers are unable to tap into the 
dynamism of the city. Florida sees this as an 
important element of creative enterprise, 
because while a bunch of people working 
with computers sounds like Silicon Valley, 
it ignores the element of Silicon Valley as a 
diverse ecosystem. As Florida writes,
Silicon Valley can’t be understood without 
reference to the counterculture of nearby San 
Francisco. Had it not been receptive to offbeat 
people like the young Steve Jobs years ago, it 
could not have become what it is today. 29
These clusters of people all in the same 
industry located far from city centers are 
effectively just warehouses for tech work-
ers, and they similarly apply the logic of the 
factory to non-factory work. They are not 
creative spaces. Indeed, especially in ani-
mation and gaming, these industrial parks 
often host companies who are doing rou-
tine fee-for-service work for Western design 
companies, or in the video game business 
doing the tedious work of “porting” – recod-
ing a video game to work on several types 
of systems. Like the art studios of Dafen, 
these science and technology parks often 
give the appearance of creativity without 
giving it actual substance. 
There is, however, another prominent 
model for creative clusters in China. This 
model of creative clusters has arisen inde-
pendently of any government intervention. 
There are many examples of this, but one 
of the best examples is the Dashanzi Arts 
District in Beijing, better known as 798 Art 
District (798 yi shu qu). Originally, the area 
was a successful factory owned by a State-
Owned Enterprise called the Seven Stars 
Group. As the company began to lay off 
workers in the late 1990s, the Seven Stars 
Group rented out factory space in order 
to pay pensions. At this time, students and 
professors from Beijing’s art schools set up 
workshops in 798, drawn in by low rents 
and the accidentally-minimalist Bauhaus 
style of the old factory. 30
The relative independence of the art 
community in 798 lasted for eight years, 
during which time it became internationally 
known as the center of Beijing’s art scene. 
However, in 2006 a joint committee com-
posed of the management of the Seven 
Stars Company and the Chaoyang District 
Government was formed to oversee 798’s 
transition into a Creative Industries Area. 
This is another element to create cultural 
and creative zones – it puts incentives to 
establish zones in innovative spaces that 
have developed naturally, and forces them 
into the matrix of state management. Citing 
“safety concerns,” the new government 
committee decreed that events and exhi-
bitions need to be officially reported and 
approved, including contents and loca-
tions. In addition, a new permission system 
was enacted to control the admission of 
new entrants. As a result of these new mea-
sures, the contemporary art scene in China 
has largely left 798 in favor of Songzhuang, 
an area where rents are cheaper and gov-
ernment control is less entrenched. 31 What 
is left is the consumerist edifice of art, polit-
ically acceptable units of culture that are 
sold on the global marketplace.
Based on the development of this area and 
subsequent flocking of companies engag-
ing in unrelated creative enterprises, the 
problem is not that Chinese people are not 
creative, but rather that the Chinese state 
cannot artificially grow creative enterprises. 
As the examples of Dafen and 798 Art dis-
trict show, when the government tries to get 
involved, it parses creative enterprise as an 
interchangeable unit and separates it into 
products to be created en masse. When 
it encounters spaces where the creative 
economy forms naturally, its instinct is to 
regulate and control them. Even when the 
product is not an artistic one, the inflexible 
organizational scheme of the state quashes 
the incentives for genuine innovation. In 
sum, China’s adoption of the creative clus-
ter ideology has been a failure. Successes 
that do come will likely come in spite of and 
not because of the government’s promo-
tion of creative industry. 
Conclusion
The failure of China’s interpretation of the 
creative cluster ideology showcases the 
idiosyncrasies of China’s political economy. 
First, it shows the reliance (and over-reli-
ance) of governments on incremental 
progress driven by the creation of special 
test zones. Second, it offers insight into 
a dimension of the center-local dynamic 
in China by showing how local officials 
respond to discourses from the national 
level, in this case by actively pursuing the 
creative-cultural industries concept. Third, 
it demonstrates how national-level polit-
ical priorities unrelated to economics, in 
this case the desire for soft-power growth, 
can be linked to economic policy. Fourth, 
it demonstrates China’s desire to move 
up the value chain. And fifth, it shows the 
limits of top-down management over cer-
tain kinds of industries, in this case creative, 
cultural, and innovative ones.
Divorcing creativity from the inclination to 
think differently is impossible. What is pos-
sible is that China can begin to develop 
the ability to accommodate and even 
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encourage differences in thinking under 
the broad umbrella of Communist party 
rule. Singapore appears to present a test 
case. Like China, Singapore has a one-party 
system and is also ethnically majority Chi-
nese. However, Singapore has a higher 
percentage of workers involved in creative 
class jobs (47.3 percent) than any other 
nation on the planet, while China ranks 
a dismal 75th, with just 7.5 percent of its 
workers involved in creative enterprise. 32 
The Singapore example suggests that 
a creative China is not impossible. What 
is needed is not an overthrow of China’s 
system of government, but rather a greater 
tolerance of diversity in expression.
A key lesson from China’s misadventures 
in the creative industry is this – China does 
not want creativity in the same way the West 
understands it.  While “disruption” may be 
a buzzword in the Western entrepreneurial 
context, the byword in China is “harmony.” 
The Chinese Communist Party has little 
use for a gay index, nor does it want cel-
ebrations of difference: it wants unity. The 
Chinese education system too is deeply 
standardized, and at every level instructors 
reward compliance. What Beijing’s bureau-
crats want is the value of creativity, completely 
divorced from the substance of it.
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Making the 
Transition: 
Examining China’s 
Environmental 
Policymaking 
Model after the 
Rise of Xi Jinping
David Rubin
In 2012, Bruce Gilley of Portland State Uni-
versity’s Hatfield School of Government 
published a paper entitled, “Authoritarian 
environmentalism and China’s response to 
climate change”. This paper was an explor-
atory analysis of China’s environmental 
policymaking structure and its position 
on the democratic environmentalism and 
authoritarian environmentalism spectrum. 
Since Gilley published his work, there have 
been several important political develop-
ments that have taken place in mainland 
China. A new regime under President Xi 
Jinping has come to power, overseeing 
the greatest leadership purges since the 
Cultural Revolution. New leadership has 
taken over at China’s Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection (MEP), while a landmark 
Environmental Protection Law (EPL) came 
into force as of January 1, 2015. Many 
leading academics, including U.S. scholar 
David Shambaugh, see Xi’s rise as a tec-
tonic shift towards greater authoritarianism, 
which may even cause the downfall of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Peo-
ple’s Republic. In this context, this paper 
refutes this position and instead posits 
that at least in environmental policymak-
ing, Xi Jinping’s China is still transitioning 
towards more inclusivity and grassroots 
engagement on pollution enforcement 
and policy generation. This assessment 
builds on Gilley’s scholarship, examining 
these developments through the lens of 
his environmental framework, while also 
undertaking an exploratory content anal-
ysis of the MEP’s phraseology in speeches 
during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping 
eras to further elucidate a shift towards 
democratic environmentalism. This paper 
examines a five-year period from March 
2010 to May 2015, eclipsing two and a 
half years before and after the power 
transition to Xi Jinping. This paper comes 
to the conclusion that, even in the post-Xi 
era, Chinese environmental policymaking 
does appear to be shifting towards a more 
“democratic model”, though there remain 
several caveats towards the nature, goal 
and structure of this “democratization”. 
China faces some of the most perplexing 
environmental challenges in the world 
today. Historically, it has used a top-down, 
authoritarian framework to address these 
equally staggering issues. However, 
despite increasingly punitive regulations, 
China still faces significant breakdowns of 
enforcement and community buy-in for its 
policies at the local-level. Bruce Gilley’s 
“Authoritarian environmentalism and Chi-
na’s response to climate change” examines 
the basis for China’s environmental policy-
making through a well-defined framework 
to contextualize particular policies as either 
democratic or authoritarian in nature. 
This analysis was less prescriptive, but 
instead more descriptive, examining the 
natures and characteristics of authoritarian 
environmentalism and democratic environ-
mentalism. Gilley also assessed that China 
is transitioning towards a more democratic 
model, versus its current authoritarian 
model. Since Gilley’s research, there have 
been several additional developments 
catalyzed by President Xi Jinping’s rise 
to power to contextualize this shift. Using 
Bruce Gilley’s framework, this paper ana-
lyzes these new data points and concludes 
that since Gilley’s initial analysis, China is 
continuing to shift towards a more demo-
cratic model under President Xi Jinping’s 
rule to address its growing environmental 
challenges, but with several important 
caveats and nuances reflecting President 
Xi’s emphasis on strong enforcement.
In this context, this assessment provides: 
1. An overview of Gilley’s framework that 
discusses how these data points will be 
operationalized; 
2. An overview of China’s historical model 
for environmental policymaking, includ-
ing an assessment of current players and 
institutions in China’s environmental policy 
processes; 
3. A descriptive analysis of recent devel-
opments since Xi Jinping’s rise as either 
“democratic” or “authoritarian”; 
4. A preliminary content analysis of MEP 
speeches to determine its shift towards 
more “democratic” or “authoritarian” poli-
cymaking; and
5. A final analysis of these developments 
to determine whether China’s policymak-
ing is shifting towards a more “democratic 
environmentalism” model, including areas 
for further research on these important 
developments. 
Examining the Framework of 
Democratic vs. Authoritarian 
Environmentalism
When evaluating policy processes, political 
frameworks can be useful tools to delin-
eate and classify specific data points. This 
is particularly important when examining 
shifts from one political model to another, 
as in the case of democratic to authoritar-
ian environmentalism. Gilley cites several 
scholars in creating a working definition for 
each of these models. 1
Authoritarian Environmentalism
Gilley provisionally defines authoritar-
ian environmentalism as “a public policy 
model that concentrates authority in a few 
executive agencies manned by capable 
and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve 
environmental outcomes. Public participa-
tion is limited to a narrow cadre of scientific 
and technocratic elites while others are 
expected to participate only in state-led 
mobilization for the purposes of implemen-
tation. The policy outputs that result include 
a rapid and comprehensive response to the 
issue and usually some limits on individ-
ual freedoms.” 2 In China, there is a strong 
prevalence of “ecoelites”, particularly within 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 
the National Leading Group to Address Cli-
mate Change (NLGACC – within the NDRC), 
National Environment Advisory Commis-
sion and various ministry-level advisory 
bodies staffed with technocrats. 3These 
science and technology organizations 
form the backbone of authoritarian envi-
ronmentalism’s justification for its policies, 
rather than relying on grassroots or com-
munity input on environmental issues. 
These structures are often characterized 
by highly-effective policy generation, but 
often experience breakdowns in enforce-
ment capacity or community buy-in at the 
local level. 
Democratic Environmentalism
Conversely, Gilley defines democratic 
environmentalism, “as a public policy 
model that spreads authority across sev-
eral levels and agencies of government, 
including representative legislatures, and 
that encourages direct public participa-
tion from a wide cross-section of society 
(drawing from Holden 2002 and Humphrey 
2007). Policy outputs may be piecemeal 
and subject to time lags, and do not gen-
erally include restrictions on basic social, 
civil, or political liberties.” 4 Policy processes 
are usually much more involved and can be 
piecemeal, but often are more successful in 
the implementation phase given a higher 
degree of socialization with the public and 
community buy-in for enforcement. 
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Gilley underscores that these two models 
form a spectrum of policymaking. Many 
states often employ elements of both dem-
ocratic and authoritarian environmentalism 
to achieve their desired policy goals and 
outcomes. This paper provides a visual 
depiction of this spectrum below. Using this 
framework, this paper will analyze specific 
instances of Chinese environmental poli-
cymaking and MEP speeches to determine 
their characteristics as either falling into the 
“authoritarian” or “democratic” model.
China’s Historical Model for 
Environmental Policymaking
Before examining the trend lines of Chi-
na’s environmental tradition towards a 
more democratic and inclusive model, it 
is important to examine the country’s histor-
ical model for environmental policymaking. 
In the case of China, its environmental pol-
icymaking structure evolved in part out of 
the nation’s political regime identity. 5
Characteristics
1  Limit freedoms to encourage  
sustainable behavior
2  Policy generated by autonomous 
central state, little role for social  
actors or representatives
3  Efficient, top-down policy generation, 
but plagued by lack of stakeholder 
buy-in and ineffective enforcement
Characteristics
1  Direct participation from a  
cross-section of public
2  Authority spread across several agen-
cies of government, including  
representative legislatures
3  Drawn-out and often piecemeal policy 
generation fraught with political 
horse-trading, but with strong  
enforcement and community support
AUTHORITARIAN 
environmentalism
IS CHINA MAKING THIS TRANSITION? 
DEMOCRATIC 
environmentalism
Democratic vs Authoritarian Environmentalism
Gilley (2012): “Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to climate change”
China as Authoritarian State
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
inarguably remains an authoritarian state, 
though with several definitional diver-
gences from formal authoritarianism. Juan 
Linz lays out the foundations for examining 
authoritarianism as a form of governance 
with four qualities: “[Authoritarian regimes 
can be characterized as] political systems 
with limited, not responsible, political 
pluralism, without elaborate and guiding 
ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, 
without extensive nor intensive political 
mobilization, except at some points in 
their development, and in which a leader 
or occasionally a small group exercised 
power within ill-defined limits but actually 
quite predictable ones.” 6 China’s political 
system fits into many elements of this defi-
nition. Instances of political mobilization 
have largely abated since the mass move-
ments of the Mao Zedong era. Small groups 
of political elites exercise control without 
specified checks or balances, though often 
follow precedent on their political roles. 
Precedent of a Shifting 
Chinese Political Model
However, as in most analyses of East Asian 
political theory, the Chinese model of 
authoritarianism is once again the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Kenneth Lieberthal 
describes China’s political model as one 
of fragmented authoritarianism, where 
“authority below the very peak of the Chi-
nese political model system is fragmented 
and disjointed… [Where] the fragmenta-
tion is structurally based and enhanced by 
reform policies regarding procedures.” 7 
This structure can also be illustrated effec-
tively through the principal-agent problem 
– local cadre, city, township, prefectural and 
central authorities will often act in their own 
self-interests, tacitly engaging with other 
officials while operating under informa-
tional asymmetry. 8 Numerous other authors 
have written about the shift in Chinese 
political decision making from a strictly 
authoritarian to a more hybrid model in 
response to a need to reestablish regime 
legitimacy and avoid widespread public 
discontent. 9 Driven by a self-interest to 
maintain power, there are many examples 
of China’s Party elites redefining policy pro-
cesses or political structures to neutralize 
perceived threats. In so doing, Party elites 
entertain various experimental policies that 
can either fall within a more democratic or 
authoritarian framework. China’s environ-
mental policymaking in this regard is no 
different. Its structure is still rooted funda-
mentally in authoritarian rule. Yet political 
elites have shown a degree of flexibility in 
their environmental policymaking (at times 
co-opting more unorthodox and vaguely 
participatory policies) in order to maintain 
order, control, and legitimacy. 
Principal Institutional Actors in 
Environmental Policymaking
In essence, the Chinese environmental 
policymaking structure is driven by three 
main bodies – the Ministry of Environmen-
tal Protection, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the 
Politburo Standing Committee [serving as a 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) structural 
complement to the two PRC agencies]. 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP): The MEP is the de facto agency in 
charge of enforcing environmental policy. 
The MEP’s role is to manage air, water, 
soil, noise and chemical pollution as well 
as solid waste management, and also to 
conduct State Council-mandated environ-
mental impact assessments, among other 
tasks. 10 Noticeably absent from its man-
date, however, is the ability to set national 
climate change goals and targets. These 
are instead set by the NDRC, whose role is 
examined below. The MEP has historically 
been incredibly weak within the Chinese 
political system, criticized by its own former 
Minister Zhou Shengxian as being one of 
the four most embarrassing government 
departments in the world, which some 
netizens quipped as being as effectual 
as landlocked Mongolia’s navy 11. Faced 
with a tradeoff between environmental 
sustainability and economic growth, PRC 
officials often prioritized development at 
the expense of the MEP’s mission. The Min-
istry’s former bureaucratic position reflects 
this. Until 1984, the MEP’s predecessor 
was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Urban Construction (MUC). 12 While the 
National Environmental Protection Agency 
was established in 1984 as an independent 
body, it did not receive a full voting seat at 
the State Council until it became a ministry 
in 2008. 13 The MEP’s operational capacity 
has also been historically weak; the Ministry 
(working with local Environmental Protec-
tion Bureaus EPBs) has historically failed 
in the most basic elements of pollution 
enforcement and compliance in the coun-
tryside, while EPBs remain subordinate 
to local governments through funding. 14 
MEP itself, however, has gained additional 
credibility and political capital with the new 
Environmental Protection Law (EPL) and a 
new minister, Chen Jining. The transforma-
tive nature of the new minister and of the 
EPL are examined in section five below. 
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National Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC): The NDRC is also an important 
policymaking body on environmental 
issues within the Chinese government. 
As mentioned above, its primary mission 
is to set national climate change tar-
gets through its Department of Climate 
Change and National Leading Group to 
Address Climate Change, as well as liaise 
with the Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection through the NDRC Department of 
Resource Conservation and Environmental 
Protection. 15,16 For many years, the NDRC’s 
chief negotiator on climate change was Xie 
Zhenhua. Xie dual-hatted as the Vice Chair-
man of the NDRC. This technocrat had led 
negotiations for China at the UN Climate 
Change Conferences since at least 2007 at 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 Bali 
Negotiations. 17 There were open reports 
that Xie had been called upon to retire from 
his position in early 2015, though stories 
circulated in mid-April 2015 indicate that 
he has now reemerged out of retirement 
to carry the negotiations at least through 
COP 21 in Paris. 18 The NDRC’s Department 
of Resource Conservation and Environmen-
tal Protection has historically worked with 
the National People’s Congress in drafting 
national environmental frameworks. 
National People’s Congress (NPC): The 
NPC’s Environmental Protection and 
Resources Conservation Committee is the 
main body for generating draft legislation 
on the environment. The NPC is strongly 
motivated by economic growth; with the 
NDRC, it had responsibility for drafting the 
first version of the new EPL until this privi-
lege was revoked following a circulation of 
its very weak public draft in August 2012. 19 
Responsibilities were turned over to the 
Law Committee of the NPC, which oversaw 
a much more environmentally-amenable revi-
sion process. The NPC often rubber-stamps 
policies that are generated within the upper 
echelons of the Chinese central government. 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC): The 
PSC also plays an important role as a CCP 
complement and check on the policies 
generated within the NPC and MEP. The 
PSC most often steps in on issues associ-
ated with national infrastructure projects. 
Chaired by President Xi Jinping and 
Premier Li Keqiang, the seventh-ranked 
member Zhang Gaoli is rumored to hold 
the environmental portfolio of the PSC. 20
“Counter Agencies”: Along with policy 
generation, there are also several agencies 
that provide checks against environmen-
tal legislation. These agencies include 
the Ministries of Agriculture, Land and 
Resources and Water Resources, who have 
claimed that certain environmental policies 
encroach on their operational jurisdiction 
given their overlap with the MEP’s mission. 
All of these agencies work to generate 
environmental policies within the Chinese 
system. Noticeably absent from this list, 
however, are social actors, NGOs, local 
governments and community members 
– all central to a classical democratic envi-
ronmentalism model. 
Evidence of a Shifting 
Chinese Structure? 
As described above, China’s environmental 
policymaking structure is remarkably com-
plex. There are several official channels and 
agencies, as well as closed technocratic 
groups, which are involved in the policy 
generation process. Bruce Gilley’s frame-
work takes a comprehensive snapshot 
of many of these players in his analysis 
of China’s authoritarian environmental 
framework. However, since Gilley’s paper 
was published, there have been several 
important developments in how the Chi-
nese government appears to be generating 
policies. This section examines several of 
these case studies, and also undertakes a 
more in-depth content analysis of shifting 
phraseology choices by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, to determine 
whether the PRC is indeed shifting towards 
a more democratic model. 
Examining Case Studies to Determine 
a Democratic Transition
There are several case studies that offer 
insight into China adopting a more dem-
ocratic and inclusive policy process for 
environmental issues, while there are 
also examples pointing towards a con-
tinuation of its traditionally closed-off, 
authoritarian model.
Evidence of a Democratic Model after 
President Xi’s Rise
Empowerment of the MEP and Minister 
Chen Jining: One of the most telling exam-
ples of a shift towards a more inclusive, 
democratically-focused environmen-
tal policymaking process in China is the 
emergence of Chen Jining and the rising 
assertiveness of the MEP in cultivating a 
stronger role for environmental enforce-
ment and community support. Chen Jining 
is viewed by some to be a transformative 
figure in Chinese environmental policy. His 
appointment as the new MEP will also have 
implications for environmental protection 
and enforcement. Chen, a rising political 
star, was hand-picked by Xi’s inner circle 
to take on the MEP’s difficult portfolio. 21 
He previously served as president of the 
prestigious Tsinghua University – Xi’s alma 
mater – and is an environmental sciences 
expert. Given his connections to Xi and 
China’s leadership circles, he is expected 
to be uniquely empowered to carry out the 
MEP’s mission. 
Since Xi Jinping came to power, there have 
also been several instances of the MEP 
trying to elicit greater local-level buy-in 
for environmental enforcement. During 
the drafting of the EPL (expanded further 
below), the MEP controversially circulated 
a public list of 34 arguments against the 
original weak draft pushed by the NDRC 
and the NPC’s Environmental Protection 
and Resources Conservation Committee. 
The list was published on the MEP’s web-
site in late October, 2012, railing against 
the role of exclusive scientific bodies in 
developing policies, lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and a lack of community rights 
or public input, among other elements. 22 
Since that time, Minister Chen has also 
taken bold steps to shut down investment 
projects harmful to local communities and 
environmental sustainability, including the 
Yangzi’s Xiaonanhai dam (a considerable 
USD 5.1 billion project) that the PSC had 
complicity greenlighted and that local 
officials had pushed for at the expense of 
community interests. 23,24 The MEP also 
announced the expansion of greater local 
pollution enforcement teams to combat 
air pollution in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei 
corridor in the Fall of 2014, and according 
to MEP Vice Minister Wu Xiaoqing is also 
ratcheting up efforts to crackdown on data 
falsification by local governments. 25,26
The 2014 Environmental Protection Law: 
Along with the MEP, the new 2014 EPL 
also takes important steps to cultivate a 
more inclusive environmental policymaking 
structure. Within the law, there are guaran-
tees for both whistleblower protection and 
public interest lawsuits, critical pillars for 
cultivating stronger local-level support for 
environmental reforms. The whistleblower 
protection statutes of the EPL takes 
important strides to, “encourage public 
involvement in monitoring corporations 
and regulatory officials to make sure they 
carry out their duties lawfully and appro-
priately.” 27 Citizens will now be protected 
when they report environmental pollution 
or ecological damage caused by institu-
tions, or if they report failures by authorities 
to address such damages. Furthermore, 
following an extensive lobbying process, 
NGOs were able to secure their role as 
champions for public interest lawsuits. In 
an earlier EPL draft, this right was given 
as an exclusive monopoly to the All-China 
Environmental Federation, an organization 
with close ties to the central government. 28 
This is an important step in enabling NGOs 
to serve as interlocutors for local commu-
nities and begin a process of grassroots 
enforcement on environmental law. 
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who destroy ecology or environment, with 
no exceptions.” 36 In a speech in 2013 on 
the Silk Road Economic Belt, he again toed 
a more authoritarian environmentalism 
line, stating that an ecological civilization 
is “[sic] about not only the well-being of 
the people, but also the future develop-
ment of the nation.” 37 Furthermore, at a 
May 2013 study session with the Political 
Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee (CCPCC), Xi stressed 
that “only the strictest system and most 
tight-knit law enforcement” could guar-
antee China’s ecological progress, saying 
that “on issues of ecological and environ-
mental protection, people should not cross 
the line or they will get punished”, and also 
called on people to shift their lifestyles and 
curb consumption to encourage greater 
resource conservation. 38 This choice of 
phrasing aligns very closely with the author-
itarian environmentalism model, particularly 
around limiting personal freedoms, enforcing 
a strict top-down approach, and underscor-
ing the autonomous and omnipotent role 
of central authorities. 
The Environmental Protection Law’s Stip-
ulations on NGOs: Other indicators that 
the Chinese government is continuing 
on its current authoritarian environmental 
model include the limits on NGOs actually 
participating in public interest lawsuits, as 
stipulated in the EPL. In order to file claims 
on behalf of the people in the People’s 
Court, NGOs must, “(1) be registered with 
the civil affairs department at or above 
the municipal level and (2) [have]… been 
focused on environment-related public 
interest activities for five consecutive years 
or more.” 39 Of the over 3,500 registered 
environmental NGOs in China (as of 2012, 
discounting unregistered), it is estimated 
that only roughly 300 will be able to meet 
these two requirements. 40,41 This limits 
the depth and breadth of NGO players 
that can participate, disenfranchising any 
young, issue-specific or locally registered 
NGOs from the process and eliminating a 
potential valuable channel to encourage 
more public involvement and discourse.
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Grassroots Push for Data Transparency: 
Another indication of a democratic shift 
has been the central government’s acqui-
escence towards greater data transparency 
on air and water pollution. Throughout 
2013, environmental NGOs began push-
ing the central government to release 
data on emissions and water discharge 
following several high-level stories about 
Beijing’s “airpocalypse”. To the surprise 
of many NGO leaders, central authorities 
agreed. On January 1, 2014, the central 
government mandated that over 15,000 
factories (including those operated by 
SOEs) must publish their pollution data 
in real time. 29 This was a coup for China’s 
environmental NGOs – while not a direct 
channel for public input into environmental 
lawmaking, greater data transparency does 
allow communities to identify and apply 
pressure to the greatest polluters in their 
towns and cities. This may indirectly culti-
vate greater public support for the central 
government’s policies. Furthermore, this 
central government signal may also cata-
lyze more local-level transparency, a central 
element of democratic transition (spread-
ing authority on tracking and enforcement 
to additional stakeholders). For example, 
the Shandong provincial government has 
started publishing its own monthly vio-
lators list after the central government 
started taking steps towards disclosing 
more data. 30
Even a Shifting Stance for the NDRC?: 
Along with the EPL and MEP, there are even 
indications that the historically removed 
and technocratic NDRC may be taking 
steps to encourage greater community 
involvement in developing environmental 
policies. Albeit before Xi Jinping’s rise to 
power, the NDRC’s National Leading Group 
on Addressing Climate Change took an 
unheard of step in cultivating grassroots 
input. In March 2011, the NLGACC issued 
an unusual call for written submissions from 
the public for ‘advice and suggestions’ 
about a draft climate change law intended 
to bring coherence to the existing suite 
of laws and regulations. The appeal was 
made “in order to realize the principles of 
democratic and open policy-making.” 31 In 
a similar move that October, the NLGACC 
held a meeting with the China Civil Climate 
Change Action Network to solicit the opin-
ions of several NGOs on that same climate 
change bill. 32 In November 2013, the NDRC 
also co-hosted a panel discussion at COP 
19 in Warsaw with the China Civil Climate 
Change Action Network, several NGOs, and 
the All China Environmental Foundation to 
discuss how China could take a more asser-
tive role in soliciting inputs from the NGO 
community. 33, 34 This is a very significant 
development for the NDRC. This organiza-
tion, which has historically aligned against 
greater inclusionary measures (including 
working with the NPC to direct the drafting 
process for the EPL at the exclusion of the 
MEP), appears to be testing the waters for 
at least slightly greater stakeholder input 
into the environmental policymaking pro-
cess – a critical element of a shift towards 
a more democratic model. Indeed, public 
input in the national law-making process 
is becoming more common, and this may 
soon be better reflected in the NDRC’s 
own functioning. 
Evidence of a Strong Authoritarian 
Model after President Xi’s Rise
Xi Jinping’s Ecological Civilization: There 
are, however, several case studies pointing 
towards a continuation of a strong author-
itarian model for environmental policy in 
China in the wake of President Xi’s rise. 
Chief amongst them has been the Pres-
ident’s choice of words. Since coming 
to office, the President has “stressed the 
concept of ecological civilization and 
conservation culture at political events in 
China and abroad more than 60 times since 
November 2012.” 35 Environmental protec-
tion is clearly an area of importance to the 
new President. However, when examining 
his remarks specifically, it becomes clear 
that his approach is ostensibly very authori-
tarian. For example, during the 12th NPC in 
early March, Xi declared that, “we are going 
to punish, with an iron hand, any violators 
Foreign NGO Enforcement Law: Another 
troubling development in the Xi Jinping era 
has been the drafting of an extremely strict 
and limiting law that would render opera-
tions for foreign NGOs nearly impossible. 
This draft law stipulated that NGOs that 
violated “Chinese society’s moral customs” 
could not operate in China, and further 
prevented foreign NGOs from opening 
any branches in China domestically. While 
state monitoring of NGO activities has long 
been accepted as simply the price of oper-
ating in China, this new law was decried 
by rights activists as effectively outlawing 
the operations of foreign NGOs. The NPC 
did amend the law after some push-back 
from internal departments on claims that 
this law would prevent Chinese organiza-
tions from tapping into the wealth of data 
that science and technology-related NGOs 
currently provide. 42 The revised draft spec-
ified instead that foreign NGOs could 
operate only with the permission of the 
State Council. This further indicates a reas-
sertion of an authoritarian structure, given 
both the prioritization of access to tech-
nocratic bodies and the consolidation of 
NGO approval to the central government’s 
State Council. NGOs are an important ele-
ment of civil society within the democratic 
environmentalism framework. Without their 
role to amplify issues from the public to 
the government, it remains very difficult 
to make a transition to a more inclusive 
policymaking structure. 
Prominence of Citizen Activist Censorship: 
Finally, censorship still features as a central 
tool of the government in limiting commu-
nity input into the policymaking process. 
On February 28, 2015, Chai Jing released 
the widely circulated Chinese film Under 
the Dome, a critique of China’s top-down 
policymaking structure and its failure to 
enforce pollution regulations. The film 
circulated for a week and generated 300 
million views before it was taken down 
from Chinese sites, while central authorities 
also ordered news sites to stop circulating 
stories about the documentary. 43 The cen-
sorship of the film underscored that the 
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central government would not tolerate such 
bold criticisms of its own policies. However, 
it is important to note that the government 
did let the film circulate for much longer 
than it could have, increasing the film’s 
exposure. Chen Jining actually praised the 
film as worthy of comparison with Rachel 
Carson’s seminal “Silent Spring”. 44
Content Analysis of MEP Speeches
Along with the anecdotal evidence pre-
sented in the case studies above, this 
assessment also attempts to quantify 
shifting language choices in the speeches 
made by senior MEP officials over the last 
five years to determine a shift towards or 
away from democratic environmentalism. 
This is an important step in operationalizing 
Gilley’s theoretical framework by providing 
an initial content analysis of an increasingly 
influential environmental decision maker in 
the Chinese political system. 
Operationalizing Variables: This paper 
uses the framework presented in Bruce 
Gilley’s “Authoritarian environmentalism 
Characteristics
1  Limit on individual freedom and 
public input to policymaking
2  Policy formation by autonomous  
“ecoelites” supported by technocrats
3  Exclusion of NGOs and business 
actors in policy formation
4  Centralized formulation and  
decentralized implementation
5  Importance of political leadership
AUTHORITARIAN 
environmentalism
DEMOCRATIC 
environmentalism
Visualizing the Environmentalism Spectrum   
Characteristics
1  Few limits on social, civil or  
political liberties
2  Policy formation driven by inclusive, 
multidimensional public discourse
3  Various stakeholders - businesses, 
NGO’s, media, issue experts, politicians
4  Decentralized formulation and  
decentralized implementation
5  Importance of stakeholder consensus
and China’s response to climate change” 
to identify shifting phraseology in MEP 
speeches. This paper draws on the wealth 
of remarks and speeches available on the 
MEP’s website, translated into English by 
the MEP itself. 45 To further visualize the 
spectrum of authoritarian and democratic 
environmentalism models, another chart is 
presented below.
This assessment identified phrases that 
best characterize both democratic and 
authoritarian environmentalism, as defined 
by Gilley and referenced throughout this 
piece. The analysis cross referenced thirty 
unique speeches, remarks, press releases, 
and articles written by former Minister Zhou 
Shengxian and Minister Chen Jining from 
May 2010 through May 2015. 46 Due to 
data limitations, only one speech is avail-
able from Minister Chen; the remaining are 
from Minister Zhou. A graphical depiction 
of the distribution of these sources across 
the five-year period is displayed above. 
Minister Zhou was quit prolific throughout 
2011 and early 2012, and had a relatively 
average number of speaking engagements 
during late 2012 and throughout 2013, fol-
lowed by high activity across early 2014. 
This study used twenty-four words and 
phrases as variables to capture a tran-
sition from authoritarian to democratic 
environmentalism. There are three vari-
able categories – independent variables, 
democratic-focused variables and author-
itarian-focused variables. In order to 
account for the wide spectrum of phrases 
that could indicate a policy shift towards 
more democratic environmentalism, this 
analysis used both “soft democratic” 
phrases (such a “public”, “people”, “soci-
ety”) as well as more “hard democratic” 
phrases (such as “media”, “NGO”, “stake-
holder”, or “democracy”) to capture the 
nuances of any potential shift. The table 
of variables is shown on the right. 
Then, using each written source’s tran-
script from the speeches section of the 
MEP website, a word frequency counter 
was used to determine phrase prevalence 
for each of the variables above. 47 This 
paper then graphically compared word 
prevalence in speeches across the 2010 to 
2015 timeframe. However, written sources 
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varied between 537 and 12,201 words. To 
account for the potential skewing of word 
prevalence, instances of phrase appear-
ance were divided by total words in a 
source, providing a phrase occurrence 
percentage metric. 48 The independent 
variables were used as controls to ensure 
that the speeches themselves concen-
trated on environmental content and 
could therefore be included in the anal-
yses. 49 However, they did not yield any 
statistically relevant trends. 
Once the phrase occurrence percentage 
was calculated, assessments of phrase 
prevalence over time were run for multi-
ple variables to determine any potentially 
statistically significant trends. There were 
both expected and surprising results for 
both the democratic and authoritarian 
phrases. The findings of the study are 
as follows:
Instances of Democratic 
Phrase Prevalence
Looking at the overall structure of the 
phrases, several important trends emerge. 
The most prevalent democratic variables 
used in official minister-level MEP speeches 
and publications since Xi Jinping’s rise are 
(in ranked order): “people”, “promote”, 
“public”, “social” and “society”. Society has 
dropped in usage, but is still fifth most prev-
alent. “Promote” has seen the most year 
over year growth. This may reflect the use of 
mobilizing campaigns such as the Ecological 
Civilization campaign.  A more in-depth anal-
ysis of “hard democratic” variables is featured 
on the right. 
When examining the “hard democratic” 
phrases, some interesting wrinkles in the 
data emerge. Some of the more contro-
versial phrases, such as democracy and 
stakeholder, drop off completely from 
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Instances of Authoritarian 
Phrase Prevalence: 
An analysis of the authoritarian phrases 
also offers interesting insights into the 
priorities of the MEP. Looking at the chart 
below, there has been a decrease in the 
prevalence of “technology” and “science” 
mentioned, while there has been a signifi-
cant rise in the use of “enforcement” and in 
particular, “punish”. A more narrow analysis 
of these phrases is on the right. 
The chart shows the prevalence of the 
use of both “punish” and “enforce” by the 
MEP Minister. Note the shifts that have 
taken place since Xi’s rise to power. There 
are greater instances of enforcement and 
punishment mentioned. 
This indicates a potential emphasis on 
coercive policy measures to ensure environ-
mental compliance, such as the pollution 
regulations in the new EPL.
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official MEP discussions at Xi Jinping’s rise 
to power. Starting in 2014, a greater rele-
vance of the term “community” and “media” 
are used. It is notable that “NGO” does not 
appear in any official Minister-level speech 
between May 2010 and May 2015. 
However, when looking at the “soft demo-
cratic variables” as above, there are a few 
interesting trends that emerge. “People” 
has seen a significant rise in use, while 
“promote” does seem to be growing in 
prevalence but seems to oscillate fre-
quently. “Public” did experience increased 
use in 2013, but has tapered significantly 
through the end of 2014. Not shown in 
this graph, “society” and “social” have 
both experienced a noticeable drop since 
Xi Jinping’s rise. At a more-macro level, 
these graphs indicate that there has been 
a fall in the use of phrases such as “stake-
holder” and “democracy” in MEP Ministerial 
speeches, with an increase in “community”, 
“people”, and “promote”. 
Authoritarian Phrase Prevalence
Pr
ev
al
en
ce
 in
 Te
xt
Year of Speech/Publication
20
10
20
13
20
11
20
14
20
12
20
10
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
14
20
14
20
12
20
12
 fine
 punish
 limit
 enforce/-ment
 tech-nology/-nical
 scien-ce/-tific/-ically-/ness
1.00%
0.50%
0.90%
0.40%
0.80%
0.30%
0.70%
0.20%
0.60%
0.10%
0%
Xi Jinping 
assumes power
Authoritarian Phrase Prevalence
“punish” & “enforce” variables
Pr
ev
al
en
ce
 in
 Te
xt
Year of Speech/Publication
 punish
 enforce/-ment
0.60%
0.50%
0.40%
0.30%
0.20%
0.10%
0%
20
10
20
10
20
13
20
13
20
13
20
11
20
11
20
14
20
12
20
12
20
10
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
14
20
15
20
12
20
12
20
14
20
14
20
14
Xi Jinping 
assumes power
Authoritarian Phrase Prevalence
“technology” & “science” variables
Pr
ev
al
en
ce
 in
 Te
xt
Year of Speech/Publication
 tech-nology/-nical
 scien-ce/-tific/-ically-/ness
0.60%
0.50%
0.40%
0.30%
0.20%
0.10%
0%
20
10
20
10
20
13
20
13
20
13
20
11
20
11
20
14
20
12
20
12
20
10
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
11
20
14
20
15
20
12
20
12
20
14
20
14
20
14
Xi Jinping 
assumes power
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS 41
C
H
IN
A STU
D
IES REVIEW
 vol 2  | 2016
40 Making the Transition: Examining China’s Environmental Policymaking Model
However, another interesting (and contrast-
ing) element of this data is the decreasing 
emphasis on “technology” and “science”, at 
least from the official MEP Ministerial line. 
This may indicate less emphasis on the role 
of technocrats and ecoelites within the Chi-
nese system. Note above how science is of 
much lower magnitude, while technology 
in only mentioned in early 2013 and again 
in mid-2014.  
Takeaways from the Content Analysis
The results of the content analysis offer 
interesting anecdotes to the nature and 
direction of Chinese policymaking, spe-
cifically through the lens of MEP senior 
leadership speeches. Some elements of 
the analysis were as predicted, such as a 
slightly softening attitude to and increasing 
prevalence of “democratic characteristics” 
within MEP publications. As laid out above, 
however, there are varying degrees on the 
democratic spectrum of Gilley’s framework. 
As such, within the confines of the speeches 
and variables chosen in this study, the 
MEP’s public narrative is incorporating the 
increasing use of soft democratic phrases 
like “public”, “promoting” and “people”, 
along with a growing (but still muted) use 
of hard democratic phrases like “commu-
nity” and “media” Simultaneously, the focus 
on more authoritarian concepts like the 
role of technology and science in policy 
generation has fallen. However, there are 
also indications of continued authoritar-
ian environmentalism at play under the Xi 
administration. Since November 2012, the 
MEP has abandoned any mention of truly 
inclusive phrases like “democratic” and 
“stakeholder” in minister-level speeches. 
The terms “punish” and “enforce” have 
reached five year highs in MEP speeches. 
Viewed in isolation, this could be the 
result of the Ministry taking a cue from 
the President’s unprecedented crack-
down on corruption to dial up its own 
Ministerial rhetoric. 
In this context, the data ostensibly points 
towards Chinese policymaking trending 
towards adopting both democratic and 
authoritarian elements in the formulation 
of its environmental frameworks, as shown 
in the qualitative assessment in section five 
and the MEP content analysis above. How-
ever, when assessing these developments 
holistically through Gilley’s framework, the 
question remains whether China’s environ-
mental policymaking is still shifting more 
towards a democratic structure under the 
new Xi Jinping administration. 
Conclusions of the Study and 
Potential Next Steps for Analysis
This study makes several important infer-
ences regarding the nature of Chinese 
environmental policymaking after the rise 
of President Xi Jinping in November 2012. 
Within the qualitative case studies, there is 
evidence of both more inclusive, grassroots 
policymaking and also more exclusive, top-
down policymaking. However, juxtaposed 
against the results of the contextual anal-
ysis, a more nuanced narrative appears. A 
more democratic model is emerging, albeit 
with growing emphasis on elements of the 
authoritarian model. In this context, the key 
conclusions of this analysis are provided in 
the section below, followed by recommen-
dations for next steps in research.
Major Conclusions – 
China Transitions to a more 
Democratic Model, with Caveats
This paper attempts to definitively answer 
the question, “Using Gilley’s framework of 
democratic vs. authoritarian environmental-
ism, is China making the transition towards 
a more inclusive, democratic policymaking 
model?” In short, based on the evidence 
available, this paper asserts that this shift to 
a more democratic model is in fact taking 
place, though it is premature to conclude a 
fundamental shift in China’s approach over 
the long-term.
Recent policy measures, including increased 
data transparency and greater public involve-
ment in the EPL, are strong indicators of a 
shift towards a more democratic model. On 
top of this, the data from the context analy-
sis shows that in MEP ministerial speeches, 
certain democratic catch phrases like 
“people”, “community”, “public”, and “pro-
mote” are growing in use, while phrases 
like “technology” and “science” are falling. 
This indicates a model potentially shifting 
towards Gilley’s democratic environmental-
ist structure, with less reliance on “ecoelites” 
and technocrats in place of the emphasis of 
society and the public to develop new envi-
ronmental policies. 
Evaluating evidence for a democratic vs. 
authoritarian shift, this paper concludes that 
the democratic evidence should be given 
more weight. While the authoritarian evi-
dence presented above could constitute a 
compelling argument, these policies and 
narratives represent the status quo for both 
President Xi Jinping and the traditional Chi-
nese model. The democratic trends in both 
the content analysis and case studies rep-
resent a significant departure from China’s 
established model of environmental poli-
cymaking. At the very least, these results 
point to greater inclusionary rhetoric from 
central authorities with a growing emphasis 
on data transparency and grassroots envi-
ronmental monitoring. 
A Shift with Caveats? 
Democratic Environmentalism 
with Chinese Characteristics
However, the more authoritarian shifts 
should not be discredited completely. 
The authoritarian trends in both the case 
study and content analysis indicate a much 
more complex structural shift in China’s 
environmental policymaking. While the 
Chinese government is showing signs of 
greater inclusionary measures, there has 
been a fall in the use of “democracy” and 
a rise in use of “punish” and “enforce” in 
official MEP speeches. Simultaneously, 
the government has advanced policies 
to carefully orchestrate the role of NGOs 
and activists. These are both indicators of 
a more authoritarian approach that stifles 
references to democratic tools and empha-
sizes stricter social controls. Therefore, in 
the context of the democratic evidence 
above, this analysis finally posits that a 
new model for environmental policymaking 
outside of Gilley’s framework is emerging 
in China – “Democratic Environmentalism 
with Chinese Characteristics”. This model 
is characterized by metered liberalization 
of democratic policymaking emphasizing 
public discourse, grassroots monitoringand 
data transparency, while still choreograph-
ing the role of civil society and carefully 
de-emphasizing “hard democratic” phrases 
in official messaging. 
Recommendations for Potential 
Next Steps for Analysis
Based on the results presented, this analysis 
recommends two areas for further research:
Further Operationalization of the Data 
Set in Content Analysis: This paper only 
used a basic search function to establish 
word prevalence. Given the magnitude of 
material available from MEP, this research 
barely scratched the surface of potential 
relationships inherent in the data. This 
paper recommends that further research 
for specific phrases be examined (beyond 
single words), and also recommends that 
the data be referenced against dates in the 
Chinese political calendar (the NPC, Five Year 
Plans, etc.) to examine how certain phrases 
became more prevalent at specific times. 
Prescriptive Analysis of China’s Transition 
to Democratic Environmentalism: This 
paper examines “how” China has begun 
to shift towards a more democratic model 
for environmental policymaking, based 
on Bruce Gilley’s framework. However, it 
does not examine “why”. There is a scholarly 
consensus that authoritarian environmen-
talism leads to effective policy generation 
but ineffective policy enforcement. Fur-
ther analysis is recommended to examine 
whether the steps taken to liberalize and 
subtly democratize the environmental pol-
icymaking structure will in fact encourage 
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greater efficacy for China’s environmental 
laws. This analysis requires an expanded 
dataset and time horizon to establish any 
relationships between these new policies 
and their effects on pollution enforcement 
and policy generation. However, such anal-
ysis would help not just in understanding 
why China is adapting to its environmen-
tal policymaking limitations, but also in 
illuminating how other authoritarian envi-
ronmentalist entities may address their 
policy shortfalls.
Appendix – Sources for MEP Speeches: 
Full text available at: http://english.mep.
gov.cn/Ministers/Speeches/
Full data analysis available in excel format 
upon request.
Month 
Year
Link: 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Ministers/
Speeches/…
May | 2010 … 201007/t20100707_191806.htm
June | 2010 … 201007/t20100707_191840.htm
November | 2010 … 201011/t20101125_197971.htm
January | 2011 … 201101/t20110113_199824.htm
January | 2011 … 201102/t20110222_201041.htm
April | 2011 … 01102/t20110216_200867.htm
April | 2011 … 201104/t20110412_209078.htm
April | 2011 … 201104/t20110415_209261.htm
June | 2011 … 201105/t20110516_210672.htm
July | 2011 … 201107/t20110707_214518.htm
August | 2011 … 201107/t20110712_214872.htm
September | 2011 … 01108/t20110815_216048.htm
Month 
Year
Link: 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Ministers/
Speeches/…
November | 2011 … 201201/t20120110_222367.htm
November | 2011 … 201111/t20111125_220550.htm
December | 2011 … 01111/t20111124_220485.htm 
January | 2012 … 201201/t20120129_222892.htm
February | 2012 … 201201/t20120113_222534.htm
July | 2012 … 201202/t20120223_223827.htm
August | 2012 … 201208/t20120807_234449.htm
February | 2012 … 201208/t20120807_234449.htm
July | 2012 … 201211/t20121121_242374.htm
August | 2012 … 201208/t20120807_234449.htm
November | 2012 … 201210/t20121030_240700.htm
February | 2013 … 201211/t20121121_242374.htm
February | 2013 … 201302/t20130216_248088.htm
June | 2013 … 201303/t20130320_249648.htm
January | 2014 … 201306/t20130613_253739.ht
February | 2014 … 201401/t20140122_266773.htm
March | 2014 … 201402/t20140217_267823.htm
May | 2014 … 201404/t20140408_270218.htm
June | 2014 … 201405/t20140529_276212.htm
March | 2015 … 201406/t20140612_276867.htm
March | 2015 … 201503/t20150319_297563.htm
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Covered with Dust: 
China’s Position 
in Regional 
Approaches to 
Yellow Dust
Peter C.Y. Kim 
How do environmental problems shape 
regional cooperation in Northeast Asia? 
Using yellow dust, more formally known 
as dust and sandstorms (DSS), as a case 
study, this article describes the prospects 
and challenges of domestic, bilateral and 
multilateral approaches to environmental 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. This article 
argues that while there has been defi-
nite progress in addressing the issue, the 
upstream-downstream dynamics of DSS 
have empowered China’s position in envi-
ronmental negotiations relative to those of 
Japan and South Korea. Domestic political 
priorities as well as an understanding of DSS 
as a strictly natural phenomenon in China will 
continue to hinder the possibility of a more 
robust regional cooperation mechanism. 
On April 15, 2015, Beijing suffered its most 
severe sandstorm in a decade. 1 Thick blan-
kets of yellow-red dust layered the capital 
as its 21 million residents were forced to 
don face-masks and goggles to protect 
themselves from injury and respiratory 
problems. Authorities at the China Mete-
orological Administration (CMA) issued a 
yellow alert, the third-most serious warning 
status, and many areas in the metropoli-
tan region recorded hazardous levels of air 
pollution, some up to nearly 1,000 micro-
grams per cubic meter. The problem had 
regional implications: just two months 
earlier, the worst seasonal yellow dust in 
five years hit the entire Korean Peninsula, 
covering places such as Seoul, Gyeonggi 
Province and Gangwon Province with up 
to 1,044 micro-grams of fine dust per 
cubic meter and more than 800 micro-
grams throughout the peninsula. 2 In fact, 
the Korea Meteorological Administration 
(KMA) deemed atmospheric concentration 
levels of particulate matter so threatening 
that people, especially children and the 
elderly, were advised to stay indoors and 
limit outdoor activity. These yellow dust 
phenomena are not limited to continen-
tal Asia. Within a day after the KMA issued 
a yellow dust warning, Japan witnessed 
rising cumulative PM2.5 levels, with Kyushu, 
Shikoku, Tokai and Tokyo experiencing 
moderately high levels of yellow dust and 
particulate matter. 3
Dust and sandstorms originating from arid 
regions of continental Asia, such as the 
Gobi Desert in Mongolia and the Loess 
Plateau in China, are becoming a signifi-
cant source of concern for the people of 
Northeast Asia. While accepted as a natural 
phenomenon and a traditional harbin-
ger of spring in the region, the increase 
in frequency and intensity of yellow dust 
storms in recent years sits at an intricate 
nexus between environmental security, 
domestic security and foreign policy. This 
paper will explore this phenomenon by 
focusing on the multilateral and domestic 
approaches taken by China, Japan and 
South Korea to address this issue. First, 
the paper will construct a paradigm that 
establishes dust and sandstorms as not just 
a natural occurrence but rather a security 
imperative that cuts across multiple sectors. 
Second, it will survey the development of 
environmental cooperation in Northeast 
Asia especially with regard to addressing 
dust and sandstorms. Last, the paper will 
examine how cooperation mechanisms are 
being implemented in China, the source of 
yellow dust, and assess its response to the 
overall problem at hand. This paper argues 
that even though recent developments in 
cooperation on mitigating DSS have been 
cautiously optimistic, China’s failure to 
establish DSS as a multidimensional priority 
makes tangible reductions in DSS in the 
near future unlikely. This research serves to 
enhance the understanding of the role of 
environmental security in Northeast Asia by 
focusing on a key local issue that is increas-
ingly placing strains on regional affairs. 
Yellow Dust: 
More Than Meets the Eye 
Yellow dust is the colloquial term for what 
is collectively and officially known as dust 
and sandstorms (DSS). 4 DSS is the name 
given to the massive dust storms that occur 
when large quantities of dust and fine 
sand particles from arid regions in China 
and Mongolia are picked up and carried 
towards the Pacific by strong westerly winds 
during the winter and spring. 
Although DSS has occurred naturally for 
thousands of years in the region, 5 its fre-
quency, geographic coverage and damage 
intensity have all escalated within the past 
fifty years. Exceptionally disruptive storms 
in 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2008 and now 
2015 have raised significant awareness 
in the region of the recurrent problem. 
Based on a 2005 report compiled by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the aver-
age recorded occurrence of DSS in China 
has increased more than six-fold since 
the 1950s, with DSS averaging only five 
days per year in the 1950s compared to 
thirty-two days in 2001. 6 Corresponding 
statistics show that annual cases of DSS in 
South Korea have also increased rapidly 
within the same period from less than four 
days a year in the 1980s to an average of 
eighteen days since 2000. 7 Japan has seen 
its average of twenty days per year in the 
1970s increase to about forty days since 
the early 2000s. 8 Although the exact rate of 
increase differs in each country, especially 
since each country uses different criteria 
and thresholds for documenting dust activ-
ity as DSS, all have experienced a dramatic 
rise in the number of DSS incidents per year 
over the past decades. 
W. Chad Futrell of Cornell University claims 
that the discrepancies in the number of 
observed DSS events among the three 
countries are largely due to the differ-
ent paths traveled by the dust storms. 9 
Indeed, storms originating in Inner Mon-
golia usually travel east, but depending on 
wind patterns, they can also travel south 
first and move east afterwards, thereby 
impacting regions within China rather 
than its neighbors. Storms that originate 
in the arid northwest regions of China 
also tend to travel southeast and often 
hit inner provinces in China towards the 
direction of Taipei rather than Beijing or 
Seoul. Similarly, storms brewing from the 
northeast can miss Beijing but pose serious 
threats in the Korean Peninsula and Japan. 
These patterns show the extent to which 
nature plays a definitive role in the yellow 
dust phenomena.
Large-scale DSS events have significant 
socioeconomic ramifications. 10 Accord-
ing to the 2005 ADB report on DSS, direct 
damage caused by DSS can include loss of 
crops and livestock; loss of topsoil; damage 
to property, industries and businesses, criti-
cal facilities and infrastructure; disruption of 
transportation systems; road accidents; and 
closures of schools and services. Likewise, 
indirect damages caused by DSS include 
increased medical expenses as well as 
increased financial costs for cleaning and 
repairing residential and commercial build-
ings. 11 Dust and sandstorms can inflict real 
horror. One such DSS incident occurred 
on May 5, 1993, and caused the destruc-
tion of 4,412 houses, 120,000 livestock 
and 373,000 hectares of cropland in the 
Hexi Corridor of Gansu Province and also 
resulted in eighty-five deaths and 246 inju-
ries. 12 This one case alone cost the Chinese 
economy 550 million Chinese renminbi 
(RMB), or about $72 million. 
As a whole, the ADB estimates that dam-
ages directly associated with DSS in China 
alone range from $70 million to $239 mil-
lion per year, with indirect costs comprising 
at least 4.5 times that of the direct costs. 13 
Understandably, the impacts of DSS differ 
based on the distance from source regions. 
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In South Korea, the Korea Environment 
Institute (KEI) states that the dust storms 
kill up to 165 people annually, mostly the 
elderly or those with respiratory illnesses, 
and sicken 1.8 million more. Schools often 
close, airports are affected due to concerns 
with visibility and a range of industries from 
agriculture to semiconductor manufactur-
ing document losses that the KEI estimated 
in 2008 to be up to 5.5 trillion South Korean 
won (KRW), or close to $5.82 billion. 14 In 
Japan, damages are limited to mostly air 
pollution from particulate matter, poor vis-
ibility that interferes with air and ground 
transportation, and yellow dust piling on 
cars and clothing. Yoshika Yamamoto, 
a researcher from the Environment and 
Energy Research Unit at the Tokyo-based 
Science and Technology Foresight Center, 
summarizes the burden of cost among the 
affected Northeast Asian countries in the 
chart below. 15
The economic costs associated with dust 
and sandstorms are minimal compared to 
the confirmed public health risks. While 
the most common health issues associated 
with DSS are increased cases of eye, nose 
and throat irritation, scientists are increas-
ingly discovering more severe health 
implications from greater exposure to fine 
dust particles. Kazuma Higashisaka et al., 
researchers at Osaka University, explain that 
bacteria can adhere to the outer surface 
of dust particles and therefore exposure 
to yellow dust can lead to increased rates 
of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, 
childhood asthma, bronchitis and even 
pneumonia. 17 More pressing, however, 
is the concern that dust storms pick up 
pollutants, heavy metals and carcinogens 
such as dioxin as they pass over industrial 
regions in China before hitting the Korean 
Peninsula and Japan. Some statistics show 
concentrations of heavy metals such as 
lead, cadmium and chromium that are up 
to fifteen times that of normal air. 18
While there have been varying views on to 
what extent anthropogenic activities have 
contributed to the intensification of DSS 
events in recent decades, there is a general 
consensus in the scientific community that 
decades of deforestation, overgrazing and 
rapid industrialization in northern China and 
Mongolia have directly contributed to land 
degradation, which in turn has accelerated 
desertification. The rate of desertification 
in China has been significant. From the 
1950s until 1975, China saw an expansion 
of desert areas by 1,560 square kilometers 
per year, which then accelerated to 2,100 
square kilometers per year from 1975 to 
1987 and finally to 3,600 square kilome-
ters per year from 1987 to 2000. 19 In fact, 
the advancing desert areas have uprooted 
villages and forced locals to migrate east-
ward, affecting a total of 400 million people 
in recent decades. 20 Because the strength 
and intensity of DSS depend largely on two 
criteria—a dry and loose surface and strong 
and persistent winds—a greater availability 
of dust and sand from desertification has 
led to increased amounts of particulates 
that are blown away by the wind. Yufu Chen 
and Haiping Tang, researchers from the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, specifically 
link recent increases in dust and sand-
storm occurrences to “the consequences 
of human activities such as over-cultivation 
and overgrazing” in Northern China and 
“land desertification due to water diversion 
to farmland and reservoirs.” 21
The causal link between DSS and desert-
ification is a point of concern for many 
environmentalists and policymakers in the 
region. Programs launched by the Chinese 
government have targeted desertification 
through afforestation since the 1950s with 
mixed results. For example, China has been 
experimenting with afforestation since 1978 
by launching the Three-North Shelter Forest 
Program in a broad area covering its North-
east, Northern and Northwest regions. 
Multiple centrally-led and non-govern-
mental organization (NGO)-led initiatives in 
Inner Mongolia have also focused on large-
scale ecological restoration projects. One 
project, headed by the Naiman Semi-Arid 
Research Center, planted poplar trees and 
aspen pines in enclosed fields to encour-
age the growth of native grasslands. Due 
to the research center’s efforts from 1985 
to 2005, degraded land claimed by desert-
ification in the Naiman Banner of Inner 
Mongolia decreased from 1,898 square 
kilometers to 1,199 square kilometers. 22 
However, environmental trends associ-
ated with climate change suggest that 
DSS will increase in the future. That climate 
change has led to drier, hotter seasons to 
the region is readily documented, but this 
trend further underscores the additional 
pressures of depleting water tables and 
increased water scarcity in Northern China, 
both of which complicate the re-vegetation 
processes that current anti-desertification 
mechanisms so highly rely upon.
Sweeping Yellow Dust Out of China: 
Regional and Domestic Approaches 
Multilateral Efforts Against DSS: 
Building a Monitoring Network
DSS is clearly a serious transboundary 
environmental issue in Northeast Asia with 
serious economic and health costs. Despite 
the political rivalry and sensitivity that have 
hindered many modes of cooperation in 
the region, DSS has led to relatively effec-
tive bilateral and trilateral mechanisms 
among China, Japan and South Korea.
Even though all three countries are parties 
to the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO), meteorological data and services 
from WMO mandates are far from adequate 
to analyze and predict DSS. 23 Therefore, 
most bilateral or trilateral agreements 
have focused primarily on improving fore-
cast accuracy, while also restoring desert 
areas in China. Both Japan and South Korea 
started individual bilateral monitoring net-
works with China in 1996. For Japan, the 
Japanese Environmental Agency estab-
lished a monitoring station on the roof of 
the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Envi-
ronmental Protection in Beijing in 1996. 24 It 
Types of Damage Caused by DSS
Across different countries by distance 16  
Source: Yamamoto (2007)
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has since initiated joint monitoring projects 
in Ningxia in 1998, conducted sampling in 
the Dunhuang region and the Taklimakan 
Desert in 2000 and built several monitoring 
stations in Japan in 2003. Japan signed a 
research agreement with China in 2000 to 
further investigate the formation, spread 
and effects of sandstorms. 25 South Korea 
similarly pursued a bilateral approach to 
DSS, opting to support a tree-planting pro-
gram in China from 2001 to 2005 through 
the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA), its primary official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) agency. 
The formation of the Tripartite Environmen-
tal Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 1999, a 
South Korean initiative to bring together 
the environmental ministries of China, 
Japan and South Korea for greater envi-
ronmental cooperation, proved to be a 
turning point for each country’s DSS strat-
egy. Although DSS was not included in the 
agenda in the first TEMM, it was eventu-
ally incorporated into the agenda by the 
third TEMM in 2001 at the insistence of 
South Korea on addressing yellow dust as 
a regional problem. According to Reinhard 
Drifte, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Asia 
Research Center of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, the fact 
that DSS was included by TEMM at its third 
iteration reveals Chinese attitudes regard-
ing yellow dust. Drifte asserts that although 
yellow dust had garnered public attention 
in all three countries by the founding of 
TEMM, China “[did] not like to be implic-
itly or explicitly exposed to the accusation 
of being the main causer of yellow [dust]” 
and believed that the inclusion of DSS in 
the TEMM agenda would naturally place 
blame onto itself. 26 Nonetheless, success-
ful diplomacy led to a tripartite agreement 
in 2001 for joint monitoring mechanisms 
through remote sensing equipment, train-
ing, and research. In 2003, TEMM, along 
with the ADB, the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), launched the 
Regional Technical Assistance on Dust 
and Sandstorm (DSS-RETA). DSS-RETA, 
in tandem with an independent Regional 
Master Plan for Prevention and Control of 
Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia, 
brought together the TEMM countries, 
Mongolia and four partner institutions 27 
with a strategy on establishing a regional 
DSS monitoring and early warning net-
work. Through DSS-RETA and the Regional 
Master Plan, a total of nineteen DSS mon-
itoring sites were built and have been 
operational since 2006, with fifteen sites 
located in China and four in Mongolia. 
All three TEMM countries currently main-
tain an early DSS warning service for the 
public, but forecasting accuracy for Japan 
and South Korea still depends heavily on 
raw data collected at source sites in China 
and Mongolia.
While regional cooperation has led to the 
construction of monitoring sites through-
out China, effective data sharing has 
still been an obstacle. In February 2008, 
China suddenly withdrew from the DSS-
RETA monitoring program and unilaterally 
refused to let equipment located within its 
borders be used for gathering meteorolog-
ical data, claiming that such information was 
critical to national security and could not be 
released to its neighbors or the public. 28 
This resulted in furious criticism outside of 
China; then Environment Minister of Japan, 
Ichiro Kamoshita, disapprovingly stated, 
“About yellow sand, I am not sure how 
and why it can be regarded as a national 
secret. Air is connected beyond national 
borders, and yellow sand travels beyond 
borders. I think it is important we share 
information.” 29 Interestingly, later that year 
in September 2008, China started relaxing 
its national security dialogue and agreed 
to share raw numerical data on PM10 
concentrations in DSS source areas with 
Japan and South Korea. 30 As recently as 
April 2015, China again agreed to provide 
yellow dust data from a greater number 
of sites, although this time only to South 
Korea as part of a bilateral agreement. 31 
These agreements are expected to give 
South Korea access to raw data from over 
seventy-four observation stations in China, 
a considerable increase from its current 
access to four CMA stations. 32
Bilateral and trilateral cooperation on DSS 
has been especially effective in two ways. 
First, DSS, at least on a regional level, has 
been acknowledged as a trans-bound-
ary environmental problem with its point 
sources located in China and Mongolia. 
Second, financial assistance, technology 
transfer and capacity building have been 
effectively implemented, with China 
receiving the largest share of assistance 
in establishing monitoring networks. 
Although tensions still remain regarding 
China’s deliberately withholding DSS data 
from its neighbors, cooperation within the 
past two decades has been moderately 
successful in monitoring the problem, its 
trajectory and its severity.
Solving DSS Through Desertification: 
Domestic and NGO Approaches 
Domestic approaches from the Chinese 
government at addressing DSS have tar-
geted desertification. According to Qi 
Lu and Sen Wang, researchers from the 
Chinese Academy of Forestry, China’s 
anti-desertification strategies mainly fall 
under six following categories: 1) building 
windbreaks on the peripheries of deserts, 
2) protecting oases, 3) managing agro-pas-
toral transition zones, 4) safeguarding the 
outskirts of cities and towns, 5) protecting 
head waters of rivers and 6) harnessing 
desertified grassland. 33 Most projects have 
attempted to address deforestation either 
through afforestation and re-vegetation or 
overgrazing and over-cultivation through 
restrictions on herding and farming. 
Since the 1980s, with the aforementioned 
Three-North Shelter Forest Project, China 
has been planting billions of trees to con-
struct a “green wall” in thirteen northern 
provinces around the Gobi Desert to 
block its expansion. In 2002, the central 
government reaffirmed its commitment to 
the so-called Green Wall by increasing its 
budget to 60 billion RMB, or $7.22 billion. 34 
As a result, the State Forest Administration 
(SFA), the central government body in 
charge of forestry affairs and thus the main 
actor for reforestation, stated in 2014 that 
“China is on track to meet its 2020 target 
for expanding the nation’s forest to cover 
23 percent of its landmass.” 35 Since 2008, 
afforestation efforts have gained momen-
tum. China has planted 13 million hectares 
of new forests per year, which has increased 
total forest coverage to 208 million hect-
ares, or 21 percent of its entire landmass. In 
fact, the Green Wall of China has received 
so much positive publicity in the press that 
even Luc Gnacadja, the executive secre-
tary of the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), lauded 
Chinese efforts to combat desertification: 
“It is fair to say that China has the right 
vision, the political will and is moving in 
the right direction.” 36
China’s massive, state-led afforestation ini-
tiatives are working in tandem with other 
afforestation projects that are coordinated 
by both international institutions and NGO 
movements. While ADB’s involvement 
in establishing monitoring networks has 
been crucial in the regional fight against 
DSS, other multilateral bodies such as the 
World Bank have extensively supported 
rural poverty programs like the Loess Pla-
teau Watershed Rehabilitation Project that 
have included grassland and soil stabiliza-
tion initiatives. These programs, although 
not specifically targeted towards DSS, are 
notable in that they have established strong 
linkages between rural poverty and desert-
ification. The prevention of DSS is also a 
significant part of the North-East Asian 
Subregional Programme for Environmental 
Cooperation (NEASPEC), an intergovern-
mental framework coordinated by ESCAP, 
UNDP, UNEP, and ADB. Unlike TEMM or 
DSS-RETA, NEASPEC includes North Korea 
and Russia, two other important stake-
holders in Northeast Asia. NEASPEC has 
organized multiple training workshops for 
policymakers on ways to combat desert-
ification through capacity building and 
information sharing. Moreover, it has 
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worked to expand the Regional Master 
Plan in Mongolia. In addition to multi-
lateral cooperation, Japan has invested 
around $375 million in 2003 and 2004 
alone through ODA to bolster China’s affor-
estation efforts, while South Korea has also 
spent over $10 million since 2001 through 
KOICA for the same purpose. 37
Japanese and South Korean NGOs have 
played a significant role in working with 
local groups in China since the 1990s to 
mitigate desertification while also alleviat-
ing rural poverty. Groups such as Japan’s 
Green Earth Network (GEN), the Korean 
Federation for Environmental Movement 
(KFEM) and EcoPeace Asia are examples 
of the numerous NGOs working in China on 
a wide variety of target-specific solutions to 
address desertification. While each NGO’s 
area of focus and expertise may be differ-
ent, they are all similar in that they have 
developed region-specific strategies and 
projects rather than simply plant trees. For 
instance, GEN has been exploring growing 
trees that could also address the needs of 
local residents and is currently focusing on 
apricot trees, which are drought-resistant 
and can also yield produce. KFEM, on the 
other hand, has prioritized the develop-
ment of hybrid grass test sites with local 
herders instead of focusing on afforesta-
tion. Likewise, EcoPeace Asia has chosen to 
invest in growing grasses rather than trees 
with the belief that grasses are more suited 
to the environment in Inner Mongolia. Part-
nership is now moving to the private sector 
as well. With the introduction of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) reports in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, 
many companies in China have launched 
tree-planting initiatives as part of their CSR 
efforts. In order to raise awareness about 
sustainable land management, South 
Korea’s Hanwha Group with UNCCD and 
the SFA helped install an 80 kilowatt-hour 
solar photovoltaic generation facility in 
Lingwu, Ningxia, in 2012 and provided 
technical training for managing and oper-
ating the facility. 
Understanding China’s 
Role in DSS Mitigation 
The relative success of TEMM in estab-
lishing monitoring networks and the 
engagement of local, regional and 
international non-government actors 
in addressing desertification and DSS 
paint a rosy picture on the outlook of mit-
igating DSS in the region. However, while 
policies have generally been portrayed 
as yielding positive results, there are sev-
eral characteristics in China’s approach to 
DSS that raise significant doubts upon the 
likelihood of actual reductions in DSS in 
the near future.
Problems with Future Multilateral 
Approaches to DSS 
The key critical difference in China’s 
approach to DSS compared to that of 
Japan or South Korea is the characterization 
of DSS as a natural phenomenon. While all 
three countries acknowledge that dust and 
sandstorms have been occurring naturally 
for thousands of years, the anthropogenic 
causes of recent increases in frequency, 
intensity, and toxicity have been strikingly 
downplayed by the Chinese government. 
In a 2007 interview with China Daily, Qin 
Dahe, director of the CMA and also a dele-
gate representing the scientific community 
at the Chinese People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference (CPPCC), stated, “It is 
impossible for human beings to get rid of 
sandstorms, which have existed for millions 
of years.” China Daily adds an additional 
dimension to Qin’s statement by summa-
rizing: “Spring sandstorms are inevitable, 
so people should accept the law of nature 
and not worry so much… So said China’s 
top meteorologist in order to correct what 
he considers public misunderstanding of 
the annual phenomenon.” 38 That Qin, 
as a member of CPPCC, emphasizes the 
natural inevitability of DSS rather than the 
anthropogenic pressures that the scientific 
community in Japan, South Korea and even 
within China highlights captures an alarm-
ing picture of the Chinese government’s 
attempt to consciously minimize its contri-
bution to DSS as a trans-boundary issue. 
This viewpoint is also confirmed by Liu Tuo, 
the head of the desertification control office 
in the SFA, who commented, “The sand-
storms are a natural disaster like typhoons 
or earthquakes,” 39 and by Chinese meteo-
rologist Lu Juntian, who wrote, “There have 
been five periods with high frequencies of 
sand storms in China over the past 1700 
years, with each period lasting about 90 
years.” 40 Some experts have gone even 
further by applauding yellow dust for its 
potential environmental benefits such as 
neutralizing acid rain, depositing minerals 
into the ocean or reflecting sunshine to 
help reduce global warming. While these 
effects may be present, the benefits are 
highly insignificant compared to the costs 
and damage DSS inflict in China, Mongolia, 
Japan, and South Korea. 
Avoiding direct responsibility for DSS has 
also factored into China’s broader view of 
treating DSS as a trans-boundary issue. As in 
most upstream-downstream politics, China, 
as the upwind country, feels less obliged 
to harness efforts to address DSS and the 
many pollution-related environmental 
problems arising from yellow dust collect-
ing industrial pollutants, which happen to 
be the main source of concern for Japan 
and South Korea. This is even more so 
because of China’s understanding of DSS 
as a natural occurrence and not one with 
anthropogenic ties. This is worrisome for 
two reasons. First, as established thus far, 
much of the bilateral and multilateral coop-
eration among the three states has focused 
on establishing monitoring networks in 
China, which was essentially a transfer of 
technology and know-how through Jap-
anese and South Korean ODA. Now that 
China has a robust system of observation 
stations installed, there may be less room 
for continued cooperation. Japan lacks the 
initiative required for developing a real 
framework for regional cooperation that 
does not involve ODA, especially since it 
suffers noticeably less from DSS than either 
of the two other countries. On the other 
hand, South Korea, which suffers more from 
DSS, has shown leadership in regional envi-
ronmental diplomacy, but cooperation with 
China on this issue is still limited to receiv-
ing raw observation data from China.
Second, because the upwind-down-
wind dynamic strengthens China’s role in 
regional DSS policymaking, for any mode 
of cooperation to be successful, Chinese 
input and willingness to comply with Japan 
and South Korea must be present. However, 
the Chinese refusal to provide monitoring 
data to Japan and South Korea in 2008, 
which curiously coincided with the Beijing 
Olympics and the central government’s 
green Olympics media campaign, shows 
that China’s willingness to comply varies 
significantly based on its domestic priori-
ties. Additionally, because Japan and South 
Korea are situated at the receiving end of 
yellow dust data, the future of multilateral 
cooperation sits precariously on domestic 
developments within China. Moreover, 
current DSS research is now shifting from 
analyzing dust storm sources and move-
ments to focusing more on the changes 
in the composition of dust as it travels 
over Chinese territory. This means that 
raw yellow dust data can now be used to 
track the amount and type of pollutants 
that dust particles capture while moving 
across China. Essentially, pollutants can be 
used as a proxy for the level of industrial 
development, which in turn can be used 
to assess China’s national economic devel-
opment policies especially in politically 
sensitive regions of Inner Mongolia and 
Xinjiang. This exposes the central govern-
ment to domestic and foreign pressure, and 
therefore, as DSS monitoring technology 
develops over time, China may be even 
less willing to share raw data with Japan 
and South Korea.
Domestic Initiatives: Good Intentions 
but Questionable Results
While the future of regional cooperation on 
DSS will likely face challenges in the coming 
years due to the crowding out of available 
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means of cooperation and an increasing 
dependence on Chinese domestic pol-
itics, there is hope for efforts to mitigate 
DSS within Chinese borders. Because the 
official Chinese stance on DSS is that it is a 
natural phenomenon, domestic efforts to 
address the problem have instead focused 
on combating desertification, which is at 
the core of dust and sandstorms. How-
ever, it is important to realize that there is 
a gap between desertification and DSS. 
The central government has focused on 
desertification because it is a significant 
problem on its own, not because it believes 
that the best way to solve DSS is through 
desertification. While many Japanese and 
South Korean NGOs have worked on affor-
estation in China with the primary objective 
of reducing dust and sandstorms, the Chi-
nese government is undoubtedly more 
concerned with the encroaching desert; 
any reductions in DSS can thus be seen as 
a positive externality. 
China has a number of strengths in com-
bating desertification. First, the Chinese 
government, through the 2001 Law on 
Preventing and Combating Desertification, 
has a well-established legal framework 
for desertification control. Second, as 
evidenced by its multi-billion RMB invest-
ment in the Green Wall of China, there is 
strong political commitment and a sound 
acknowledgment of desertification at the 
top leadership level. Third, national affor-
estation policies have had high levels of 
participation by local farmers and have 
attracted the help of many local orga-
nizations, allowing for a transition from 
top-down to bottom-up approaches in 
re-vegetating lands lost to deserts.
However, these efforts have been met with 
criticism from the scientific community. Jon 
R. Luoma, a contributing editor at Audu-
bon, writes that researchers question the 
long-term sustainability of China’s affor-
estation push. More specifically, Luoma 
argues that based on an analysis by sci-
entists at Beijing Forestry University, up 
to 85 percent of the newly-planted trees 
may ultimately fail in the medium to long-
term. 41 Many of the newly planted saplings 
have a lifespan of only four decades, are 
mono-cultures prone to disease and ulti-
mately are unsuited to the soil. Chen and 
Tang also suggest that the project is gen-
erally unsuccessful because the types of 
trees that are planted do not survive the 
arid and semiarid steppe landscape. 42 Gao 
Jixi, a researcher at the China Environmen-
tal Science Institute, wants policymakers 
to consider the “environment in northern 
and [north]western China as a whole” and 
states, “Planting more trees does not mean 
the improvement of the environment.” 43 
Likewise, Xu Jianchu, a professor at the Kun-
ming Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy 
of Sciences, argues, “The SFA only looks 
at forested land, but they forget the big 
picture.” 44 The big picture, he claims, sug-
gests worsened soil erosion and water 
scarcity as major casualties of China’s 
afforestation program. 
Towards a Cleaner Future
For China to help solve the increasingly 
pressing issue of dust and sandstorms, 
there must be distinct developments in 
the battle against desertification and the 
national concept of DSS as more than a 
natural phenomenon.
Recent developments in environmentalism 
in China show good promise. President Xi 
Jinping and Premier Le Keqiang have both 
declared war on pollution on the basis of 
a Chinese-style ecological civilization. A 
greater emphasis on market mechanisms 
and pollution taxes are pressuring dirty 
state-owned industrial facilities, such as 
coal plants and petrochemical plants, to 
comply with environmental targets set forth 
by central authorities, while civil society has 
taken a greater role in raising awareness of 
air and water pollution issues. The success-
ful passing of the Environmental Protection 
Law (EPL) now allows public interest law-
suits through registered NGOs, guarantees 
whistle-blower protection and calls for 
greater data transparency. Even the cadre 
system, often seen as the fundamental 
weakness in local implementation of central 
environmental policies, is shifting towards 
green evaluations, with criteria such as air 
quality becoming one of the metrics used 
to evaluate cadres and gauge their likeli-
hood of promotion. 45
These political developments offer unprec-
edented opportunity for addressing 
environmental issues such as desertification 
and DSS. To redirect anti-desertification 
efforts from simply planting trees to a more 
sustainable policy, the following concepts 
must be considered. First, policymakers 
must further coordinate with researchers, 
ecologists and environmental experts. The 
largest setback to the Green Wall of China 
is the incompatibility of trees with the local 
ecosystem. In fact, in Chinese deserts and 
grasslands in Inner Mongolia, grass is by 
far the most common form of vegetation 
rather than trees. The massive planting of 
trees not only conflicts with the ecology 
of the region, but is also more expensive 
and uses large quantities of groundwater 
that are becoming increasingly scarce. 
In western Inner Mongolia, groundwater 
has now receded to 100 meters below 
the surface from what used to be just 
0.5 meters. 46Grass, on the other hand, is 
denser, is primarily dependent on rainwater 
rather than groundwater, and keeps the soil 
from blowing away. Second, afforestation 
efforts must continue into areas further 
away from cities. The lack of infrastructure 
such as roads in key areas has meant that 
afforestation efforts both from the central 
government and NGOs have avoided the 
very remote areas that are perhaps more 
stricken by land degradation. Third, anti-de-
sertification programs must emphasize 
poverty alleviation and a greater consid-
eration for local customs in rural Inner 
Mongolia. Overgrazing is a key contributing 
factor to desertification, but central gov-
ernment programs that target overgrazing 
have little regard for the lives of the local 
people, who are some of the poorest in the 
nation. In some villages in Inner Mongolia, 
open grazing has been banned outright 
and the number of grazing animals limited. 
The central government aims to resettle the 
remaining 1.1 million nomad population 
who are mostly ethnic Mongolians. Yang 
Youlin, the Asia regional coordinator for 
UNCCD, agrees with the need for increased 
local input: “We definitely need to better 
understand the traditional nomadic culture 
on the steppes here. Nomadic herdsmen 
are not comfortable with static agriculture… 
[and] want to own more animals.” 47
In terms of addressing dust and sandstorms, 
it is in China’s interest to first recognize 
the anthropogenic input factors that have 
increased the frequency, intensity and 
toxicity of recent storms. While the central 
government’s main environmental priori-
ties appear to be air quality, water quality, 
water management and land degradation 
(including desertification), dust and sand-
storms sit at an intricate nexus between 
all of these issues. Mitigating yellow dust 
improves air quality, especially with respect 
to trapped pollutants, heavy metals and 
other forms of PM2.5 and PM10. Targeting 
DSS also addresses issues of water scarcity 
and land degradation. Therefore, estab-
lishing direct linkages between DSS and 
each of China’s environmental initiatives 
can provide a more robust framework to 
tackle both problems simultaneously. 
Furthermore, by underscoring such link-
ages, China can open new venues for 
ODA from Japan and South Korea. The 
environmental communities in China’s 
neighboring countries have prioritized 
DSS mitigation efforts for years, especially 
because unlike other domestic environ-
mental problems, the upwind-downwind 
nature of DSS has meant that Japan and 
South Korea are powerless to reduce costs 
inflicted by DSS unless they actively engage 
with China. China has a host of environ-
mental problems that require attention, 
and as argued above, these problems 
offer potential linkages to DSS. An official 
push in expanding DSS prevention within 
China will be viewed favorably by the other 
two countries and can lead to increased 
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financial or technological assistance with 
other related environmental problems, 
thereby resulting in positive gains. More-
over, Japan and South Korea, as downwind 
countries, will feel a greater level of inclu-
sion and involvement in solving DSS, which 
can assuage regional tensions over this 
environmental issue.
To do so, there must be a greater empha-
sis on cooperation between domestic 
researchers and policymakers. TEMM and 
NEASPEC have allowed for joint research 
between Chinese scientists and their Jap-
anese and South Korean counterparts who 
understand DSS as more than a natural 
occurrence. Even within China, there is a 
strong scientific community that recognizes 
the multidimensional linkages. A general 
agreement on the anthropogenic factors 
contributing to DSS among the ecoelites 
and technocrats could shape policy more 
favorably towards resolving the DSS prob-
lem. Included in the broad overhaul on the 
characterization of yellow dust is a greater 
need for civil society and the media to 
become involved in reporting dust and 
sandstorm events. While media reports 
have detailed the extent of damage caused 
by each DSS incident, they have shown a 
general pattern of qualifying the economic 
and social costs with the emphasis that DSS 
are inevitable occurrences of nature. This 
gap in available evidence and reporting is 
significant enough for civil society actors, 
including NGOs and independent filmmak-
ers, to pressure the Chinese government to 
take a stronger stance on addressing DSS. 
Finally, there may be room for Chinese 
officials to link DSS (or more generally 
desertification) to climate change, espe-
cially as experts are now worried that 
increasing temperatures and drier seasons 
may thwart years of land recovery. Climate 
change has national security implications. 
However, the Chinese government has 
shown reluctance to associate climate 
change with national security, 48 so it is 
highly unlikely that desertification (and 
DSS) will serve a role greater than its current 
one as an environmental problem.
Conclusion 
Dust and sandstorms are a significant 
environmental issue. While they do occur 
naturally, it is without a doubt that man-
made changes in China’s environment, 
especially desertification, have led to 
more frequent and intense storms in recent 
decades. Because dust particles pick up 
industrial pollutants and bacteria while trav-
eling across China before inflicting damage 
on South Korea and to a lesser extent 
Japan, the regional community is increas-
ingly alarmed by the socioeconomic and 
public health costs of yellow dust. Within 
the past two decades, China, Japan and 
South Korea have made unprecedented 
strides in environmental cooperation on 
DSS despite lingering political sensitivities. 
Collaborations such as TEMM and DSS-
RETA with assistance from international 
organizations such as ADB, UNESCAP and 
UNCCD have established a strong network 
of monitoring systems throughout China 
and Mongolia, while continued bilateral 
mechanisms have led to ODA and technol-
ogy transfers from Japan and South Korea 
to the point source sites. However, China’s 
unilateral handling of raw observation 
data based on its domestic priorities has 
placed strains and distrust on an otherwise 
effective cooperation.
At home, China does not have a specific 
policy mechanism for DSS and instead 
treats DSS as nothing more than a natural 
phenomenon. At the same time, however, 
its aggressive afforestation tactics through 
the Green Wall of China and other projects, 
such as those that have targeted overgraz-
ing, have contributed greatly to mitigating 
desertification, which in turn address prob-
lems central to DSS. With opportunities 
for increased multilateral cooperation on 
DSS likely to decrease, China’s domestic 
efforts against DSS are critical to the future 
of dust and sandstorms as a policy agenda 
in Northeast Asia. There is room for devel-
opment: a change in Chinese official and 
public stances on yellow dust by recogniz-
ing the anthropogenic input factors, the 
establishment of linkages between DSS 
and its core environmental drivers and 
the opening of new venues for coopera-
tion from Japan and South Korea through 
ODA in other environmental issues. Recent 
political developments within China show 
that central authorities are now more 
than ever inclined to tackle environmen-
tal issues. But with so many problems to 
choose from, it remains to be seen whether 
DSS as a separate policy issue will be able 
to catch the attention of Chinese leaders 
as they engage in their recently declared 
war on pollution.
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Same Goal, 
Different 
Trajectories: China 
and India’s Naval 
Modernization 
in Comparative 
Perspective
Shuxian Luo
Since the 1990s, as China and India have 
become rapidly integrated into the global 
economy, the need for a modern blue-water 
navy has loomed large. Despite similarities 
both in driving forces and constraints, the 
two countries’ naval modernization have 
demonstrated very different trajectories. 
China has prioritized “near-sea” defense 
capabilities and modernized its navy at 
a stunning pace, whereas India empha-
sizes power projection capabilities but 
has carried out its naval modernization at 
a relatively modest speed. The two coun-
tries’ economic development gap, while 
a critical factor contributing to their mili-
tary capabilities gap, leaves unanswered 
some key questions observed in this dis-
crepancy. Besides economic factors, there 
are other factors that have decisively influ-
enced their naval development patterns. 
These factors include threat perceptions 
between the two countries as well as alli-
ance options and threat perceptions with 
third-party countries.
The imperative of developing a modern 
navy has been harbored by the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic 
of India since their independence in the 
1940s. 1 However, in the four decades fol-
lowing their foundation, both countries 
had to allocate their limited resources to 
build up ground forces as they perceived 
major security threats emanating from the 
land. 2 Since the 1990s, as China and India 
have become rapidly integrated into the 
global economy, the need for a modern 
navy has loomed large due to a variety of 
common driving forces. The major driv-
ers entail:  their increasing reliance on 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for 
trade and energy supplies, the growing 
desire to establish dominance in areas 
regarded as their “maritime backyards” 
(the South China Sea and the northern 
Indian Ocean, respectively) and the need 
to protect their growing global interests. 3 
Additionally, both countries have wrestled 
with similar constraints, including the long-
standing dominance of their armies and 
competing choices between defense and 
civilian goods.
Notwithstanding so many similarities, China 
and India’s naval modernization has fol-
lowed very different trajectories. China has 
prioritized “near-sea” defense capabilities 
and modernized the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) at a stunning pace. India 
emphasizes power projection capabilities, 
but has carried out its naval modernization 
at a relatively modest speed. 4
At first glance, the development gap 
between China and India seems to offer 
a plausible explanation for the different 
paths in their naval modernization. Eco-
nomic power, while a key enabler of military 
modernization, fails to address some key 
questions in this discrepancy, however: 
why did China and India choose to prior-
itize different types of naval capabilities? 
Beyond economic factors, are there other 
factors that can better explain their different 
paces and scopes as well as their sources of 
arms acquisition? Have the two countries’ 
priorities changed over time and will they 
change in the future?
This paper will answer these questions by 
examining two factors. The first is the threat 
perception of each country, which offers a 
clear explanation for why China and India 
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chose to prioritize different capabilities. 
The second is the availability of potential 
allies, which helps to explain why China and 
India’s naval modernization has proceeded 
at different speeds and scales, and through 
different arms acquisition sources. 5 The 
conclusion will also discuss how the trends 
of naval modernization are likely to play out 
in both bilateral and multilateral contexts, 
and how the Sino-Indian interactions in the 
maritime domain will shape their broader 
strategic discourse.
What Capabilities to Build: 
Measuring Threat Perception
Comparison of naval modernization 
between China and India dwells, for the 
most part, on their distinct evaluations of 
their own maritime security environments. 
Differing threat perceptions appear to be a 
major factor that accounts for the different 
naval capabilities that the two countries pri-
oritize in their paths to naval modernization.
Having settled most of its land border dis-
putes in the 1990s, China sees its major 
security threats lying on its maritime periph-
ery, specifically, Taiwan, and maritime 
territorial disputes in the East and South 
China Seas. Beijing views the “near-sea” as 
the “main strategic direction” of its military 
planning and modernization, in which the 
United States (primarily the U.S. Navy) is 
viewed as China’s most likely adversary. 6
Taiwan comes as the first and most press-
ing maritime issue that instills a sense of 
urgency and vulnerability in Beijing. Spe-
cifically, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crises 
exposed   the weakness of the PLAN vis-
à-vis the U.S. Navy, and underscored “the 
potential challenge of U.S. military inter-
vention.” 7 Arguing that U.S. “hegemonism” 
and “military interventionism” were on the 
rise, Chinese security analysts pushed for 
prioritizing and accelerating military mod-
ernization. 8 In its 1998 Defense White 
Paper, China declared the modernization 
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a 
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major component of its defense strategy, 
with an emphasis on “reducing quantity 
and improving quality” while transition-
ing the PLA from “manpower-intensive” 
to “technology-intensive.” 9 The growing 
pro-independence mentality in Taiwan 
throughout the 1990s—which culminated 
in the victory of the pro-independence can-
didate, Chen Shui-bian, in Taiwan’s 2000 
presidential election—underscored the 
imperative for Beijing to accelerate naval 
modernization in preparation for a Taiwan 
conflict scenario. 10 In the 2004 Defense 
White Paper, China clearly stated that the 
PLAN, along with the PLA Air Force and the 
Second Artillery, would receive priority in 
terms of resource allocation. 11
The Taiwan issue aside, China has not 
resolved its territorial disputes with any of 
its eight maritime neighbors, leaving an 
oceanic periphery embedded with flash-
points. 12 The East China Sea presents a 
major arena where China and Japan have 
clashed since the mid-2000s. Each side 
presses its claims by deploying naval and 
coast guard vessels to disputed waters 
around the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. In 
the South China Sea, China’s relations 
with Southeast Asian countries, particularly 
Vietnam and the Philippines, have soured 
rapidly as clashes at sea have become 
more frequent. Beijing has always been 
aware that should China attempt to use 
force in either case, the U.S. military is a 
major factor that could stand in the way 
of China’s success. 13
These disputes are also increasingly related 
to another issue of equally strategic con-
cern to Beijing: the “Malacca Dilemma.” 
This dilemma refers to the prospect that the 
U.S. Navy, by using its air and naval deploy-
ment in the Indo-Pacific region, can block 
China’s energy lifelines. Acknowledging the 
vulnerability of its critical sea lines, Beijing 
typically envisions such a blockade against 
the backdrop of a China-U.S. military con-
flict in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea 
or the South China Sea. 14
By contrast, India enjoys a far more benign 
maritime environment, which has enabled 
New Delhi to invest more in building its 
power projection capabilities to safeguard 
its seaborne trade and energy imports, and 
undertake low-intensity and noncomba-
tant functions in the far-flung waters of the 
Indian Ocean.
With its longstanding territorial dispute 
with Pakistan over Kashmir and Jammu, 
India confronts “no counterpart to the 
Taiwan impasse [on its maritime frontier] 
that compels [the Indian leadership to take] 
quick action on their part.” 15 Although 
maritime border disputes once existed 
between India and its neighbors, most were 
minor and have been settled through bilat-
eral and multilateral negotiations as well as 
international arbitration. 16
Although Pakistan remains India’s major 
threat on the subcontinent, whether the 
Pakistani naval capability—especially its 
submarine fleet—poses a threat to India is 
questionable. If New Delhi sees Pakistan 
or littoral defense as its primary maritime 
concern, then it should have invested heav-
ily to build “a localized fleet of short-range 
surface combatants supplemented by land-
based naval aviation assets,” which New 
Delhi has not done. 17 Indeed, the Pakistani 
navy is only half the size of the Indian Navy 
(IN) in terms of manpower, and one-fifth the 
size in terms of combat vessels. 18
Whether India perceives China as its major 
threat is also debatable. Over the past 
decade, New Delhi appears to have per-
ceived the expanding presence of China 
in the Indian Ocean as a major challenge 
to India’s dominance in this region. 19 The 
“string of pearls,” a term coined by Booz 
Allen Hamilton in 2005 with reference to 
China’s network of maritime facilities in the 
littoral of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and 
the PLAN’s routinized anti-piracy operations 
in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 have both 
caused consternation in India. 20
That said, New Delhi seems to have yet to 
reach a broader consensus on the imme-
diacy and severity of the threat China 
would impose on India’s security interests, 
mostly because of the uncertainty about 
China’s long-term intentions. 21 Some India 
experts believe that the mainstream per-
spective in New Delhi “has been that the 
threat from China is not direct, but lies in 
Beijing’s special relationship with Islam-
abad. There is no consensus in India that 
New Delhi should seek military advantage 
over Beijing… India has been unwilling to 
match Chinese investment in defense mod-
ernization.” 22 This also is reflected in the 
steadily moderate growth trend in India’s 
military expenditure. No spike is observed 
for the years following either 2005 or 2008 
(as marked by the red lines in Figures 2 
and Figure 3). China was mentioned in the 
IN’s 2007 and 2009 Maritime Doctrine only 
“in passing, with fleeting — albeit forebod-
ing — reference to ‘some nations’ attempting 
to ‘gain a strategic toehold in the Indian 
Ocean Rim.’” 23 A recent Pew survey shows 
that most Indian respondents still view Paki-
stan as India’s archenemy. 24
Beyond its home waters, the rapid inte-
gration of India into the global economy 
has forcefully dictated its navy to enhance 
capabilities to ensure the country’s “security 
of access and trade.” 25 Indeed, “the pri-
mary mission driving naval modernization is 
sea-lane security, with the development of 
‘softer’ aspects of power projection capabil-
ities receiving some support, while the need 
to deter hostile maritime powers does little 
to explain India’s recent naval moderniza-
tion.” 26 Conceptualized as “constabulary,” 
“diplomatic” and “benign” missions as 
opposed to “military” missions in the IN 
doctrinal documents, these missions cover 
low-intensity and noncombatant operations 
such as anti-piracy, maritime patrol, human-
itarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
DR) and evacuations.
Pace, Scope, and Acquisitions: 
Examining Ally Options
Although both China and India have few, if 
any, formal alliances on paper, India does 
have several potential allies while China 
does not. This distinct difference appears 
to have critically affected the differing stra-
tegic time horizons envisioned by decision 
makers in Beijing and New Delhi, which 
in turn have translated into the different 
paces and scopes of China and India’s 
military modernizations. In addition, the 
discrepancy in ally options also affects each 
country’s sources of arms acquisition.
China has limited ally options. 27 Despite 
Beijing’s peaceful development rhetoric, 
good neighbor policy and charm offen-
sive diplomacy, it is nowhere near forging 
a global network of allies and security 
partners compared to what the United 
States has fostered. Chinese analysts are 
well aware that this disadvantage will be 
extremely difficult to overcome since a 
global alliance network requires not just 
hard power but soft power and historic 
opportunities. 28 Therefore, seeing itself 
as “a superpower fundamentally differ-
ent from the United States,” China has 
embraced a defense strategy stressing 
self-reliance over alliances. 29
Meanwhile, surrounded by U.S. allies and 
potential allies, China seems to believe that 
the time horizon for its military buildup is 
short. There is a deep anxiety in Beijing 
that the United States has been seeking to 
contain China by orchestrating an “Asian 
NATO” with Japan, South Korea, Australia 
Source: Wikipedia commons
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surface combatants, weapon systems, 
submarines and technology.  43 Since the 
2000s, China has invested heavily in boost-
ing its indigenous defense industry. By the 
second decade of the 2000s, the PLAN’s 
acquisition had shifted mostly to indige-
nously designed and produced weapons 
and platforms. 44
On the other hand, India enjoys largely 
unrestricted access to the international 
weapons market and has been the world’s 
largest weapons importer since 2009. 45 
The IN has so far obtained its major plat-
forms from abroad. While this has enabled 
India to acquire state-of-the-art naval 
equipment from foreign suppliers, the flip 
side of this balance is that a high degree of 
dependence usually means a high degree 
of vulnerability. Arms embargoes, restric-
tions on the use of imported equipment 
or delivery delays all may curtail the navy’s 
modernization efforts. In fact, delays have 
remained an acute problem with India’s 
arms imports. 46 Operating and maintaining 
a mix of equipment systems from different 
countries may also pose additional technical 
barriers and financial costs.
This is not to say that India is likely to enter 
a binding alliance with any of these afore-
mentioned countries. On the contrary, 
lacking certainty about China’s intentions 
in the long-run, New Delhi appears to have 
not reached a broader and clearer consen-
sus on the future direction of India-China 
relations and thus is unlikely to make such 
a move. Indeed, pursuing a hedging strat-
egy through omni-directional diplomacy 
and having ally options appears to have 
provided effective leverage that New Delhi 
can employ to hedge against a potentially 
assertive China without outright antagoniz-
ing Beijing. In a similar vein, maintaining 
close alignment with India without forming 
a formal alliance appears to be a hedging 
strategy adopted by both the United States 
and Japan in response to the rise of China.
The differing ally options for China and 
India contribute to their distinct sources of 
arms acquisitions. Since 1989, China has 
been subject to US arms sale sanctions, and 
thus, Chinese arms acquisition and tech-
nology transfer from the United States and 
other Western countries remain at a modest 
level. The PLAN has relied on Russia as the 
single most important supplier for modern 
and India, and constructing a “C-shaped 
encirclement” on China’s maritime periph-
ery. 30 Beijing appears to believe that “the 
faster China’s socioeconomic develop-
ments are, the more likely it will face hostile 
forces’ containment and encirclement… 
the PLA must have a full understanding of 
the complexity and gravity of the national 
security situation, and the significance and 
urgency of accelerating national defense 
and military modernization.” 31
Viewed in this context, Beijing sees the 
imperative to build a full-size, modern 
military. This includes what the 2015 
Defense White Paper calls “a combined, 
multi-functional and efficient… modern 
maritime military force… commensurate 
with national security and development 
interests.” The sense of urgency also drives 
China to expedite this process as allowed 
by the country’s economic and technolog-
ical capacities. 32
India, however, has several ally options. 
New Delhi’s relations with Washington 
have seen a steady upswing since 2001. 33 
The two capitals have been cooperating 
broadly in defense technology, weapon 
production and arms sales. 34 Under the 
Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, 
bilateral relations continue to strengthen. 
Particularly, navy-to-navy collaboration 
“has grown dramatically in size, scope and 
sophistication,” and has grown to be “the 
most robust” component in overall mili-
tary-to-military relations. 35 India has been 
increasingly hailed by the United States as 
a “natural ally” in the Asia-Pacific, largely 
due to their shared value of democracy, 
growing economic ties and common inter-
ests in counter-terrorism and balancing a 
rising China. 36
Since the 1990s, India has maintained 
close ties with the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) under the 
“Look East Policy,” and has engaged in 
active naval diplomacy with Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand 
and the Philippines. 37 Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi’s “Act East Policy,” which 
he announced at the 2014 ASEAN-In-
dia Summit, has given a new thrust to 
this relationship.
In the West Pacific, India has been rapidly 
expanding its defense cooperation with 
Japan as both countries increasingly see 
a shared interest in balancing an assertive 
China. 38 Building on the “strategic and 
global partnership” announced in 2006, the 
two countries launched their 2+2 Dialogue 
in 2010, with senior officials from both 
countries’ foreign and defense ministries, 
and the Defense Policy Dialogue in 2011, 
involving meetings between their defense 
ministers. 39 In 2015, the two countries 
reached a defense deal that would enhance 
mutual defense equipment, technology 
and information sharing. 40 India has also 
been boosting its maritime security coop-
eration with Australia since 2006. 41
Having potential allies appears to be vital 
leverage that enables India to cope with 
China’s expanding maritime power through 
a concerted effort by a group of nations, 
rather than by India matching the pace 
or scope of China’s naval modernization. 
Despite some Indian strategists’ ambitious 
goals for India’s naval development, it is 
a commonly acknowledged fact in New 
Delhi that “[r]esource limitation will not in 
the foreseeable future allow their force to 
‘go one-on-one’ against the Chinese navy, 
either in terms of numbers or strategic 
assets.” 42 Moreover, the likelihood of a Chi-
na-India confrontation at sea—even only as 
part of a multi-country conflict with China in 
which the IN would operate in conjunction 
with the United States and other navies—
looks remote. Therefore, with India’s still 
daunting domestic socioeconomic chal-
lenges and the United States’ continuing 
maritime dominance in Asia, New Delhi 
may see a more pragmatic strategy in play-
ing the role of a moderate partner rather 
than an overbearing leader in the Indo-Pa-
cific security architecture.
Arms Exports to China 
Source: SIPRI database (accessed October 16, 2015)
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Translating Threat Perceptions 
and Ally Options into 
Capability Building
China and India, driven by their very differ-
ent threat perceptions and alliance options, 
have taken divergent paths to modernize 
their navies. Drawing heavily on a rapidly 
growing indigenous defense industry, the 
PLAN has devoted considerable resources 
to building “near-sea” defense capabilities 
with “key elements… specifically tailored to 
counter U.S. capabilities.” 47 On the other 
hand, the IN has focused on building its 
power projection capabilities based on 
imported equipment and increasingly 
indigenously-developed platforms.
China has made major strides in modern-
izing its submarine forces, which are key to 
conducting sea control operations. This is 
regarded by Beijing as “a critical element of 
regional deterrence, particularly when con-
ducting ‘counter-intervention’ (anti-access/
area denial or A2/AD in US military termi-
nology) against modern adversaries.” 48 
According to the latest report released by 
the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, since 
1995 China has acquired a total of fifty-six 
submarines at a rate of about 2.7 subma-
rines per year. The PLAN is also upgrading 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) on these 
submarines. 49 China’s naval combatant 
vessels have been rapidly modernized as 
well. 50 Some types of vessels are consid-
ered “comparable in many respects to the 
most modern Western warships.” 51
In addition, China has made rapid develop-
ments in anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). 
Since 2008, China has been fielding the 
DF-21D. This ASBM, equipped with a 
maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), 
can hit moving ships at sea, posing an 
unprecedented threat to U.S. Navy vessels 
operating in the Western Pacific. 52
While “near-sea” defense has been and 
will continue to be the primary focus of the 
PLAN’s modernization, the development 
of China’s power projection capabilities is 
more recent and still nascent. In the after-
math of the 2004 tsunami in Southeast 
Asia, as the United States, India, Japan 
and other regional actors promptly sent 
humanitarian assistance and personnel to 
the region, China was embarrassed by its 
inability to “provide immediate disaster 
relief in its own backyard” due to its lack 
of necessary power projection and logistics 
capabilities. 53 This need for better power 
projection capabilities in the region, the 
improvements in the cross-Taiwan Strait 
relationship since 2008, combined with 
China’s expanding global interests, have 
convinced the PLAN to devote more 
resources to building power projection 
capabilities to cope with non-traditional 
security threats from the “far sea.” China’s 
2008 Defense White Paper articulated for 
the first time a requirement for military 
operations other than war (MOOTW). 54 
The PLAN has been conducting anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden since late 
2008, and commissioned its first aircraft 
carrier Liaoning in 2012. The 2015 White 
Paper requires the PLAN to transform its 
focus from a single point on “offshore waters 
defense” to a combination of “offshore waters 
defense” and “open seas protection.” 55
On the other hand, India, driven by the goal 
of securing its SLOCs and the desire to have 
its great-power status recognized, sees the 
aircraft carrier program as the backbone 
of its naval modernization. As it stated in 
the 2009 Maritime Doctrine, “sea control 
is the central concept around which the 
[IN] is structured, and aircraft carriers are 
decidedly the most substantial contributors 
to it.” 56 The power projection capabili-
ties proved to be an extremely effective, 
vital asset for India’s cultivation of its soft 
power in the region when the IN promptly 
responded to the 2004 tsunami with the 
participation of the Indian Naval Ship (INS) 
Viraat. 57 Currently having two carriers in 
active service, the IN already has experi-
ence operating the vessels. 58 India’s first 
homegrown carrier was undocked in 2015 
and is expected to be in service in 2017. 
The second, currently under design, may 
be granted U.S. permission to use General 
Dynamics’ advanced Electromagnetic Air-
craft Launch System. 59
That India has been almost single-mindedly 
focused on power projection capability 
building seems to reasonably explain why 
the country’s progress in modernizing its 
subsurface and surface fleets lags behind 
that of the aircraft carrier program. Cur-
rently, India’s submarine fleet consists of 
fourteen submarines, which are largely 
obsolete and diesel-powered with an 
operational readiness rate of lower than 
40 percent. Acquisition of new submarines 
suffers from serious delays in delivery. 60 
India’s surface fleet is in a better situation. 
Until recently, seven of India’s ten in-ser-
vice destroyers had been commissioned for 
over fifteen years with an average service of 
twenty-five years. 61 To ameliorate this situ-
ation, India has successfully commissioned 
two Kolkata-class—its most modern indig-
enously produced combatants to replace 
the aging destroyers. In addition, India 
commissioned six Russian-built Talwar-class 
frigates between 2003 and 2013. 62
Both China and India have endeavored 
to build up naval nuclear forces as a 
central piece of developing a credible 
second-strike capability. Similar to other 
naval capabilities, the main focus of China’s 
sea-based nuclear deterrent capability is to 
meet the challenge from the more powerful 
U.S. nuclear arsenals. This buildup simulta-
neously guarantees Beijing a second-strike 
capability vis-a-vis India. The PLAN currently 
has four Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-pow-
ered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in 
service, all equipped with twelve JL-2 sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
that have an estimated range of 7,400 
km. 63 India possesses land-based delivery 
platforms capable of hitting targets deep 
within China, including Beijing and Shang-
hai, but has yet to develop a credible at-sea 
deterrent capability with regard to China. 64 
The IN did not begin the sea trial of its first 
SSBN until late 2014.  Currently the SSBN 
is in the stage of completing final trials. 65 
Despite India’s nuclear asymmetry with 
China and the slow pace of India’s nuclear 
buildup, the nuclear capabilities that both 
Arms Exports to India 
Source: SIPRI database (accessed October 16, 2015)
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countries possess remains a key source of 
stability at the strategic level.
Looking Ahead
China and India clearly have different 
threat perceptions and alliance options, 
which in combination   have translated 
into very different trajectories of their 
naval modernization. This simultaneous 
modernization, in and of itself, did not 
begin as an arms race, and is still prema-
ture to be depicted as a toe-to-toe maritime 
rivalry. However, their naval modernization 
alludes to a regional security competition 
due to strategic mistrust between China 
and India. Over recent years, New Delhi 
has developed a perception that China’s 
bolstered ties with India’s neighboring 
countries and naval modernization aim 
to encircle India. Beijing, on the other 
hand, views India’s outreach to the Pacific 
region and naval buildup as an attempt to 
restrain China’s influence in South Asia and 
power projection into the Indian Ocean. 
This mutual perception is compounded 
by suspicions deeply rooted in the long-
standing security issues including the 
Sino-Indian border dispute and Sino-Paki-
stani relations. In the years to come, as both 
countries strive to expand their presence 
in each other’s “maritime backyards,” this 
shared perception of maritime compe-
tition will likely continue, and be further 
compounded in the broader geopolitical 
context of the China-India-Pakistan trilat-
eral relations and the China-India-US-Japan 
quadrilateral interactions.
Overlapping competition for influence in 
each other’s “maritime backyard” is also a 
major factor contributing to China-India 
maritime competition. The Indian Ocean 
has traditionally been an area of primary 
interest for New Delhi. As China continues 
to build a blue-water navy and expand its 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it is 
bound to challenge India’s dominance in 
this region. New Delhi will likely respond 
by continuing to revitalize and augment its 
security ties with the littoral countries, as 
has already been signaled by Modi’s March 
2015 visit to Seychelles and Mauritius. 66 In 
the South China Sea, China’s assertive ter-
ritorial claims have galvanized a strong call 
among the Southeast Asian countries for a 
balancing strategy. Viewed by ASEAN as “a 
useful balance to China’s heft,” India has 
been welcomed as a partner. 67 As tensions 
in the South China Sea continue, New Del-
hi’s strengthening security and economic 
ties with ASEAN countries, in particular Viet-
nam, will likely gain more weight, which China 
will likely reciprocate with continued suspi-
cion and further naval buildup. 68
The China-India border issue, albeit not 
directly related to the maritime competition, 
will continue to be another major source of 
mistrust between the two countries, which 
in turn will intensify the competition at sea 
through mis-perception and miscalculation. 
The border issue shapes India’s perception 
of China through the prism of the 1962 
Sino-Indian War. Due to this perception, 
there is a tendency in New Delhi towards 
exaggerating the significance and threaten-
ing nature of China’s actions and strategic 
intentions, including the PLAN’s modern-
ization, while ignoring stabilizing factors 
in crucial dimensions, including nuclear 
deterrence and growing economic inter-
dependence. This perception will continue 
to feed into China’s perception of a hostile 
India and China-India security relations in 
zero-sum terms.
Sources of mistrust and rivalry also lie 
beyond the bilateral framework. Beijing’s 
“all-weather” relationship with Islamabad 
remain a serious concern for New Delhi 
and will likely continue to influence the 
China-India security discourse, despite 
modifications in China’s policy toward 
Pakistan since the 1990s. 69 New Delhi will 
likely continue to view major infrastructure 
projects, including the Gwadar Port and the 
Karakorum Corridor, as potential Chinese 
military assets in the Indian Ocean region.
The relations between China, India, the 
United States and Japan may produce 
mixed implications for Sino-Indian inter-
action in the naval dimension. The United 
States and Japan’s outreach to India is 
largely a function of the United States and 
Japan’s responses to the rise of China, and 
each one of the four players has adopted 
a strategy of hedging in dealing with each 
other. On the one hand, each country has 
been carefully calculating its moves so as 
to avoid threatening core interests of any 
of the other three parties. Both China and 
India have exercised great caution to avoid 
making moves that would impinge on each 
other’s core interests—such as the maritime 
territorial issues for China and nuclear issue 
for India—while cooperating on issues of 
common interests such as trade and climate 
change. On the other hand, as the power 
distribution between China and the United 
States continues to shift, New Delhi seeks 
to maintain the equilibrium of power in the 
Asia-Pacific by developing a balance with 
the United States and Japan toward China 
and continued naval buildup. China, suspi-
cious of India along with the United States 
and Japan ganging up against China, may 
be tempted to constrain India’s power on 
the subcontinent through Pakistan and 
redouble the PLAN modernization as a 
counter-balance in the maritime domain.
As neither India nor China appears pre-
pared to change its tactics on any of these 
issues, these hurdles will likely persist and 
impede trust-building at the strategic level. 
However, there is still room for maritime 
cooperation and confidence-building mea-
sures at the operational level. Beyond their 
peripheral waters, China and India’s inter-
ests converge significantly, which should 
serve as a foundation for future coopera-
tion, especially in MOOTW. This will likely 
serve both countries’ interests and pave the 
road to addressing strategic mistrust.
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
China India China India China India China India China India
SSBN 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 4 0
SSN 5 0 5 0 5 0 6 1 5 1
SSK 44 15 57 16 61 19 54 16 60 13
Aircraft 
Carrier 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2
Destroyer 18 5 20 8 21 8 28 8 17 12
Frigate 32 18 40 12 42 17 52 12 54 13
Amphibious 
Ship (LPD) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1
LST 19 1 18 2 19 2 27 5 26 5
LSM 35 8 41 7 31 5 56 5 59 4
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Assessing the 
Decision 
Process Behind 
U.S. Military 
Intervention in a 
Cross-Strait Crisis: 
A Scenario-Driven 
 Analysis
Winston Kung
In any potential military crisis between 
China and Taiwan, the first-order ques-
tion which arises would not be, “Could US 
naval forces defeat Chinese naval forces in 
a cross-straits scenario?” but rather, “Would 
the U.S. commit to militarily intervene at 
all?” This paper undertakes a scenario anal-
ysis of the U.S. geopolitical calculus behind 
military intervention, assuming a fixed 2017 
crisis scenario of Taiwanese President Tsai 
Ing-Wen escalating pro-independence 
rhetoric, and China responding through 
mobilization of naval forces in the Taiwan 
Strait. After an analysis of the legal, dip-
lomatic, strategic and domestic opinion 
factors likely to affect a U.S. president’s deci-
sion on intervention, we conclude that the 
United States would conduct non-kinetic 
military operations to signal a strong threat 
of American intervention, while simultane-
ously applying heavy diplomatic pressure 
to both China and Taiwan to de-escalate the 
situation; we further conclude that China 
and Taiwan will likely de-escalate accord-
ingly to U.S. pressure, in light of U.S. military 
and diplomatic leverage.
Ever since the United States first signed a 
Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic 
of China (ROC) in 1954, Taiwan has been 
the most sensitive geopolitical fault line 
between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Even the subse-
quent abrogation of the United States’ 
alliance treaty with Taiwan has not removed 
the sensitivity of this flashpoint; indeed, 
its replacement, the purposefully vague 
Taiwan Relations Act, has only rendered 
the interactions between the United States 
and the PRC murkier. Up to this day, many 
observers would agree Taiwan remains the 
issue most likely to spark a potential war 
between the United States and China.
Any such conflict between the world’s two 
strongest powers would massively impact 
the global geopolitical order, and deserves 
correspondingly careful study. Indeed, 
there have been volumes of military 
assessments on the prospects of conflict 
over Taiwan, many of which are based 
upon scenario-driven analyses. However, 
these assessments usually assume a fully 
engaged state of war between the U.S. and 
China as their starting point. Compared to 
these analyses, there is a relative lack of 
scenario-driven analyses of the political 
decision behind whether the U.S. would 
choose to intervene militarily at all – yet 
assessing the outcome of this decision 
would likely be the most important factor 
informing the planning of all sides affected 
by the crisis, from China and Taiwan to 
regional neighbors including South Korea 
and Japan.
This paper examines the U.S. likelihood 
of militarily defending Taiwan in a cross-
strait crisis. It does so through assuming 
a fixed scenario through which the crisis 
first unfolds, and comprehensively exam-
ines each of the dimensions the President 
of the United States is likely to weigh in 
formulating his or her response to such a 
crisis. The purpose of this analysis is not to 
provide a policy recommendation, or even 
to predict the outcomes of the scenario 
with any degree of certainty, but rather 
to illuminate the complex, often clashing 
mixture of factors affecting the decision 
for intervention. Fixing a scenario to one 
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specific situation is essential to conducting 
an analysis which yields insight on factors 
which might affect a president’s judgment; 
without a fixed prism, any analysis would 
otherwise devolve into the dreaded axiom: 
“It depends on the situation.”
This analysis assumes a scenario unfolding 
in 2017, one year into ROC President Tsai 
Ying-Wen’s first term. Throughout 2016, the 
PRC has undergone frustrating attempts 
to induce Tsai to re-confirm the 1992 Con-
sensus, or otherwise offer a replacement 
“One China” formula, yet has received little 
response from Tsai. 1 To begin the scenario, 
as a means of exerting leverage, the PRC 
withdraws some of the Three Linkages 
with Taiwan, including direct flights. 2 This 
sets off a nationalistic reaction in Taiwan, 
especially among student leaders and 
Tsai’s pro-independence base, and Tsai 
accordingly escalates her rhetoric, from 
non-recognition of the 1992 Consensus, 
to explicit denial of both the 1992 Consen-
sus and the One China concept. The PRC 
interprets this as a move towards Taiwan 
independence, which crosses one of their 
“red lines,” and mobilizes their navy across 
the Taiwan Strait in what looks like clear 
preparation for military action, although it 
is not yet clear whether they will attempt an 
amphibious invasion, a blockade or merely 
a coercive posture. 3 Meanwhile, the PRC 
has suffered an economic slowdown over 
the last two years, and PRC rhetoric esca-
lates aggressively in nationalist invective 
against Taiwanese renegades, as the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP) leaders seek 
to exploit nationalism to restore their dam-
aged legitimacy. This all happens within a 
matter of days, taking the United States policy 
apparatus rather by surprise. All other global 
issues–the South China Sea, the Middle 
East, Russia and Ukraine–remain roughly 
unchanged from their status in 2015. 
In light of this situation, this analysis will 
evaluate the President’s reaction from the 
four dimensions most likely to affect the 
decision: legal, diplomatic, strategic/mili-
tary and domestic opinion/politics. These 
dimensions are not implied to be strictly 
separate; indeed, the President would 
have to assess them simultaneously, and 
concerns from one dimension will bleed 
into another. However, as an organizational 
paradigm, the analysis will be broken down 
by section into these dimensions, and point 
out linkages to other dimensions as neces-
sary. This analysis will not explore who will 
be the President or personalities of specific 
candidates likely to be the 2017 President. 
This is to avoid delving into a murky realm 
of psychoanalysis and political horse-race 
calling; instead, the focus is to examine the 
landscape of trends that would condition 
any President’s decision.
Legal Dimension
Any decision for intervention would have 
to first examine legal obligations, either in 
domestic law or through treaties, which 
might bind the United States to any course 
of action. If there were a legal obligation 
for the United States to defend Taiwan, the 
United States would have no choice but 
to follow the law: all other factors would 
become irrelevant.
The United States does not currently main-
tain a treaty alliance with Taiwan nor do any 
of its domestic laws bind the United States 
to declare war over an invasion against 
Taiwan.  The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 
states that Congress will “consider any effort 
to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means, including by boycotts 
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area,” and 
that it will “maintain the capacity of the 
United States to resist any resort to force or 
other forms of coercion that would jeopar-
dize the security, or the social or economic 
system, of the people on Taiwan”; but con-
sidering an attack against Taiwan a threat 
and maintaining the capacity for resisting 
coercion do not equate to an obligation 
to use that capacity. The TRA specifically 
lays out what actions should be taken if any 
crisis arises: “The President is directed to 
inform the Congress promptly of any threat 
to the security or the social or economic 
system of the people on Taiwan and any 
danger to the interests of the United States 
arising therefrom. The President and the 
Congress shall determine, in accordance 
with constitutional processes, appropriate 
action by the United States in response to 
any such danger.” In other words, the Pres-
ident is obligated only to brief Congress 
and consult with it; “appropriate action” 
is not defined, and conceivably includes 
non-action or simply verbal protests. 4
So the United States is under no legal com-
pulsion to enter a war. But if it does decide 
to do so, what legal implications does this 
have for U.S. allies? These legal implications 
will inform how U.S. allies urge the United 
States to react, given their level of legal lia-
bility and entanglement if the United States 
does intervene. 
In the event that the United States does 
enter a war with China, this does not 
impose any legal obligation on U.S. treaty 
allies South Korea or Japan to join the war, 
although it may impose an obligation on the 
Philippines. The South Korea-U.S. Mutual 
Defense Treaty only covers armed attacks 
on “territories now under [the United States 
or South Korea’s] respective administrative 
control,” where Taiwan obviously does not 
qualify. 5 The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security only covers “an 
armed attack against either Party in the terri-
tories under the administration of Japan.” 6 
However, the U.S.-Philippines mutual treaty 
has language that may entangle the Phil-
ippines in a war if combat indeed occurs 
between the United States and China, as 
the treaty’s coverage includes attack on 
either party’s “armed forces, public vessels 
or aircraft in the Pacific.” 7
Although Japan is under no obligation 
to join the United States in a war against 
China, it may have the legal capacity to do 
so if it wishes, despite its pacifist Constitu-
tion. The Japanese Diet recently passed a 
reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution, stating that Japan could come 
to its allies’ military aid under the condi-
tion that “the attack on that country poses 
a clear danger to Japan’s survival or could 
fundamentally overturn Japanese citizens’ 
constitutional rights to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness.” 8 An attack on 
Taiwan, which is only seventy miles away 
from Okinawa, can conceivably be argued 
as a “danger to Japan’s survival.”
Ultimately, the legal dimension confers 
no obligation one way or the other on the 
President’s options. He or she will have to 
make his or her decision based off of the 
other dimensions. Of course, this legalistic 
argument alone will not help the United 
States much if the rest of the world under-
stands the Taiwan Relations Act as a true 
U.S. defense commitment–by implication, 
if not strict legal mandate.
Diplomatic Dimension
Perhaps the most crucial dimension for the 
President to weigh is how the U.S. course 
of action affects its relationships in the East 
Asia region, as well as U.S. global reputa-
tion and credibility. The President would 
have to further consider what diplomatic, 
non-military options the United States can 
pursue in response to a crisis.
Historically, the United States has adopted 
a policy of “strategic ambiguity” towards 
Taiwan, warning China that the United 
States may intervene against any cross-
strait aggression, while simultaneously 
warning Taiwan that the United States may 
not defend Taiwan if it acts provocatively. 9 
This stance is intended to deter destabi-
lizing moves from both sides of the strait, 
and perhaps also give the United States an 
“exit option” to refrain from military inter-
vention in a crisis. If U.S. allies perceived 
the United States as truly being indifferent 
to the interests of either side, the United 
States could perhaps walk away from a 
conflict without any loss of credibility in 
its other defense commitments. 
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But this is not the case. The pattern of 
rhetoric and behavior used by the U.S. 
government, consistent over the past few 
decades, has created an understanding of 
strategic alignment between the United 
States and Taiwan as well as the expectation 
of some form of military aid in a crisis–to the 
point where Lingnan University professors 
Brian Bridges and Che-Po Chan have called 
the relationship “sufficiently strong… for the 
U.S. to qualify as an ‘ally’ in all but name.” 10
It is easy to see where this characteriza-
tion springs from. As a starting point, the 
United States and the ROC were treaty 
allies from 1955-1979. When that was 
abrogated, the Taiwan Relations Act was 
passed almost immediately afterwards; 
while not imposing a strict legal obliga-
tion, it couches the United States’ reaction 
to any use of force against Taiwan in strong 
language, considering it a “threat to the 
peace and security of the Western Pacific 
area and of grave concern to the United 
States.” 11 Continued arms sales to Taiwan 
over the past four decades, including a 
$1.83 billion arms package approved in 
December 2015, further reinforces this 
impression of strategic alignment. 12 Rhet-
oric from both U.S. diplomats and military 
officials has also created the impression 
of a U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense. 
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
proclaimed Taiwan an important “security 
partner.” 13 In 2003, Admiral Dennis Blair 
informed Chinese leaders that U.S. forces 
were prepared to fight on behalf of Taiwan, 
and that defending Taiwan was worth risk-
ing American lives. 14 The relationship 
between the Taiwan and U.S. militaries has 
been exceedingly close: Taiwanese officers 
were invited to the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, funded by the Defense 
Department, despite a lack of official 
diplomatic recognition. 15 Perhaps most 
revealingly, an operational plan, Oplan 
5077-044, was leaked, showing plans for 
a fully engaged U.S. war against China over 
the defense of Taiwan. 16 Given the cumu-
lative impression that these actions have 
given, the United States would most likely 
suffer some loss of credibility if it does not 
follow through on the implied commitment 
to Taiwan, though not to the same extent 
as if it failed to defend an official treaty ally. 
Despite this pattern of exceptionally close 
relations, the United States has made clear 
that its implied commitment does not 
translate into giving Taiwan carte blanche 
to provoke China, and has continually 
reiterated its support for the One China 
policy, as made clear in the 1982 U.S.-China 
communique: “The United States Govern-
ment… reiterates that it has no intention 
of… pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or 
‘one China, one Taiwan.’” 17 Moreover, it has 
directly taken diplomatic steps to rein in 
pro-independence behavior from Taiwan, 
most notably when President George W. 
Bush directly criticized ROC President Chen 
Shui-Bian for proposing controversial ref-
erenda on the ROC constitution in 2003. 18
Given this impression of strategic alignment 
between the United States and Taiwan, 
while also understanding the strong U.S. 
support for the status quo, how would 
U.S. allies encourage the United States to 
respond to this scenario’s crisis? It is diffi-
cult to gauge their stances on this issue, 
as the governments of Japan, Korea and 
the Philippines have viewed public com-
ment on any cross-strait security issues as 
a diplomatic taboo. However, this analysis 
attempts to infer their preferences from 
their economic and security concerns.
Certainly, U.S. allies have a vested interest in 
this situation being resolved without kinetic 
use of force, and especially without them 
being drawn into war with China. China is 
South Korea’s largest trading partner by 
far, 19 and ranks as Japan’s second-largest 
trading partner. 20 Any escalation of con-
flict in the region would severely disrupt 
these trade flows; more dangerously, a 
hostile resolution to the crisis would per-
manently render China a more aggrieved 
and unpredictable power. Therefore, there 
would likely be a strong preference towards 
a diplomatic solution before any combat 
occurs. Japan itself, through former Prime 
Minister Mori, took diplomatic steps to 
warn President Chen Shui-Bian against 
provocation in 2003. 21
However, if a diplomatic solution fails to 
be reached and further military escalation, 
or even kinetic combat, occurs, U.S. allies 
would probably be in favor of the United 
States showing military commitment rather 
than standing by. South Korea, in recent 
years, has grown increasingly concerned 
over what they perceive as waning U.S. 
global engagement. This concern has 
grown to the point where South Korea has 
pushed for an indefinite delay in OPCON 
2015, the plan to transfer South Korean 
soldiers from U.S. operational command 
to South Korean command, on the notion 
that U.S. command operationally binds the 
United States to South Korea’s defense. 22 
Larry Niksch, a Congressional Research Ser-
vice Asian specialist, has noted that South 
Korean officials have even raised questions, 
“in response to Russia’s actions against 
Ukraine, as to whether the perceived weak 
response of Obama would be repeated in a 
full-scale military crisis with North Korea.” 23 
If the South Korean establishment views the 
U.S. defense of Ukraine – which the United 
States has never had any military commit-
ment to, formal or implied – as insufficient, 
they will almost certainly view U.S. inaction, 
in the face of Chinese aggression against 
Taiwan, as a serious indication of U.S. dis-
engagement from global affairs. Of course, 
their preference for U.S. engagement 
would be coupled with the fact that they 
would have no obligation to be entangled 
in the conflict, or otherwise disrupt their 
relationship with China.
The Philippines and Japan have even 
deeper reasons to urge U.S. resolve against 
Chinese aggression – Chinese aggression 
has directly threatened their own territo-
rial interests in the Spratly and Senkaku 
(Diaoyu) Islands. For them, a robust U.S. 
response to Chinese military activity against 
Taiwan would send a reassuring signal that 
the U.S. takes its military commitment to 
the Asia-Pacific region seriously, and will 
not back down from confrontations with 
China. However, their deeper concerns 
with China are balanced by deeper risks 
of entanglement in backing U.S. interven-
tion in Taiwan–the Philippines through 
their defense treaty language, and Japan 
through its operational proximity to Taiwan, 
and the almost certain need for U.S. forces 
to operate out of Japanese bases in any 
defense of Taiwan. 24
Despite these direct risks of war with China, 
Japan would still likely support U.S. inter-
vention if China moves past intimidation 
towards a kinetic attack on Taiwan. Like 
South Korea, a guiding principle for Japa-
nese foreign policy has been to encourage 
deepened U.S. engagement in East Asia. 25 
Additionally, Japan has deep strategic 
reasons for keeping Taiwan out of China’s 
military sphere of influence. Daniel Twin-
ing, a former member of the Secretary 
of State’s Policy Planning Staff, notes, “a 
friendly Taiwan helps secure southeast-
ern approaches to the Japanese home 
islands — the most likely route of any air-
borne or naval assault on America’s closest 
Asian ally.” 26 According to Twining, these 
concerns have led Japan to “more clearly 
define the defense of Taiwan as a core area 
of alliance cooperation” with the United 
States; 27 in 2005, Japan even sent mili-
tary technicians to observe a hypothetical 
U.S.-Taiwan-Japan joint operation, with 
both Japanese and Taiwanese personnel 
linking up computers in the simulation 
through U.S. middleman computers. 28 This 
indicates a level of commitment from Japan 
towards Taiwan’s defense, and certainly a 
wish to see resolve from the United States.
With U.S. credibility and engagement 
in Asia already under question from its 
Asian allies, a perceived failure to mili-
tarily hold off Chinese aggression could 
seriously erode the credibility of U.S. 
security guarantees. In the absence of a 
regional Asian security architecture – the 
U.S. alliance system in Asia has long been 
described as a “hub-and-spoke” system – if 
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U.S. allies began to doubt the value of the 
U.S. defense system, they would have no 
alternative sources of security to turn to but 
themselves. U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander 
Scott H. Swift gave a speech in response 
to aggressive Chinese tactics in the South 
China Sea, asserting that, “alarmed by these 
trends, claimants and non-claimants alike 
are transferring larger shares of national 
wealth to develop more capable naval 
forces beyond what is needed merely for 
self-defense, raising the risk of a sustained 
arc of increased regional tension” – in other 
words, a destabilizing arms race. 29 Use of 
Chinese force against Taiwan, unopposed 
by the United States, would be orders of 
magnitude more disruptive, and trigger a 
proportionally more destabilizing “arc of 
increased regional tension,” as well as seri-
ously diminish U.S. influence in East Asia. 
The President could not fail to ignore this 
possible outcome in judging a response 
to this crisis.
While military confrontation of China might 
reassure allies and maintain U.S. regional 
credibility, it comes with a very serious risk: 
the rupture of diplomatic relations with 
China. The U.S.-China bilateral relationship 
affects not only East Asia, but also global 
affairs. U.S.-China cooperation has been 
crucial to resolving a wide range of global 
issues important to the United States, from 
the sanctions regime against Iran, to climate 
change, to – most importantly – sustaining 
both sides’ economic growth through huge 
levels of trade. The United States would be 
loath to stake the stable management of 
such important global issues, as well as its 
economic prosperity, on Taiwan – a non-
ally acting, in this scenario, in blatantly 
provocative ways.
However, many of these issues – especially 
sustained economic growth – are equally 
important to China. As Professor Robert 
Sutter, an expert on East Asian affairs, stated 
in an interview, “the Chinese basically coop-
erate on these things on a calculation that’s 
based on what serves their interest.” 31 
China could not cut off its support for 
global warming accords without angering 
its increasingly environmentally-sensitive 
population, nor allow Iranian nuclear pro-
liferation without jeopardizing the stability 
of its energy supplies. Any disruption to 
the relationship would negatively affect 
both countries; it would perhaps be even 
more economically painful to China, whose 
economy is extremely export-oriented and 
whose largest export market, by far, is the 
United States. 31
If direct combat between the United States 
and China were to actually occur over 
Taiwan, the impact on the U.S.-China rela-
tionship would not simply be a temporary 
disruption; it would be a long-lasting rup-
ture. The RAND Corporation’s U.S.-China 
Military Scorecard predicts that “a war for 
Taiwan would be a… sharp, and probably 
desperate affair with significant losses on 
both sides.” 32 The optics arising from a fully 
escalated war – ships sinking, thousands 
of lives lost, possible strikes against Chi-
na’s coast – would lead to bitter memories 
and poison the relationship for decades 
to come. The United States would fear 
pushing China from strategic competi-
tor to aggrieved permanent enemy. But 
China would equally fear the United States 
becoming a fully determined, hostile force 
for containment. The enormous damage 
this would entail for both sides’ long-term 
goals implies that escalation is in neither 
side’s interest.
The United States does not want to lose 
its already suspect credibility among allies. 
Nor does it want escalation to cause a rup-
ture in the world’s most important bilateral 
relationship. This suggests that the United 
States will prioritize a diplomatic solution, 
as a way of demonstrating engagement 
and leadership over the issue to its allies 
without risking unpredictable military 
escalation. The United States could exert 
heavy pressure on Tsai to back off from her 
pro-independence statements, while offer-
ing China an off-ramp to save face through 
Taiwanese rhetorical concessions, and pro-
ceed with military de-escalation.
There is precedent for the United States 
using diplomatic pressure to rein in 
Taiwan. In 2003, President Bush took the 
unprecedented step of directly criticiz-
ing “the leader of Taiwan[’s]” willingness 
to “make decisions unilaterally to change 
the status quo.” 33 The State Department 
and National Security Council also issued 
statements publicly to the same effect. 34 
In the assumed scenario, the United States 
would find it more difficult to issue such 
overtly critical public statements; it could 
be interpreted as weak support for a qua-
si-ally under duress. However, the United 
States could still exert strong pressure on 
Taiwan privately, not least through privately 
asserting strategic ambiguity to Taiwanese 
leaders–as this analysis will demonstrate 
in later dimensions, there are many cred-
ible reasons for the United States to not 
to get involved. Even if the United States 
has already shown signals of military sup-
port, the United States could still threaten 
to cut off future post-crisis support for 
Taiwan in various economic and social 
issues, including revoking potential sup-
port for Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty 
(TPP) entry, or canceling the Visa Waiver 
Program, unless Tsai immediately issued 
a statement to the effect that Taiwanese 
society is still in favor of the ’92 Consensus. 
This would threaten Taiwan with the serious 
consequences of economic isolation with-
out jeopardizing U.S. military credibility by 
cutting off Taiwanese security.
Would Taiwan listen to this pressure? Prece-
dent indicates that Taiwan has backed down 
before under Chen, and Chen is a seem-
ingly more risk-tolerant personality than 
Tsai. Presumably, Tsai would be escalating 
her rhetoric in a context of a more inde-
pendence-radicalized social climate, driven 
especially by youth protesters. However, 
forces in Taiwan in favor of stable relations 
with China still remain strong. The business 
elite, and the KMT, represent two formida-
ble forces in Taiwan society that would be 
exerting pressure for Tsai to back down. 35
Simultaneously, the United States would 
pressure China with both rhetoric and mili-
tary signaling – to be further covered in the 
strategic dimension – that the United States 
will intervene against aggression. However, 
the United States would simultaneously pri-
vately communicate to China their efforts 
to rein in Taiwan, and offer a face-saving 
exit option. 
Would China accept such an “off-ramp” 
for de-escalation? Unless Chinese nation-
alist sentiment has spiraled out of control, 
the answer is likely yes. After all, Chinese 
military actions, dating back to the 1962 
war against India, have often been used as 
coercive diplomacy to “prove a point,” and 
foregone further escalation into protracted 
war. The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was 
declared a victory in Beijing, even though it 
ended with de-escalation in the face of U.S. 
carrier dispatches, because it forced the 
United States to warn Taiwan against future 
provocation. 36 Historically, Chinese leaders 
have coupled threats against Taiwan with 
an option for de-escalation: three days 
before President Chen’s inauguration, Chi-
na’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated, “Taiwan 
leaders have before them two roads:” 
one road led to force, and the other road 
was the option to “pull back immediately 
from their dangerous lurch towards inde-
pendence… and dedicating their efforts 
to closer cross-Straits relations.” 37 China 
is also very familiar with the use of the 
United States as a diplomatic intermedi-
ary to resolve crises with Taiwan. During 
a period of particularly high tensions with 
President Chen, China gave Dick Cheney 
– no great sympathizer to China – the “full 
red-carpet treatment,” in hopes that he 
would return to Washington to encourage 
greater pressure against Chen 38 The final 
reason for China to accept a face-saving 
off-ramp is simple and stark: the alternative, 
escalation, leads to an unknown situation, 
which is unfavorable to it in military trends 
and carries enormous risks. 
Of course, the President must not dismiss 
the possibility that despite the United 
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States’ best diplomatic efforts, China may 
continue its military escalation. If Taiwan 
bows to diplomatic pressure and offers a 
conciliatory statement while China keeps 
escalating, the decision seems clear-cut: 
the United States, and the world, would 
then begin to view Chinese aggression 
as unprovoked, and intervene to militarily 
support Taiwan. 
The trickier situation emerges if neither side 
backs down rhetorically. Some academics 
believe that any perception that Taiwanese 
intransigence has unilaterally provoked the 
crisis may lead the United States to feel let 
off the hook from its defense commitments 
to Taiwan – a line of thinking which Sutter 
summarizes as “Taiwan getting its just des-
serts… [as an] “irresponsible partner.” 39 If a 
diplomatic solution to the situation cannot 
be found, the President enters a wider geo-
strategic debate: whether Taiwan is worth 
defending no matter what. Experts can be 
found on both sides of the debate. Charles 
Glaser, director of the Elliot School’s Insti-
tute for Security and Conflict Studies, has 
argued for abandoning the defense com-
mitment to Taiwan, as “the risks of reduced 
U.S. credibility for protecting allies… should 
be small, especially if any change in policy 
on Taiwan is accompanied by countervail-
ing measures.” 40 (It is worth noting that in 
his context, this would be a gradual shift 
in policy; in our scenario’s context, the 
United States has not done any signaling 
beforehand that it is changing its strategic 
position on Taiwan.) Other academics, most 
notably Davidson political science profes-
sor Shelley Rigger, have argued that U.S. 
support for Taiwan is crucial for the Asian 
security architecture. 41 At this point, it is 
unclear what the President would do. 
The assessment would likely boil down 
to the President’s personality, advisors 
and judgment call. 
Fortunately, the precondition for this sit-
uation – Taiwan refusing to back down in 
the face of pressure – is unlikely. It would 
have to assume a radical polarization of 
Taiwanese society far beyond its current 
status. Short of a situation of unrestrainable 
Taiwanese provocation, it seems clear that 
U.S. diplomatic interests – to preserve its 
credibility but not rupture its relationship 
with China – would chart a path towards a 
diplomatic resolution, while still maintain-
ing non-combat military signaling to show 
U.S. resolve.
Military/Strategic Dimension
Before the decision to intervene in Taiwan 
is evaluated on its military and strategic 
merits, this analysis must make it clear that 
there is no clear phase in which diplomacy 
stops and military efforts begin. Unless 
the United States chooses to declare war 
against China, diplomacy would almost cer-
tainly be taking place simultaneously with 
U.S. military positioning. In fact, military 
signaling would be necessary to reinforce 
U.S. diplomacy. The military dimension 
is evaluated in a separate section for 
organizational clarity.
The first-order strategic question is how 
much strategic value the island of Taiwan 
holds, independent of its political-symbolic 
importance. The answer is quite a lot. Chi-
nese military planners have long asserted 
the importance of gaining military superi-
ority within the “First Island Chain,” a line 
which stretches from Japan through Taiwan 
down to the Philippines and Indonesia; 
securing military dominance over Taiwan 
would be China’s first opportunity to hold 
an island in the chain. According to Chinese 
policy experts, holding Taiwan would have 
significant geostrategic implications, from 
denying rival powers’ access to seas adja-
cent to China’s coast, to allowing Chinese 
submarines to operate in the open ocean 
east of Taiwan. 42
Meanwhile, for the United States, Twining 
observes, “Hostile control of Taiwan would 
geographically sever the primary base [in 
Okinawa] of U.S. expeditionary forces in 
Asia from strategic regions such as the 
South China Sea and the Indo-Malaysian 
archipelago… The operation of the U.S. 
alliance system in Asia, and the reassur-
ance American forward-deployed forces 
have offered Asian partners for decades, 
could be overturned if Taiwan flipped from 
friendly to unfriendly hands.” 43 This threat 
to Okinawa would be further compounded 
by the exponential increase in China’s 
anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/
AD) when distances shorten – while China 
can currently exert effective A2/AD near its 
coast, controlling Taiwan would give it A2/
AD capability up to the borders of Japan. 44 
In short, the United States has a strong 
strategic interest in keeping the Chinese 
military out of Taiwan.
But what if Taiwan could hold off the Chi-
nese military by itself? In such a case, the 
President’s dilemma would be solved, as 
the United States could simply rely on 
Taiwan to defend itself without risking 
direct combat with China. This was cer-
tainly possible as recently as the early 
2000’s. 45 However, in the assumed year of 
the scenario, 2017, China will have a mas-
sive array of modern military assets which 
Taiwan lacks, including attack submarines 
and fourth generation naval aircraft. 46 Ana-
lysts almost unanimously agree that Taiwan 
alone would not be able to secure naval or 
aerial superiority against China, especially 
if China were committed to fully kinetic 
strikes against Taiwanese assets. 47 A Chi-
nese blockade would very likely succeed in 
the absence of U.S. intervention. However, 
even in 2017, China would face enormous 
– perhaps prohibitive – risks in any amphib-
ious invasion. The Department of Defense 
notes that China does not even have “the 
conventional amphibious lift required to 
support such a campaign.” 48 The impli-
cation of these force assessments is that 
China’s military operations would likely stop 
at a blockade and fall short of occupation. 
However, a blockade cannot guarantee 
capitulation, and may even harden attitudes 
through a Taiwanese nationalistic backlash 
– especially if the United States makes a 
point to supply Taiwan through the block-
ade. This lack of Chinese military capacity 
to unilaterally force capitulation could make 
Beijing more favorably disposed to a dip-
lomatic off-ramp.
Of course, acquiescing to a blockade, in 
hopes that Taiwan will be able to bear 
the costs without capitulating, would still 
damage U.S. credibility. Here, the Presi-
dent must consider: if U.S. forces are fully 
committed to all-out combat against China, 
could the United States actually achieve 
victory? If U.S. forces are likely to lose, that 
changes the calculation behind committing 
forces considerably. 
The broad spectrum of military assess-
ments indicates that the United States 
would probably still defeat China – but to 
do so would require a protracted, risky and 
bloody war. By no means would it be a one-
sided conflict. For the first seven days, the 
United States would probably not even find 
sufficient basing to conduct a successful 
campaign for air superiority, according to 
the RAND Corporation’s US-China Military 
Scorecard. 49 Neither side could assume vic-
tory with a great degree of confidence, and 
both sides would incur significant casual-
ties. 50 However, over time the United States 
would have a greater margin for error than 
China: RAND assesses that due to U.S. mil-
itary advantages across a wide variety of 
operational factors, the U.S. could afford a 
number of military setbacks and still prevail 
in a conflict, while “Chinese leaders face a 
situation in which failure in even one area 
could spell catastrophe.” 51
All-out protracted war is not a situation 
arrived at overnight. Given the political 
sensitivities of the situation, and the degree 
to which military movements would be 
important not just for operational value, but 
also political signaling, officials would likely 
develop a ladder of escalation options.
The first half of the ladder would involve 
non-kinetic options short of combat. On 
China’s side, this would involve mobilizing 
its navy – the scenario already assumes this 
has occurred – and perhaps taking some 
minor offshore Taiwanese islands. The 
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United States has a range of non-kinetic 
options to respond with. It could raise 
its level of military alerts, conduct mili-
tary exercises, or summon carrier groups 
to formations not immediately within the 
cross-strait theater, but in position to proceed 
towards it (Clinton’s action in the 1996 crisis). 
More coercively, the United States could 
impose a distant blockade. This would 
involve blockading China’s oil imports in 
maritime choke points distant from it, most 
notably the Strait of Malacca. China’s status 
as the world’s largest net importer of oil 
renders it economically vulnerable to such 
a blockade; one estimate predicts a dis-
tant blockade could reduce China’s GDP 
by 6.6 percent. 52 There are flaws with the 
blockade strategy: military specialists have 
pointed out a lethal “inner-ring” blockade 
would need to complement blockades at 
distant choke points to fully cut off China’s 
supplies. 53 Nevertheless, an outer-ring 
blockade which does not contact China’s 
forces, even if not fully operationally effec-
tive, is a useful intermediate escalation step 
for the United States – a way to signal mil-
itary resolve without entering combat or 
declaring war. Finally, in the event of a Chi-
nese blockade of Taiwan, the United States 
could send convoys through the blockade 
to test Chinese reactions. All these options 
would force China to fire the first shot.
Beyond non-kinetic options is a similarly 
multi-pronged ladder of kinetic escala-
tion. The first and most likely step would 
be China striking Taiwan – not just mobi-
lizing or blockading. Such a strike is very 
possible if the PLA pursues a blockade. PLA 
doctrine envisions blockade operations as 
a “Joint Blockade,” which would involve not 
only an embargo, but also kinetic missile 
strikes against Taiwanese ports, airfields 
and air-defense assets. 54 Inflicting actual 
force against Taiwan might not trigger a 
kinetic retaliation from the United States; 
Sutter believes if such a case occurred, the 
United States should send a strong warning 
to China not to repeat further strikes, but 
not yet strike Chinese assets. 55 However, 
as covered in the diplomatic dimension, 
inflicting violence against Taiwan could 
represent clear Chinese aggression to U.S. 
allies, and tip their scales towards encour-
aging a robust military response, increasing 
the likelihood of U.S. intervention.
Base strikes between China and United 
States would represent a further level of 
escalation. A RAND Corporation study 
points out that the nature of Chinese doc-
trine – which stresses surprise, pre-emption 
and “key-point strikes” against a superior 
adversary – makes a Chinese pre-emptive 
strike on US bases in Okinawa likely, even 
going so far as to call a Chinese strike on 
the U.S. Kadena Air Base as “something 
of a ‘no-brainer’ from an operational 
perspective.” 56 Here, China is caught in 
a dilemma. China knows if it strikes U.S. 
bases, this is an automatic casus belli and 
draws the U.S. military into an all-out war 
– a war that the United States probably 
holds an overall advantage in, even after 
initial base strikes. Yet its best chance of 
operational victory relies on pre-emptively 
launching these strikes. The resulting catch-
22 implies China will likely seek to avoid 
this dilemma altogether by preventing the 
military tension from escalating too far – 
especially if the United States is dangling 
a diplomatic solution.
Conversely, the United States could launch 
strikes on Chinese missile assets in Fujian 
and other coastal provinces. However, as 
the side superior in overall firepower, the 
United States does not have the asymmet-
ric pressure for surprise and pre-emption, 
especially one that carries such serious 
political risks. It is therefore likely that the 
U.S. would refrain from striking the Chinese 
mainland unless the Chinese struck U.S. 
forces first.
The final phase of the escalation ladder 
would involve nuclear options. Some loose 
talk of nuclear risks over a Taiwan scenario 
has occurred before: a Chinese senior offi-
cial was said to have told American officials 
in 1995, “in the end, you care more about 
Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.” 57 
Such threats are probably infeasible from 
the Chinese side. China has publicly 
declared a “No First Use” nuclear doctrine 
for decades. 58 Moreover, given the lim-
ited number of Chinese intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can actually 
reach the United States, and U.S. missile 
defense capabilities, it is dubious whether 
China has confidence in successfully strik-
ing even one U.S. city. 59 The United States 
possesses full escalation dominance in 
every conceivable nuclear capability; any 
resort to nuclear escalation by China would 
be highly unlikely.
How far would both sides be willing to 
climb up this escalation ladder? The United 
States, given its superior military capabili-
ties at every rung of escalation, can afford 
to wait for China to escalate before going 
tit-for-tat; for example, it can strike Chinese 
shores only after the Chinese strike U.S. 
bases. China will realize that the United 
States has full escalation dominance, and 
that it can probably win even after pre-emp-
tive strikes on U.S. assets – pre-emptive 
strikes would only serve to bring about 
a more protracted war and harden oth-
erwise ambiguous U.S. attitudes with a 
full-on casus belli. In this scenario, losing a 
war would be absolutely disastrous for the 
CCP, undermining its nationalistic claims of 
overseeing China’s rise on the world stage, 
at the same time its legitimacy is already 
being undermined by an economic slow-
down; running the risk of a fully escalated 
war would be unacceptable. 
The President would be fully aware that 
neither side wants the spiraling risks that 
kinetic escalation could bring. Therefore, he 
or she would most likely first order non-ki-
netic options to signal military resolve 
– for example, positioning carrier forma-
tions. If China escalated to a blockade, a 
convoy could be sent through, or a distant 
blockade imposed. The operation chosen 
would force China to be responsible for the 
first strike, a risk which the United States 
knows China would be hesitant to take. 
In the meanwhile, this graduated ladder 
of non-kinetic escalation could provide 
the time necessary to negotiate a diplo-
matic solution between all sides, while still 
demonstrating the seriousness of a U.S. 
defense commitment.
Domestic Opinion / Politics Dimension
Public opinion in the United States is 
strongly against any war over Taiwan. Since 
1982, surveys conducted by the Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs have found that 
no more than one third of Americans have 
ever advocated defending Taiwan from a 
Chinese invasion; only 26 percent of Ameri-
cans support it today. Of course, the polling 
numbers alone should not determine 
a U.S. response; after all, the same poll 
shows that only 47 percent of Americans 
support defending a clear-cut treaty ally, 
South Korea, against North Korean aggres-
sion. However, even in this context, support 
for defending Taiwan is strikingly low. Out 
of all scenarios polled, defending Taiwan 
against China received the least support on 
the list – even defending Ukraine, a country 
which has never had any type of defense 
relationship with the U.S., against further 
Russian invasion was more popular. The 
American population, as a whole, is grow-
ing more isolationist; the desire to “stay 
out of global affairs” is at its highest point 
since 1947. 60 Even if one assumes that a 
crisis could trigger war fever, one cannot 
expect too strong a wave of support: in the 
2003 Iraq invasion, the war fever case par 
excellence, support for the invasion only 
grew by 12 percent, from 54 percent before 
the September 11th attacks, to 64 percent 
on the eve of the war. 61 A corresponding 
12 percent boost in support for a war with 
China would bring support levels from 26 
percent to only 38 percent. 
Economic interdependence provides 
additional motive against domestic sup-
port for a war. China is the United States’ 
largest source of imports, and its third 
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS 91
C
H
IN
A STU
D
IES REVIEW
 vol 2  | 2016
90 Assessing the Decision Process Behind U.S. Military Intervention in a Cross-Strait Crisis
largest export market. 62 Commercial 
interests would likely be highly against 
a war that ruptures relations with China. 
But in any crisis context, the markets will 
have already plunged, having immedi-
ately priced in the increased political risks; 
therefore, businesses would be in favor of 
U.S. engagement to bring about a quick 
resolution of the issue and also enable nor-
malized ties and trade relations afterwards. 
One should not assume, though, that the 
dim public support for war over Taiwan 
and the concerns over economic stability 
would mean that American society would 
not support intervention. There is still a vast 
array of interests in the United States which 
are predisposed to view China negatively. 
As political science professors Andrew 
Nathan and Andrew Scobell have pointed 
out, “China’s political system elicits oppo-
sition from human rights organizations; 
its population-control policies anger the 
antiabortion movement; its repression of 
churches offends American Christians; 
its inexpensive exports trigger demands 
for protection from organized labor; its 
reliance on coal and massive dams for 
energy upsets environmental groups; and 
its rampant piracy and counterfeiting infu-
riate the film, software, and pharmaceutical 
industries. These specific complaints add 
strength to the broader fear of a ‘China 
threat,’ which permeates American polit-
ical discourse.” 63
Meanwhile, sympathy for Taiwan runs 
strong in the United States. Americans 
clearly see more of their values reflected 
in Taiwan, a freewheeling democracy, than 
in authoritarian China. Taiwan has also 
committed significant resources to actively 
shaping American attitudes: it has funded 
academic institutions and lobbyists to the 
tune of millions of dollars a year. 64 China, 
while also exerting its own resources on 
lobbying, has failed to achieve results any-
where nearly as successful. 65
These results for Taiwan are perhaps 
reflected most prominently in Congress. 
The Congressional House of Representa-
tives has long shown a bipartisan streak 
of sympathy and support for Taiwan. In 
2000, the House passed a Taiwan Security 
Enhancement Act, which would have for-
malized links between the United States 
and Taiwanese militaries, though it failed 
to pass the Senate. 66 As recently as 2013, 
Congressman J. Randy Forbes wrote a 
bipartisan letter to the Secretary of Defense 
calling Taiwan “our democratic ally,” and 
pressing for Taiwan to be invited to the 
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 multi-
national naval exercise. 67 In the event of 
the scenario’s outlined crisis, we can safely 
expect these same congressmen and con-
gresswomen to call for the United States 
to stand up against a bullying China and 
defend its democratic Taiwanese brethren. 
Any attempt to justify non-intervention, 
through pointing out Taiwan’s unilaterally 
provocative steps towards independence, 
would not convince these congressmen 
and congresswomen. As recently as the 
1990s, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich 
was asking, “Why don’t we just recognize 
Taiwan?” 68 Granted, the political situa-
tion has changed since the 1990s, when 
memories of the 1989 Tiananmen massa-
cres were still fresh – but it is not clear that 
Congressional attitudes towards China 
have improved since then, especially in the 
recent context of rising trade and South 
China Sea tensions. Of course, a strong 
isolationist contingent in Congress could 
cancel the anti-China and pro-Taiwan voices 
out; but it is important to recognize that 
legislators in support of Taiwan still retain a 
strong voice, perhaps stronger in Congress 
than among the general public.
Ultimately, it is difficult to arrive at a defin-
itive net assessment of public opinion 
and domestic politics; there are impe-
tuses towards both a policy of strong 
intervention, and total non-intervention. If 
the President wanted to sell either policy 
to Congress and to the American public, 
he or she could find plenty of means to 
appeal to both audiences – democratic 
values, anti-China sentiment and the vocal 
pro-Taiwan lobby in Congress to support 
intervention, or the low opinion poll num-
bers and overall isolationist mood to justify 
non-intervention. 
Should the President decide that he or 
she indeed is willing to risk war with 
China, there would be significant hur-
dles in engaging in pre-emptive military 
action against China–the President would 
need to obtain a Congressional authori-
zation for war against China, in the face 
of low polling support for war. However, 
non-kinetic military operations short of 
war, where assets are positioned to dare 
China to shoot the first shot, could offer the 
President a path around this dilemma; any 
Chinese first strike against American forces 
would almost certainly swing public opin-
ion strongly behind a war against China.
Ultimately, domestic opinion and politics 
do not give us strong predictive value on 
the President’s decision because of the 
cleavages on both sides and the diffi-
cult-to-forecast nature of national moods 
and media frenzies. Perhaps the most that 
can be said is that the President could 
attempt to placate both pro-Taiwan hawks 
and isolationists through a policy of strong 
diplomatic pressure against China while 
maintaining non-kinetic or other military 
operations that are below the threshold 
of war.  
Final Assessment and Conclusion
The analysis has shown that the legal 
dimension confers no obligation on the U.S. 
to act towards intervention or non-interven-
tion. The diplomatic dimension suggests 
that our allies want engagement, though 
not necessarily combat, and that neither 
the United States nor China would want 
escalation. The military/strategic dimension 
indicates there are good strategic reasons 
for defending Taiwan and that the United 
States would hold the overall upper hand 
in a conflict. War would be highly risky, 
and the United States has military options 
below the level of combat. Finally, domestic 
opinion and politics provides enough social 
impetus, both for and against intervention, 
that the President could craft a solid public 
messaging strategy to support the policy 
he or she chooses for diplomatic and 
strategic reasons.
Taking the cumulative implications of all 
these dimensions, I conclude that the Pres-
ident will most likely push the Taiwanese 
and Chinese hard for a diplomatic solution 
to the crisis, while ordering non-kinetic mil-
itary operations short of combat to signal 
the threat of American intervention. This 
would probably be enough to de-escalate 
the situation, given the United States’ dip-
lomatic leverage over Taiwan, and China’s 
reluctance to run risks in an unfavorable 
military situation.
However, in the unlikely, but still possible, 
scenario that push truly comes to shove – 
that China continues to militarily escalate 
the situation – would the U.S. President 
really be willing to commit the country to 
war against the world’s second most pow-
erful country, or even commit to non-kinetic 
actions that risk combat? The risks could 
be enormously high: economic crisis, and 
even a non-negligible possibility of mili-
tary defeat. There is no way to answer this 
with any certainty; it will depend on the 
President’s personal beliefs and tempera-
ment. However, this paper’s assessment is 
that diplomatic and strategic factors would 
incline the President towards at least risking 
combat, if not firing the first shot, due to the 
salience of the Taiwan issue to the overall 
alliance system in Asia, and the feeling that 
the Chinese would probably back down 
due to the risks involved.
This raises the question: what happens if 
strategic factors shift so that U.S. military 
capabilities no longer possess so-called 
escalation dominance over the Chinese – in 
other words, if U.S. shows of resolve, daring 
China to shoot the first shot, become more 
likely to trigger a Chinese acceptance of 
combat? In such a situation, the President’s 
willingness to take any form of military 
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